Petitioners are aggrieved of the judgments and a decrees dated 26-7-2003 of learned Senior Civil Judge, Mansehra and that of the learned District Judge, Mansehra dated 14-1-2004. The former granted temporary injunction in a pending suit while the latter confirmed the same in appeal.
2. Arguments heard. Record perused.
3. Prior to the impugned order temporary injunction was allowed, appeal against that was filed before the District Judge but during pendency of the appeal the statutory life of the same as laid down in Rule (2B) of Order XXXIX, C.P.C. Had expired by then, thus appeal was treated infructuous but the respondents re-applied for grant of temporary injunction to the trial 'Court which was allowed and is the subject-matter of this petition.
4. The learned counsel for the .Petitioners contended that the second order extending the temporary injunction has also spent out its statutory life of six months and being no more in the field, hence this petition be disposed of on this legal proposition. To the contrary learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs was of the view that after expiry of the first six months period for which the initial order of temporary injunction was passed, the second order called the extension of injunction would ipso facto amount to confirmation of the same till the disposal of the suit and the same is effective/operative in the field.
5. For understanding the true legal import of the said provision it is reproduced below:-- "Order XXXIX, Rule (2-B).--The order of the injunction made under rules 1 and 2 after hearing the parties or after notice to defendant shall cease to have effect on the expiration of six months unless extended by the Court after hearing the parties again and for reasons to be recorded for such extension: Provided that report of such extension shall be submitted to the High Court."
6. The law maker has introduced (rule 2-B) with the object to suppress the mischief of delay in the disposal of those cases in which temporary injunctions are granted. The outer limits of six months, i,e, the terminus provided for the initial order Of injunction is with the object to place an embargo on the powers of the Courts granting temporary injunction in pending cases for indefinite period so to ensure the speedy disposal of such cases. Additionally, the amendments introduced were with the view that the beneficiary of it may not misuse the same by protracting the litigation a fact judicially noticed by the Courts in the past. The proviso to rule (2-B) has further laid emphasis that copy of the order extending temporary injunction shall be submitted to the High Court which is a further check on the discretionary powers of the subordinate Courts. Again the aim and object behind it is that District Courts shall decide those cases in which temporary injunctions are granted as quickly as possible. After the enactment of rule (2-B) the extension of temporary injunction is no more a matter of routine and it cannot be done in the old fashion. The Court while extending the same shall have to record sound reasons and copy of the same is to be essentially sent to the High Court for information. The absolute discretion earlier vested in the said Courts has thus been taken away. We have noticed with concern that ordinarily copies of such orders are not sent to the High Court which amounts to a clear violation of the mandatory provision of rule (2-B), C.P.C. Non-compliance therewith would render such order legally defective and susceptible to interference in appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
All the subordinate Courts, therefore, are required to send copy Of the order extending the temporary injunction each time to the High Court without fail.
7. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the phrase/word "extension" used in the provision of rule (2-B) shall be construed confirmation of the initial order of temporary injunction shall operate and be effective pending disposal of the case is based on misconception of the law. The word "extension" according to the dictionary definition means "to stretch out, to prolong, to enlarge, to expand, to widen". According to the Blacks Law Dictionary centennial addition 1891-1991 word "extension" means any increase in length of time specified in the contract, lease, enlargement of main body, addition of something similar that to which it is attached, to cause to reach or continue as from point to point, to lengthen or prolong, extension of time for performing an act that is otherwise to be done within time specified by the Court rule or order in civil actions.
8. The word "extension" has been issued by the law maker in Rule (2-B) with an definite object to which no different meaning widening its scope can be given because such a construction would certainly defeat the very purpose for the achievement of which the said rule was enacted. The manifest intention behind the same is that the granting temporary injunction for an indefinite period as was done in the past has been done away and by now it is to be regulated by periodical extension so that tendency of granting temporary injunction in a routine manner for unlimited period without deciding the main case is to be curbed/suppressed. The change has introduced a new system of dispensation of quick justice with a proper discipline to be maintained by the subordinate Courts while granting and extending temporary injunction.
9.. The word "confirm or confirmation" have altogether different meaning and connotation. These words mean to give permanency to an interim order, to establish, to ratify, to verify, to assume, to admit to full communion Thus on plain reading and perusal keeping in view the dictionary meaning referred to above no different view can be formed except that the extension of temporary injunction on the expiry of the initial period of six months is an extension and in no case shall exceed six months. The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent is not tenable being based on misconception of law and being devoid of sanction of law.
For the above stated reasons, therefore it is held that the impugned order through which temporary injunction has been extended was only for six months albeit it is not specifically mentioned therein and on the above analogy and construction of the rule the impugned order has spent out its statutory life, thus is no more operative and effective in the field and is not existing, thus this petition has become infructuous and is accordingly disposed of.
10. Before parting with the judgment the District Courts are emphatically directed to intimate/send copy of the order extending temporary injunction to the High Court strictly complying with the proviso to Rule (2-B) of Order XXXIX. It is also emphasized that while granting extension in the injunction order under the above rule the Court shall record sound reasons for the same and shall also consider its own contribution in the delay of disposal of the main case as well as of the patties particularly of the beneficiary of the order. In case the beneficiary of the order is found indulging in delaying tactics by protracting the trial in the main case that can be considered as a disentitling factor for extension of the temporary injunction order. Whenever the Court for valid reason extends the initial order of injunction then the main case shall be given priority for disposal and before the expiry of the extended period the Court shall decide the main case in all circumstances.