' SYED JAMSHED ALI, J.---Respondent No,1 filed a grievance petition under section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (No,XCI), 2002, (herein referred to as the Ordinance), before the learned Labour Court No,5, Sargodha (Camp at Jhang). In this Constitutional petition assumption of jurisdiction by the said learned Labour Court has been questioned on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. The facts of the case are noted hereunder.
2. Respondent No,1 was posted as Accountant (Officer Grade III), in the Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd.
Chak Noor Shah branch, District Jhang where disciplinary proceedings were initiated and concluded against him at that place. He was transferred to Faisalabad on 16-1-2002, where order dated 29-5-2002, under the signatures of Secretary, Disciplinary Action Committee, Central office Karachi, was served upon him whereby he was dismissed from service. After addressing a grievance notice, he filed a grievance petition before the learned Labour Court No,5, Sargodha (camp at Jhang). The petitioner moved an application under Order VII rifle 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 4-3-2003, objecting to the territorial jurisdiction of the said learned Labour Court. This application was dismissed by the learned Labour Court No,5, Jhang vide order dated 25-4-2003, on the ground that the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the said learned Labour Court. A judgment of this Court in Muhammad Khalil v. The President Bolan Bank Limited (2000 PLC 323) was relied upon.
3. The learned counsel of the petitioner had questioned correctness of the view taken by a learned Single Judge in the case of Muhammad Khalil (supra). Since the controversy raised a question of public importance, the matter was referred to the Honourable Chief Justice for constitution of a Division Bench. This is how this writ petition is being heard by this Bench.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the notification dated 14-6-1995, issued by the Govt. Of Punjab in the Labour and Manpower Department under section 35 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, (since repealed and enacted as section 44 of the. Ordinance), which defines the territorial jurisdiction of said learned Labour Courts Nos.4 and 5 respectively as Civil Districts of Faisalabad and Toba Tek Singh and Civil Districts of Jhang, Sargodha, Mianwalai, Bhakkar and Khushab and submits that since on the date of passing of the impugned order of dismissal respondent No,1, was posted at Faisalabad, the learned Labour Court No,4, Faisalabad, alone had the jurisdiction in the mater. He contends that jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court is to be determined by the special law i.e, the Ordinance and not by the Code of Civil Procedure which stands excluded by virtue of section 4 of the said Code. He elaborated his submission by referring to Standing Order No, 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Establishments (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, to contend that a dismissed workmen can only question the order of dismissal and at no stage prior to the order of dismissal he has any remedy under the Ordinance. According to him section 46 of the Ordinance contemplates a notice to the employer within one month of the day on which "cause of such grievance arises" and then a workman can approach the learned Labour Court. According to his reading of the said provision, the cause of grievance arose in this case when order of dismissal was passed against respondent No,1 and since on the said date he was posted at Faisalabad, the learned Labour Court No,5, had no jurisdiction in the matter. He contends that "cause of action" in section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code is not synonymous with the cause ofgrievance contemplated by section 46. Reference was also made to sections 9,12,31,33, and 35 of the Ordinance to contend that the Ordinance is a self contained code and no other law was relevant to determine territorial jurisdiction of a Labour Court. It is further contended that a special law overrides the general law, and even though under section 45(2) of the Ordinance, the learned Labour Court has all the powers of a Civil Court yet filing of a petition before the learned Labour Court relates to a matter of procedure and territorial jurisdiction is to be determined with reference to the special law, i.e, the Ordinance. He maintains that while deciding the case of Muhammad Khalid (supra) this Court did not consider the provisions of the Ordinance, and solely on the basis of section 36 of I.R.O. 1969, (enacted as section 45 of the Ordinance), applied section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure to hold that a grievance petition could be filed at a place where cause of action had arisen. He submits that the rule laid 'down in the case of Muhammad Khalil supra, therefore, requires reconsideration. In support of his submission reliance was placed on Baz Muhammad v. Chairman, Balochistan Labour Appellate Tribunal, Quetta and others (1998 SCMR 1203), Muhammad Yar Buttar and 4 others v. Board of Governors, Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, Islamabad and another (1999 SCMR 819), Mustehlcum Cement Limited through Managing, Director v. Abdul Rashid and others (1998 SCMR 644), Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Salem (1994 SCMR 2213), Sardar Balbir .Singh v. Atma Ram Srivastava (AIR 1977 Allahabad 211), Messrs Rah-e-Menzil Transport and others v. Muhammad Ameen (PLD 198 (W.P.) Karachi 182), Imdad Ali v. Managing Director, Passco and othes (1997 CLC 686), Syed Muhammad Hussain v. Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. And another (PLD 1980 SC 80), Muhammad Siddiq and another v. Zawar Hussain Abidi and others (PLJ 1976 SC 493), Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Second Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another 1973 PLC 111), Federal Bank for Cooperatives, Islamabad v. Ehsan Muhammad (2004 SCMR 130), Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v.
Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others (1996 PLC (C.S.) 702), and Messrs Wah Industries Limited, Wah Cantt, District Rawalpindi v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal Lahore and 2 others (1998 PLC 1).
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No,1 maintains that since neither the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial. Establishments Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 nor the Ordinance, specify the manner to determine territorial jurisdiction for filing a grievance petition by a workmen, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable. He submits that the charge-sheet was served on the petitioner while he was posted at Jhang and even the B inquiry was concluded while he was posted there, the dismissal orderwas conveyed from Karachi and mere posting of respondent No,1 at Faisalabad, will not give jurisdiction to the learned Labour Court, Faisalabad, because neither any proceedings were taken at Faisalabad nor the dismissal order was, passed within the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court, Faisalabad. He submits that case of grievance was against the inquiry initiated and concluded against respondent No,1, at Jhang, therefore, the said learned Labour Court had the territorial jurisdiction in the matter. He referred to the definition of "cause of action" and "grievance" from Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, definition of "cause of action" from the Law Lexicon and the definition of "cause" and "grievance" from the Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Volume No,6) to contend that "cause of grievance" contemplated by section 46 and "cause of action" are synonymous and the case of Muhammad Khalil (supra) had correctly been decided. He also submits that the Ordinance is a beneficial legislation and, therefore, was required to be interpreted in a beneficial manner to advance the remedy. Reliance was placed on Lahore Development Authority v. Abdul Shafique (PLD 2000 SC 207).
5-A. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties have been considered. The main contention of the learned counsel is that the Ordinance is a complete Code and for determining territorial jurisdiction of a learned Labour Court, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be applied. The relevant provisions for answering the question are Sections 44, 45 and 46 of the Ordinance. Sections 9,12, 31, 33 and 35 and Standing Order 12(3) have no bearing on the question required to be answered.
6. Before the question is adverted to the provisions of sections 9,12,31,33 and 35, my be noted, section 9 provides for registration of Trade Unions, section 12 authorizes cancellation of registration of Trade Unions, section 31 relates to strikes and lock outs while according to section 33, a collective bargaining agent or an employer, may apply, to the Labour Court for the redressal of any grievance or enforcement of any rights guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement. This provision not only, does not provide for determination of territorial jurisdiction of a Labour Court but also that it does not provide for redressal of an individual grievance of a workman. According to section 35 no industrial dispute shall be deemed to exist unless it has been raised in the prescribed manner by a collective bargaining agent or an employer. The manner to bring 'an industrial dispute has been provided in the Ordinance. It is not relevant as far as redressal of an individual grievance is concerned for which the relevant provision is section 46 of the Ordinance.
7. The relevant provisions for sections 44, 45 and 46 of the Ordinance are reproduced for ready reference.
S.44. Labour Court.---(1) A Provincial Government may, in consultation with the. Chief Justice of the respective High Court, by notification in the official Gazette, establish as many Labour Courts as it considers necessary and, where it establishes more than one Labour Court, shall specify in the notification the territorial limits within which or the industry or the classes of case in respect of which, each one of them shall exercise jurisdiction under this Ordinance."
S.45(2) A Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested. In such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act V of 1908); including the powers of--
(a) compelling the production of documents and material objects; and
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects; and
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents.
S.46. Redress of individual grievance.---(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop Steward or collective, bargaining agent, within one month of the day of which cause of such grievance arises.
(2) Where a worker brings his grievance to the notice of an employer himself or through his Shop Steward or collective bargaining agent, the employer shall, within fifteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the worker.
(3) If an employer fails to communicate a decision within the periodpecified in sub section (2) or if a worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worer or Shop Steward may take the matter to his collective bargaining agent or the Labour Court, as the case may be, and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court, it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the mater being brought before it as if such' matter were an industrial dispute."
Standing Order No,12 (3): "The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance."
