KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-The petitioner who is a retired Superin--tendent of Police is involved in case under sections 148/1491,452/366/376, 365/464/363/362/336, P. P. C. As per F. I. R. Registered at Police Station, Jhelum City, on 18-8-1978, on a written complaint of the Assistant Commissioner, Jhelum. The petitioner applied for bail before arrest by Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 3300-B of 1978 which was rejected by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 28-8- 1978. The petitioner was taken into custody whereafter he again approached the High Court for bail vide Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 3672-B of 1978 which met the same fate and was dismissed by the same learned Single Judge on 30-9-1978. Against the last-mentioned order the petitioner filed a Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 411 of 1978 which was dismissed by this Court on 19-10-1978.
2. It may be mentioned that in the earlier pre-arrest bail petition, the petitioner had taken up a plea that in this case the F. I. R. Was registered at the instance of and investigation was directed by the Assistant Commissioner after he had made certain inquiry under order of the Deputy Commissioner to whom an application had been made trial the police had ransacked the house of one Muhammad Shafi and abducted his family members. It was pleaded that the inquiry held by the Assistant Commissioner was a ".`judicial inquiry" of the type of an inquiry in a "complaint case" whereafter he should have proceeded on the judicial side under section 200 of the Cr. P. C. And could not have directed the registration of an F. I. R. Or investigation of the case. This plea was repelled by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court as indicated above on 28-8-1978. In the second bail application which was filed after arrest, this plea was again taken up but appears not to have been pressed. Similarly in the criminal petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 411 of 1978, this plea was specifically raised as per its para. 10 (F) but at the time of arguments was not pressed before us. It appears that the petitioner had on this matter filed a separate petition for quashing of the F. I. R. In the High Court, being Writ Petition No. 4411 of 1978 under Article 199 of the Constitution which was dismissed by the learned Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court in Chambers on 21-11-1978. The petitioner has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal against the same.
3. The petition is not accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment of the learned Chief Justice but the learned counsel has requested that we should hear this case without that copy. He has not also placed on record a copy of the High Court order dated 28-8-1978 in the earlier pre-arrest bail wherein this point was repelled. In the circumstances there was no justification to entertain this petition without a copy of the relevant orders but the learned counsel submitted that the case against his client had been transferred to a Military Court and was fixed for trial on 26-11-1978, therefore, filing of the certified copy of the presently impugned order may be dispensed with especially when its copy has not been provided to his client so far. We have taken up this case in view of the special exigency above-mentioned though we must observe that there was no justification on the part of the petitioner as not to place on record a copy of the High Court order dated 28-8-1978 which according to his own shoving dealt with the point in band and reasoning whereof was followed by the learned Chief Justice in the presently impugned order.
4. Coming to the merits of the present petition learned counsel repeated the same plea which has been mentioned above regarding the alleged illegality in the registration of the case. He has argued that the learned Magistrate in the instant case, in pursuance of a direction of the learned District Magistrate "to inquire" had "taken cognizance" of the offence, and had proceeded to make inquiry by taking down statements of certain persons. After having done so, it was not open for the Magistrate to have directed registration of a case or investigation by police. This raises a question as to what amounts to taking cognizance of an offence. As pointed out in R. R. Chari v. The State (AIR 1951 SC 207) "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190 (l) (a), Criminal Procedure Code he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this chapter-proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this chapter but for taking action of some other kind e.g. Ordering investigation under section 156 (3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence." To the same strain are Badshah Mia and others v. The State (PLD 1958 Dacca 598) and Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavadas v. The State of West Bengal (AIR-1959 SC 1118). In the later case it was held at page 1123 that "as to when cognizance is taken of an offence will depend upon the facts and circum--stances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuing of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that purpose cannot by themselves be regarded as acts by which cognizance was taken of an offence. Obviously, it is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceedings under section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under section 204 of Chapter XVII of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and therefore had taken cognizance." Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts and the circumstances of the present case it will be evident that the Assistant Commissioner had not proceeded with any "complaint" or any case in any "judicial capacity". The DeputyCommissioner had received an information regarding certain alleged highhandedness of the police and disturbance of law and order in hi executive capacity. He directed the Assistant Commissioner to enquiry into the matter.
The Assistant Commissioner enquired into the matter in that capacity and after noticing that the facts disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence, he directed the S. H. O., Police Station, City Jhelum, to register a case. Learned counsel has not been able to show an law which prevented him from doing so. Subsection (3) of section 15 of the Criminal Procedure Code clearly lays down that "any Magistrate empowered under section 90 may order such investigation as above mentioned".
This may be read with section 23 of the Police Act V of 1861 which is headed as "Duties of Police Officers", and so far as relevant lays down that "it shall be the duty of every Police Officer promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him by any competent authority ....
To detect and bring offenders to justice and to apprehend all persons whom he is legally authorised to apprehend, and for whose apprehension sufficient ground exists . . . ." The registration of the case on the part of the S. H. O. Concerned being thus quite in the ambit of the provisions of the aforesaid law no exception can be validly taken against the same before us. It may hereby pointed out that the only restriction placed by the Code of Criminal Procedure on the sort of persons who can complain of the commission of an offence, in order that action may be taken thereon, according to law, are those contained in Chapter XV, sections 195 to 199 that is to say in cases of breach of contract, defamation and offences against marriage falling under Chapter XIX or XXI of the Penal Code which lay down that only a "person aggrieved" concerned in the matter can move. Similarly in cases relating to adultery or enticing a married woman, the "husband or some person having the care of such woman" should make a complaint. It is also laid down in section 197, that prosecutions against specified public servants shall not be entertained without the previous sanction of the appropriate Government. (For detailed reference on the subject see sections 195 to 199-A, Criminal Procedure Code). Barring these or any other specific restriction, any person can set the law in motion, and that may take the form as well of a complaint in Court as an information lodged with the Police. The latter would proceed under section 154 if the offence were cognizable and under section 155, if non-cognizable. It is thus quite clear that any person aware of the commission of an offence may set the law in motion even though he is not personally injured or affected by the offence. The rule is that, if a general law is broken, any person has a right to complain whether he has suffered any particular injury or not. The right to report of the violation of law belongs, unless expressly restricted, to every member C of the public including a Magistrate.
On the facts and in the circumstances of this case as above explained and as there was no restriction on the part of the Magistrate to act in a particular manner in his executive capacity, his direction for registration and investigation of the case cannot be taken exception to. The petition has no merit and is dismissed