This second appeal is directed against order, dated the 8th November 1978, passed by an Additional District Judge of Lahore, whereby he dis--missed the first appeal of the appellant, Sheikh Manzoor Hussain, against an order for his ejectment from a house.
2. The ejectment of the appellant had been ordered by a Rent Controller. Mr. Mansoor Akbar Kokab in consequence of an application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Restriction Ordinance), made by the respondents, Mr. Muhammad Mudassir and another. In that applica--tion it was, inter alia, alleged by the respondents that they wanted to reconstruct the house in dispute and also needed the same for their own occupation. The pleas put forth by the respondents were upheld by the learned Rent Controller and, therefore, he ordered the ejectment of the appellant. As stated earlier, his order has also been armed, in appeal, by the learned Additional District Judge.
3. The first objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant against the impugned order is that it is coram non judice. He has maintained that the application for ejectment was presented to the Senior Civil Judge who is also a Rent Controller, by virtue of his office. He entrusted the application to the aforesaid Rent Controller, Mr. Mansoor Akbar Kokab who ultimately decided the same. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that being himself a Rent Controller also, the Senior Civil Judge could try the application himself but he had no power to transfer it to Mr. Mansoor Akbar Kokab and; as such, the order of ejectment made by Mr, Mansoor Akbar Kokab was without authority. According to him, it is only a District .Fudge who can transfer a rent case from one Rent Controller to another, under section 15-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, and as he had not transferred the case from the office of the Senior- Civil Judge-ruin-Rent Controller to that of Mr. Mansoor Akbar Kokab, the entrustment of the case to Mr. Kokab was illegal and ultra vires.
4. 1 am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. The entrustment of cases, which is commonly known as distribution of cases, is different from the transfer of cases. To illustrate this, reference can usefully be made to sections 12 and 15 of the Punjab Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 and section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 15 of the said Ordinance deals with the distribution of civil cases while section 12 thereof and section 24 of the said Code relate to the transfer of those cases which arc entrusted at the time of their institution while their transfer takes place after they have been so entrusted and taken cognizance' of by the Court to whom they are made over. Thus, the entrustmentof cases and their transfer is not one and the same thing.
5. Now, adverting to the rent case filed by the respondents, the learned Senior Civil Judge who also enjoys the powers of a Rent Controller, had entrusted the case to Mr. Kokab, another Rent Controller, and did not transfer it from his office to that of Mt. Kokab. Thus, while making over the case to Mr. Kokab he did not exercise the owners vesting in the District Judge under section 15-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance.
6. The Rent Restriction Ordinance does not contain any provision about the entrustment of rent case as has been made in section 15 of the Punjab Civil Courts Ordinance in respect of the entrustment of civil cases. Since the Rent Restriction Ordinance happens to be a very brief piece of legisla--tion, a Rent Controller is, as of necessity or for the just and proper admi--nistration of this law, permitted to do certain things which are not warranted o by any express provision thereof. For instance, it has been ruled in Muhammad Aslam Mirza v. Mst. Khurshld Begum (PLD 1972 Lah.
603that a Rent Controller can recall' an ex parte order made by him although the Rent Restriction Ordinance does not, in so many words, empower him to do so. The entrustment of cases by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller is aimed at proper distribution of newly-instituted rent cases among the Rent Controllers. It is an administrative arrangement which does not offend against an provision of the Rent Restriction Ordinance or any other law. It is, there--fore. Not correct to say that the entrustment of the present case by the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller to Mr. Kokab, another Rent Controller, was illegal or ultra vires.
7. The application filed by the respondent was presented to a Rent Controller (Senior Civil Judge) as required by subsection (2), section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance and it was decided by another Rent Controller (Mr. Kokab). No exception has been taken to their appointment as Rent Controllers. Therefore, the mere fact that the aforesaid application was decided by a Rent Controller other than the one to whom it was initially presented does not make the order of the latter as without authority simple for the reason that the application reached him indirectly and not directly. In view of ail this, I am not prepared to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the order of ejectment made by Mr. Kokab coram non judice.
8. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondents had failed to establish that they required the house in dispute reasonably and in good faith for the purpose of reconstructions. The two Tribunals below have recorded a concurrent findings that the house in dispute was so required by the respondents. They examined Anwar Hussain (P. W. 1) who is a Building Inspector of the Lahore Municipal Corporation. He stated that as the house in dispute was in dangerous condition the Corporation bad directed the respondents to demolish the same. The notice served by the Corporation in this behalf is on the , record. Abdul Rashid (P. W. 2), who is a Record Keeper Of the Corporation, made statement to the same effect. The respondents are minors. Their father Mir Muhammad Akram appeared as A. W. 4 and deposed that he had obtained sanction of the Corporation for the reconstruction of the house. It is not denied that the construction plan submitted by the respondents has been approved by the Corporation. The evidence of the respondent also derives support from that of the appellant in as much as Aalam (R. W. 1). Who was examined by the appellant, had stated that the premises in question were in a dilapidated condition and that a part thereof had already collapsed. Another witness of the appellant, Muhammad Tufail (R. W. 2), said that although the walls of the building were not so bad the staircase had fallen down. The appellant himself entered the witness box as R. W. 4 and stated that half of the building in dispute had fallen down. In view of all this evidence, the two Tribunals were justified in holding that the respondents require the building in dispute reasonably and in good faith for the purposes of reconstruction.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondents had not produced any evidence regarding the estimated cost of the reconstruction of the building nor they had shown that they had sufficient funds to undertake its reconstruction and, therefore, their bona fides had not been established. He cited the case of Messrs Zakaria Bros., Karachi v. Messrs Hashwani Sales and Services Ltd., Karachi (PLD 1979 Kar. 581), to support his contention. It is true that. In the case under report the landlord had produced evidence regarding his bank balance also but it is not necessary to do so in each case in which evidence of a tenant is sought on the ground of reconstruction of the building occupied by him. Clause (iv) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance requires the landlord to produce sanction regarding reconstruction of the building but does no oblige him to indicate the estimated expenditure for such reconstruction or produce evidence showing that he has enough funds to meet that expenditure. If the intention of the law-makers had been to require the landlord to furnish the estimate of expenditure and also establish that he is in a position to incur that expenditure they would have incorporated that requirement also in clause (vi) Old which was, obviously, not done. Therefore, the mere fact that in a particular case the landlord had, with a view to strengthening his case, given evidence regarding the availability of funds with him does not mean that if in any other case the landlord fails to do so, he will be non-suited. In the circumstances, the mere fact that the respondent did not furnish estimate of expenditure for rebuilding the premises to dispute or has not demonstrated that he has adequate funds to spend thereon does not justify a conclusion that his requirement is not bona fide.
10. It was also urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondents had not been able to establish that they needed the premises in dispute for their personal use. Here too, I am unable to accept his plea. As already stated, the respondents ace minors and are represented by their father Mir Muhammad Akram. He appeared as P. W. 4 and said that they are living in a rented house and, therefore, want to shift into the house in dispute after its reconstruction. Ch. Qaseem- ud-Din (A. W. 3) supported his testimony by deposing that they are living as tenants in a house belonging to him. It. Was also conceded by the appellant (R. W. 4) that the respondents are putting up in a rented house. Needless to say that, except in rare cases, it is more convenient and less expensive for a person to live in his own house than in a rented one and that by living therein he can also maintain it better than when it is occupied by a tenant. It has; therefore, been rightly held by the lower Tribunals that the respondents need the house in dispute in good faith for their own occupation.
11. In view of what has gone above, I find no force in this appeal and dismiss it in limine.