8. None of the above provisions prescribes as to how territorial jurisdiction of a learned Labour Court is to be determined. Reading the aforesaid provisions together it is clear that a dismissed workman cane. Approach the learned Labour Court, against a "cause of grievance". The question, therefore, is that whether a cause of grievance is the same thing as "cause of action" to determine the territorial jurisdiction. "Cause of action" and "grievance" have been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary as under:- "Cause of action.---The fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial redress or relief against another. The legal effect of an occurrence in terms of redress to a party to the occurrence. A situation or state of facts which would entitle party to sustain action and give him right to seek a judicial remedy in his behalf. Thompson v. Zurich Ins. Co., D.C. Minn., 309 F.Supp. 1178, 1181, Fact, or a state of facts, to which law sought to be enforced against a person or thing applies. Facts which give rise to one or more relations of right duty between two or more persons. Failure to perform legal obligation to do, or refrain from performance of, some act. Matter for which action may be maintained. Unlawful violation or invasion of right. The right which a party has to institute a judicial proceedings. (underlining, is ours).
Grievance "In labour law, a complaint filed by an employee, or by his or her union representative, regarding working conditions and for resolution of which there is procedural machinery provided in the union contract. An injury, injustice or wrong which gives ground for complaint because it is unjust, discriminatory, and oppressive."
' A 'grievance' has also been defined in the Words and Phrases permanent Edition Volume 6 as under: Grievance.
A "grievance" to give a person a right to an appeal frbm the decision or doings of any school committee, district meeting, or trustees, does not imply a wrong growing out of some infraction of law or a litigated question of right. A deprivation of school privileges is a grievance.
' A "grievance" is an injury or a wrong done which gives ground for complaint because it is unjust and oppressive, and a "party aggrieved" is one who suffers from injustice. "Persons aggrieved" are those who suffer some special injury different from that which affects them and the public generally.
' The definitions of "cause of action" and "grievance" connote a right action. The accepted meaning of the "cause of action" as whole bundle of facts which would entitle a party to sustain action and give him right to seek judicial remedy. Therefore, "right of action" necessarily includes cause of action. In fact it is the cause of action which gives a right of action and is, therefore, the "cause of grievance". In this case not only the charge-sheet was served on the petitioner when he was posted at Jhang but the inquiry was also concluded at Jhang. The order of dismissal was the culmination of the inquiry against respondent No,1 and the entire proceedings taken against respondent No,1 gave him cause of the grievance within the contemplation of section 46 of the Ordinance. Therefore, the contention that cause of action arose only on the dismissal of respondent No,1 is not acceptable.
9. We have also noticed that the impugned order was not passed within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court Faisalabad, it was only conveyed to respondent No,1 while he was posted at Faisalabad. Since neither the impugned order was passed at Faisalabad nor any proceedings were taken against respondent No,1 at Faisalabad, the learned Labour Court at Faisalabad did not have the jurisdiction in the matter and respondent No,1 had rightly invoked the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court at Jhang.
10. There could not be any dispute with the ptoposition that a special law overrides a general law.
However, the principle will only E apply when there is an express provision in a special law to the contrary. We have not been able to find an express provision in the Ordinance prescribing the manner in which territorial jurisdiction of a Labour Court is to be determined. According to section 45 of the said Ordinance, a Labour Court is deemed to be a Civil Court with all the powers of the Civil Court. Filing of a lis before a learned Labour Court is not merely a matter of procedure, it is referable and includes the power of a learned Labour Court to take cognizance of a lis brought before it. Although section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code saves a special or local law but to exclude the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of determination of territorial jurisdiction there had to be a specific provision in the Ordinance while according to section 141 of the C.P.C. The procedure in the said Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. The nature of jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court is civil and in the absence of any specific provision in the Ordinance, section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to determine territorial jurisdiction of a learned Labour Court. There is force in the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No,1 that the Ordinance, is a beneficial legislation and has to be interpreted with the same object. It may also be noted that in case of doubt, if any, (although we have none) the provisions of the Ordinance have to be interpreted in favour of the workmen.
Another principle of interpretation which does not admit of any doubt is that it should be so interpreted to advance remedy and to suppress a mischief. The vice in the view canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if it is accepted, it will provide a device to the employer to frustrate the remedy available to a dismissed worker. To illustrate we may refer to the case of Muhammad Khalid (supra) in which the employee of a Bank while posted at Faisalabad was charge-sheeted, and even the inquiry was held at Faisalabad and then he was transferred to Quetta where termination order was served on him'. A workman residing and posted at Rawalpindi in a Bank may be transferred to Karachi after completion of an inquiry where the dismissal order is served upon him. In that case it will be extremely difficult for him to file a grievance petition at Karachi. Such a workman may not have adequate resources to prosecute his grievance petition at Karachi. Therefore, a Labour Court will have jurisdiction in the matter where cause of action arises.
