JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.---This revision petition filed by the petitioner/plaintiff, namely, Abdul Sami Butt impugns the concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned trial Court, dated 13-5- 1996 and 24-2-1997 passed by the learned Appellate Court, whereby his suit seeking declaration of title to the suit-land measuring 1 Kanal, 14 Marlas, was dismissed.
2. The facts of this case are relatively straightforward. The land in question was resumed by the Government under Martial Law Regulation No.115 from its original owner. It was granted to one Ghulam Muhammad on 23-12-1978 under the Land Reforms Act, 1977. Ghulam Muhammad sold the land to one Abdul Razzaq vide Mutation No.9011, who in turn, sold it to Mst. Rashida Begum through a registered sale-deed. Mutation No.13075, dated 3-3-1981 was duly sanctioned in favour of Mst.
Rashida Begum. Thereafter, the said Mst. Rashida Begum sold the land to the petitioner again by means of a registered sale-deed which was recorded in Mutation No.29760 sanctioned on 6-2- 1989. These facts are not disputed.
3. Thereafter, on 15-1-1990, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order directing the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) to cancel the grant made in favour of Ghulam Muhammad. This was done by the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation), who proceeded to cancel the grant vide order, dated 12-2-1990. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, dated 15-1-1990 and or the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) dated 12-2-1990 were wholly illegal, firstly, because they were not competent to cancel the grant and, secondly, because even if they were competent, they could not have cancelled the grant without affording an adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It was also contended that in the facts and circumstances of this case, cancellation of the grant could not have been ordered because of the conduct of the concerned Government functionaries, who through their own acts and omissions enabled the purchasers of the suit-land to acquire unencumbered title in the same.
4. The contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner, noted above, are well-founded. The learned Appellate Court has observed that it was not necessary to give a hearing .To the petitioner/plaintiff before resuming the land. This observation appears to have been based on the provisions of section 16(2) of the Land Reforms Act, 1977. This legal provision merely stipulates that the Provincial Land Commission may cancel a grant of land for breach of any of its terms after giving an opportunity of being heard to the grantee or his heirs. It is obvious from a bare reading of section 16(2) that it applies where title continues to vest in the grantee or his heirs. Section 16(2) does not, in any manner, dispense with the provisions of natural justice where the grantee has actually transferred the land to a bona fide purchaser for value. In the circumstances, the learned Appellate Court misdirected itself and exercised its jurisdiction illegally by holding that it was not necessary to give a notice to the petitioner before resuming the land.
5. The circumstances of this case bring to the fore another important issue. The Land Reforms Act was administered by the Provincial Land Commission. The Chairman of the Commission was a Member of the Punjab Board of Revenue. The Land Commission and the Board of Revenue, as such, were responsible for ensuring that restrictive c covenants, if any, attaching to the grant of land under the Land Reforms Act, 1977, were duly noted in the Revenue Record. The evidence on record shows that this was not done. Upon a specific question addressed to him, learned counsel for the respondents acknowledged that there was no document exhibited on record from which it could be ascertained that the restrictive covenant attaching to the grant of land in favour of Ghulam Muhammad had been noted in the Revenue Record. In the circumstances, the successive transferees of the land, mentioned in para.2 above, could not have had any notice of the restrictions imposed on the grant made in favour of Ghulam Muhammad. The respondents, as such, were themselves responsible for creating circumstances which would mislead a bona fide purchaser such as the present petitioner. The respondents, therefore, are estopped from resuming the land. This estoppel is not an estoppel against the law but an estoppel based on the circumstances narrated in this paragraph, which have induced the successive purchasers, including the present petitioner, into purchasing the land on the assumption that title to the same vested absolutely in the previous owner.
6. Yet another aspect of the case is that the vendor from whom the petitioner purchased the land, namely, Mst. Rashida Begum was quite clearly the ostensible owner of the land in question.
Mutation No.13075 dated 3-3-1981 was duly sanctioned in her favour. This mutation did not include any indication that the land was granted subject to restrictive covenants and could not be sold.
The petitioner was only obliged to undertake due diligence to ascertain from the Revenue Record if Mst. Rashida Begum was, indeed, the owner of the land. This obviously was done by the petitioner.
According to the available evidence, the four essential ingredients of section 41 of' the Transfer of Property Act stood fulfilled in the present case. In the circumstances, the title of the petitioner could not have been defeated.
7. It would be strange indeed if the respondents were to be, allowed to defeat the title of a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration when they themselves have contributed in creating the impression that there was no cloud or encumbrance on the title of the successive purchasers of the land in question.
8. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the learned Courts below have acted illegally in the exercise of their jurisdiction. Their judgments and decrees, as such, are not legally sustainable. The same,, therefore, are set aside. The petitioner having produced sufficient evidence on F record to prove his case and there being documentary evidence in rebuttal, is entitled to the declaratory decree prayed for by him. His suit, therefore, is decreed as prayed for.