' Through instant civil revision under section 115, C.P.C. Taj Muhammad and Qayam-ud-Din petitioners have challenged the validity of judgment and decree, dated 29-5-2004 of learned Additional District Judge-II, D.I. Khan whereby he on acceptance of appeal of Pirzada Khalid Mansoor, respondent No,1 herein, directed against the judgment and decree, dated 24-3-2003 of learned Senior Civil Judge, D.I. Khan, remanded the case to trial Court, with direction to decide the same on merits after recording of evidence.
2. Shortly narrated the facts of the case are, that respondent No,1 brought a suit against petitioners and others for possession through pre-emption of land measuring 35 Kanals, 11 Marlas situated in Mouza D.I. Khan. On 7-3-2003 petitioners filed an application for dismissal of the suit which was contested by respondent No,1 by filing replication. The learned Senior Civil Judge, D.I. Khan after hearing the parties, accepted the application of petitioners vide order, dated 24-3-2003 and dismissed the suit of respondent No,1. Feeling aggrieved, respondent No,1 filed appeal before learned District Judge, D.I. Khan which was entrusted for disposal to learned Additional District Judge-II, D.I. Khan who vide order, dated 29-5-2004 accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to trial Court for its decision on merits after recording of evidence.
3. Mr. Ahmed Ali Khan, Advocate for the petitioners contended that suit of respondent No,1 was premature because the property had not been transferred permanently in favour of the petitioner and that sale was incomplete because according to agreement to sell, out of sale consideration, certain amount has been paid whereas the remaining is to be paid up to 16-1-2005. Having said so, learned counsel maintained that judgment of learned Appellate Court is against law and cannot be allowed to remain intact. Explaining the delay in filing of civil revision, learned counsel maintained that attested copies of the documents got missed from the typist and for obtaining new copies, time was consumed, therefore, revision petition could not be filed in time. To augment the contentions, learned counsel place reliance on Muhammad Inayat and 5 others v. Mst. Nisar Fatima (PLD 1994 SC 120), Muhammad Inayat and others v. Fateh Muhammad and others (PLD 2004 SC 778), Furqan Ahmad Khan, v. Abdur Rehman and others (1997 SCM R 422) and Mst. Gohar Taja v. Sajid and others (2003 YLR 1994 Peshawar).
4. A perusal of the record would reveal that the Appellate Court i.e, Additional District Judge, Bannu has passed the impugned Judgment on 29-5-2004. The petitioners filed application for obtaining certified copies on 31-5-2004 and the copy of the Judgment was supplied to them on 12-6-2004.
The revision was filed on 25-9-2004. The limitation for filing the revision petition hai been provided in section 115, C.P.C. By Act No, VI of 1992 amendment in section 115, C.P.0 has been made, whereby the period prescribed for filing a revision is 90 days, which is not provided by Limitation Act, subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act has contemplated as under:-- "In computing period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a revision of judgment, the day on which the Judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed shall be excluded."
5. The benefit of above said provision of law is available only in cases where there is an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for a review of Judgment. This subsection nowhere mentions revision applications. The omission of the words 'revision applications' in the afore-quoted subsection is not accidental. This subsection restricts its application to merely two kinds of applications namely an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of judgment only. The benefit of subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is not attached to the revision applications.
6. The law givers had amended section 115, C.P.C, by means of an Act XI of 1992, whereby following amendment was incorporated:-- "Amendment of section 115, Act V of 1908.-In the said Code, section 115, in subsection (1) in the proviso for the full-stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following further proviso shall be added namely: ' Provided further that such application shall be made within ninety days of the decision of the subordinate Court."
7. The perusal of the above amendment contemplates that an application under section 115, C.P.C.
Shall be made within 90 days. Of the decision of the Subordinate Court. Prior to the above amendment no statutory period was prescribed by the Law for filing of the revisions but the superior Courts had always insisted that ordinarily such proceedings should he instituted within the period of 90 days. It is pertinent to mention here that in the judicial system the law of limitation has got its own significance relating to the period prescribed for instituting the proceedings. The Limitation Act contains in its fold remedial provisions like sections 5, 12, 14 which empowers the Courts to enlarge the period of limitation in peculiar circumstances of each case. Provided these provisions have been specifically made applicable on the proceedings and in the absence of its application the Court at its own shall not he competent to make applicable the provisions of these sections. In this behalf it is noticed that under C.P.C. There are various provisions where section 5 of the Limitation Act has expressly been made applicable to condone the delay in filing the proceedings is sufficient cause exit in favour of the party who seeks the condonation of delay. But this section of the Limitation Act had not been made applicable in accordance to section 29 of the Limitation Act, on the revision under section 115, C.P.0
8. The petitioner has though filed an application for condonation of delay but the ground for delay taken in the application is not appealable to mind. Thus, I have no hesitation in holding that the revision petition has been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, hence, not maintainable.
9. On merits too, the impugned judgment calls for no interference because every aspect of the case has been discussed in a proper manner, leaving no room for interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
10. The case-law cited by learned counsel for the petitioners is distinguishable and of no help because facts of those cases proceed on different premises.
11. Outcome of above discussion is that this revision being barred by time and devoid of merits as well, is dismissed in limine.