' This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for setting aside of order, dated 17-7-1993 passed by respondent No,1 and implementa tion of directions issued by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, dated 20-9-1981 and allotment of land bearing Khasra Nos.1729, 1730 and 1756 situated in village Charar, Tehsil Lahore Cantt., Lahore.
2.Briefly stated the facts of the case are that: the said land was allotted to one Al-Garzi son of Taju which was challenged by Mukhbars Muhammad Sultan Khan, Pir Dad Khan and Mst. Peyar Bano under sections 10/11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, claiming allotment of land on the basis of fraud and misrepresentation. The Additional Settlement Commissioner cancelled the land from the name of Evacuee Al-Garzi and declared the applicants entitled for the allotment under section 14(1)-A of Land Settlement Act, 1958 after inquiry with regard to the claim/units of Mukhbars. This cancellation order of A.S.C. Had been challenged by some other person through Writ Petition No,62/R of 1983 which was dismissed on 5-4-1983 and the I.C.A. Was also dismissed as withdrawn.
3. The present petitioners have knocked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court for direction to the Settlement Authorities for allotment of land in their favour as Mukhbars under section 14(1) of the Land Settlement Act.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that Mukhbari application had been filed on 29-3- 1974 before the cancellation order of land was passed and the evacuee laws were repealed on 30- 9-1974, therefore, the case of the petitioners is covered within the ambit of pending proceedings.
He further submitted that Additional Settlement Commissioner, vide his order , dated 20-9-1981 had declared entitled the Mukhbars for allotment of land after making an inquiry regarding claim/units of Mukhbars.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners, contending that the present petitioners were not the applicants who filed the Mukhbari application. The name of petitioner No,2 Mst. Jamila Khatoon was later on added in the application by interpolation. The Mukhbars Muhammad Sultan Khan and Pir Dad Khan did not agitate the matter before the Settlement Authorities after 20-9-1981 nor any inquiry was made with regard to their evacuee claims. Further added that this land could not be allotted against agricultural land as it was declared as building site vide notification dated 16-5- 1973 being an urban land so the allotment of such land on the basis of claims/units whether urban or rural, could not be made. He has placed reliance to the cases of Muhammad Ramzan v. Member (Rev.)/CSS 1997 SCM R 1635 and Ali Muhammad v. Chief Settlement Commissioner 2001 SCM R 1822.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their kind assistance.
7. The Mukhbari application certainly was filed by Muhammad Sultan Khan, Pir Dad Khan son of Faqir Ahmad and Mst. Peyar Bano widow of Sher Muhammad. Mst. Jamila Khatoon petitioner No,2 was not the party in that application. The perusal of the application clearly indicates that her name was later on added in the array of applicants. The Additional Settlement Commissioner with the power of Chief Settlement Commissioner vide his order, dated 20-9-1981, cancelled the land of evacuee person Al-Garzi and declared entitled the Mukhbars for allotment of the same land under section 14-1(A) of the Land Settlement Act, 1958 after inquiry/verifying the claim/units of Mukhbars.
The said persons did not agitate the matter before any Settlement Authority nor they produced their claim for verification and inquiry before any Settlement Authority.
8. The Mukhbar is entitled for allotment only if he has an uncertified claim but it seems that the Mukhbars/applicants had no claim form or uncertified units. The land in dispute is situated in village Charar, Lahore Cantt. Which is an urban area and the claim of an evacuee for agricultural land could be adjusted only against agricultural land. The Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a notification dated 16-5-1973, declaring the urban land within the Municipal limits as `building site' and no allotment of such land on the basis of claimants, units, whether urban or rural could be made. Reliance in this respect can be made to the cases of Bashir Ahmad reported as 1991 SCM R 377, Muhammad Ramzan v. Member (Rev.) and Ali Muhammad, referred to (supra), therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the cases referred to above, this land was not available for allotment against agricultural claim because it had been declared as 'building site'.
9. This writ petition has been filed by Talat Jahan Barki and Mst. Jamila Khatoon petitioners, Nos.1 and 2. As observed in the preceding paragraphs petitioner No,2 was not Mukhbar, so, she was not entitled for allotment of land under the relevant provision of Land Settlement Act, 1958.
10. The most important feature of the case is that the said petitioners had empowered one person Subha Sadiq Khan Barki son of Pir Dad Khan who is real son of one of the Mukhbar, as attorney empowering him to mortgage, sell, lease and to make agreement of land and also to prosecute litigation of suits with regard to the said land. The instant writ petition has been filed and signed by one Mian Muhammad Asghar Naveed, Special Attorney empowered by general attorney Subha Sadiq, who was appointed/empowered by the writ petitioners. It is settled proposition of law that power of attorney must be construed strictly as giving only such authority as is conferred expressly or by necessary implication and the person authorized to do any particular act would do only that specific act and would not travel beyond the authority vested in him. The judicial proceedings launched in a manner not authorized by power of attorney executed in favour of a person would be a nullity in the eye of law. The power of attorney only gives that power which is specifically mentioned therein, and it would operate prospectively and not retrospectively. The writ petitioners while authorizing Subha Sadiq Khan Barki as their general attorney have not authorized or empowered him to appoint a special attorney/Mian Muhammad Asghar Naveed, therefore, the present writ petition filed by the Special Attorney is not maintainable as having no authority.
Reference in this context can be made to the cases of Muhammad Mahrban v. Sadruddin 1995 CLC 1541, Muhammad Afsar Khan v. Khadim Hussain PLD 1978 SC (AJK) 143, The Central Bank of India Ltd., Lahore v. Messrs Tajuddin Abdur Rauf 1992 SCM R 846, Abu Bakar Saley Mayet v. Abbot Laboratories and another 1987 CLC 367.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners when confronted with the situation that the general attorney had not been empowered by the petitioners to appoint further "Special Attorney" and the attorney has no authority under the law to file the present writ petition, could not respond.
12. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition having no force is dismissed.