We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the case of Muhammad Khalid (supra) was correctly decided.
12. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner proceed on their own facts. These have, however, been examined. In the case of Baz Muhammad (supra), the petitioner, a Wapda employee, had approached the learned Labour Court. An objection to the jurisdiction was raised but was repelled by the learned Labour Court. The order was set aside by the learned Appellate Tribunal. The learned Baluchistan High Court maintained the said order which was upheld by the Honourable Supreme Court.
13. In the case of Muhammad Yar Buttar (supra), the employees of Oversees Pakistani Foundation had assailed show-cause notices, in appeals before the learned Federal Service Tribunal, which were dismissed by the learned Tribunal and the order was maintained by the Honourable Supreme Court.
14. In the case of Mustehkum Cement Limited (supra), the grievance petition of the workman was dismissed without considering the merits and the order was maintained in appeal by the learned labour Appellate Tribunal. The learned Peshawar High Court, however, interfered in the matter. The contention before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan was that the workman was employed in supervisory and managerial capacity and could not invoke jurisdiction of the labour Court.
' The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan interfered in the matter- on the ground that the learned High Court could not decide the petition on merits and the case was remanded to the learned Labour Court.
15. The case of Port of Trustees of Karachi (supra), primarily pertains to the role of a precedent. In this case an observation was also made that a workman who was dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment was not a workman unless his dismissal and discharge had connection with or was in consequence of an industrial dispute.
16. In the case of Sardar Balbir Singh (supra), the Full Bench of the Lakhnow High Court was considering the provisions, of Order II Rules 2,3 & 4 of the Civil Procedure Code and the observation made was that "cause of action" was distinguishable from "right of action" and the two expressions were not synonymous. A "right of action" was, however, explained in the said judgment as: "a right to presently enforce a cause of action a---remedial right affording redress for the infringement of a legal right belonging to some definite person; a cause of action is the operative fact 'which give rise to such right of action."
17. The case of M/s. Rah-e-Manzil Transport and others (supra) arose out of a suit for damages for rash and negligent driving.
18. In the case of Imdad Ali (supra), a suit was filed by an employee of a statutory Corporation at the place where he was residing. The plaint was returned with the observation that such suit could be filed either at a place where "cause of action" had arisen or at the place where the Headquarter of the statutory Corporation was located.
19. In the case of Sh. Muhammad Hussain (supra), the question under consideration of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether a grievance notice could be addressed by a counsel. In this judgment, the observation, which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that a beneficial interpretation can only be given when the language is not clear and two or more different interpretations are possible.
20. In the case of Muhammad Siddiq and another (supra); the observation was that in case of conflict between the Civil Procedure Code and any provision of local or special law, the latter will prevail.
21. In the case of M/s. Brookbond Pakistan Limited (supra), interpretation of section 36(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. (No,XXIII) 1969, was involved. The observation, which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the said section did not confer upon a Labour Court all the powers of a Civil Court and, therefore, an interim injunction restraining employer from terminating, the service of the employee could not be granted.
22. In the case of Federal Bank for Cooperatives (supra), the observation made was that when a situation is specifically dealt with by a provision of law then any general provision relating to the same subject-matter was not attracted.
23. In the case of Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. (supra), the observation was that a workman could not maintain a petition under section 25-A, in respect of his dismissal which was not with reference to an industrial dispute. Reliance was placed on the judgments of Port of Trustees Karachi (supra).
The rule laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Mustehkum Cement Limited, that by virtue of Standing Order No,12(3) a workman aggrieved of his discharge or dismissal etc. Could proceed to take action in accordance with section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 was not considered.
24. In the case of National Bank of Pakistan (supra), it was held that Bank employee as Officer Grade III, whose duties were supervisory in nature could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.
25. In the case of Wah Industries Ltd., the view taken by this Court in the case of. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited (supra) was reiterated.
26. None of the aforesaid judgments deals with the question of determination of the territorial jurisdiction of a Labour Court.
27. For what has been stated above, we find no merit in this petition I which is dismissed.-