' RAHMAT HUSSAIN JAFFERI, J...--This judgment will dispose of above two appeals as common questions of facts and law are involved.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellants were permanent employees of the respondents. On 13-5-1997 the respondents dismissed the appellants and such order was served upon them on the same date. It is alleged by the appellants that on 11-8-1997 they delivered the grievance notices at the gate of the respondents' factory which were received by the gatekeeper but no written receipt was given to them. On 12-8-1997 they sent grievance notices to the respondents, which were served upon them. They replied the said notices which were found unsatisfactory therefore they filed two separate grievance petitions before the Labour Court. On 10-4-1998 the Labour Court gave separate decisions in both the grievances petitions by holding that the grievances A notices were not served within time as required by section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance (I.R.0.), 1969 therefore the grievances petitions were dismissed. The appellants challenged the said decisions before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi. Both the petitions were allowed. The cases were remanded to the Labour Court to record the evidence of postal authorities on the point of service of grievances notices upon the respondents and then the point of limitation should be decided. After the remand of the cases the Labour Court recorded the statement of postal official.
According to his evidence the grievances notices were served upon the respondents on 20-8-1997.
The Labour Court after going through the evidence and hearing the parties counsel against formed the similar opinion therefore the grievances petitions were dismissed under the impugned decisions.
3. I have heard the parties Advocates and perused the record of this case very carefully. The learned Advocate for the appellants has argued that the grievances notices were issued on 12-8- 1997 but the same were served on 20-8-1997 because the respondents did not accept the notices before that date therefore the appellants cannot be held responsible for the acts of respondents which were done with mala fide intention in order to make the grievances notices time-barred. He has further stated that under section 65-B of I.R.O. 1969 the delay in serving the notice can be condoned and for that purpose the appellants had filed applications under section 5 of Limitation Act but the Labour Court did not condone the delay though sufficient cause was shown in the applications. He has requested that the delay if any in serving the notice upon the respondents may be condoned. He has further stated that the grievances petitions before the Labour Court were filed within time as such if the notices were found to be barred by limitation then the grievances petitions can be decided on merits.
4. Conversely the learned Advocate for the respondents has stated that the pre-condition for filing the grievance petition is the service of notice within three months from the date of cause of action; that the cause of action accrued to the appellants on 13-5-1997 therefore the grievances notices should have been served upon the respondents on 12-8-1997 but the same have not been served as the notices were served on 20-8-1997; that the delay in sending the grievance notices cannot be condoned as no sufficient cause has been shown; that the grievance petitions before the Labour Court were within time but the same were not maintainable as no grievance notices were served within the required time as such he has supported the impugned decisions of the Labour Court.
5. I have given due consideration to the arguments, gone through the material available on the record and found that under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 the appellants were required to serve a grievance notice upon the respondents within three months from the date of cause of action.
Admittedly the appellants' services were terminated and such communication was made to them on 13-5-1997 as such cause of action accrued to them on the said date therefore the grievances notices were required to be served within three months of the said date. Admittedly the notices were served upon the respondents on 20-8-1997 as such the said notices are time-barred.
6. Under section 65-B of I.R.O., 1969, section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made applicable therefore the appellants had made an application for condoning the delay. Under section 5 of Limitation Act a delay can be condoned for a sufficient cause shown by the party. In the present case the appellants in the said applications stated that they were poor workers therefore they had no money to engage an Advocate; that when they engaged Advocate he informed them that the last date for service of the grievance notice was 12-8-1997; that they prepared the notices on 9-8- 1997; that they delivered the notices at the gate of the factory of respondents but no written receipt was given; that they contacted their Advocate who informed them that the notices might be sent by registered post A/D receipt; and that thereafter the notices were sent through registered post.
7. I have considered the explanation furnished by the appellants, evidence available on the record and found that no evidence was led to prove the assertions of the appellants that they had delivered the grievance notices at the gate, except their own statements. The appellants did not show the date on which they engaged Advocate. However it has been established that it was before 9-8-1997. The appellants and their Advocate in their affidavits have suppressed such date which clearly shows that the appellants have not come to the Court with clean hands therefore it has adversely affected their explanation. Under the law the appellants are required to furnish sufficient cause for condoning the delay. "Sufficient cause" means, the situation beyond the control of the party. Reference is invited to a case of Khadija Begum v. Yasmin, PLD 2001 SC 355. The cause shown by the appellants is not such which can come within the definition of sufficient course. The Labour Court also formed such opinion which is based upon the evidence available on the record as such the said findings does not required any interference.
8. The learned Advocate for the appellants has argued that the date of service of notice may be taken as the date of sending the notices; that the said date from the postal receipt shows as 12-8- 1997. In this connection I may point out that the law does not permit to take the date mentioned in the postal receipt as service of notice but the date of service of notice can be taken to be the date on which the notice would be delivered to the addressee in the ordinary course of post. It is pertinent to point out that under section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 a notice which is required to be served by post under a statute, the date of service of such notice is the date on with the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The said section reads as under:--
27. Meaning of service by post. When any central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" on either of the expressions" give" or any other expression is used, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been affected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the order the course or post."
9. Thus under section 27 of the General Clauses Act when the date of posting the letter cannot be taken as the date of service of notice then how in the present case the date of posting the notices, (on which date the notice was delivered to the postal authorities and they issued such receipt) can be taken to be the date of service when particularly it is not the statutory obligation that the grievance notice be served through post. In such cases the date of service of grievance notice would be the date on which the notice would be delivered, in the due course of post to the addressee on his correctly mentioned address containing the letter. As such the arguments of the learned Advocate for the appellants are without any force.
10. For filing the grievance petition before the Labour Court one of the prerequisites is service of grievance notice upon the respondents. Reference is invited to Prince Glass Works Ltd. v. Jafar, 1980 PLC 373 and S.W.H Jafferi v. Mohammad Salim Shaikh, 1980 LLC 375. As the grievance notice have not been served upon the respondents within the time as provided under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 nor the appellants have furnished sufficient cause for condoning the delay in sending the grievance notices therefore the petitions were not maintainable before the Labour Court.
11. I have also examined the impugned decisions of the Labour Court but could not find any irregularity or illegality in the said decisions therefore they do not require any interference.
Consequently the Appeals are dismissed.