' This second appeal impugns the concurrent findings of the learned trial Court dated 18-7-1979 and of the learned lower Appellate Court dated 9-2-1998, whereby a suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff was dismissed.
2.. The facts of the case have elaborately been set out in the impugned judgments and need not therefore, be reproduced in extenso.
3. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for preemption on the basis that he was owner of the estate at the time of the impugned sale dated 14-7-1977. The record, however, shows that the plaintiff acquired title on 15-2-1978 i.e. Subsequent to the sale. This is established from Exh.D.2, which is a copy of the register of mutations.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant, firstly, argued that the appellant was an occupancy tenant and, therefore, by virtue of the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1952 he automatically became owner by operation of the said law. I have considered this contention and find that it is without merit. Section 114 was introduced into the Punjab Tenancy Act through the aforesaid amending Act.
According to the law, as amended, only such occupancy tenants became owners upon enactment of the aforesaid law as fell within subsection (2)(a) or (b) of section 114. For ease of reference, section 114(2) is reproduced as under:- "114. Extinction of occupancy -- tenancies:-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, including this Act, no person shall, after the coming into force of the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1952, acquire or have occupancy rights in any land under any excitement or contract or any decree or order of any Court or other authority and the existing occupancy rights in respect of all lands other than lands owned by Government or by any person who under the law for the time being in force is an evacuee, shall on the coming into force of the aforesaid Act, be extinguished, and the land comprised in a tenancy so Extinguished shall vest as hereinafter provided.
(2) An occupancy tenant, who at the time of the coming into force of the aforesaid Amendment occupies any land as such, shall become owner as under:---
(a) of the entire land comprised in his tenancy without payment of any compensation where he pays no rent therefore beyond the amount of the land revenue, and rates and cesses for the time being chargeable therefore;
(b) of such portion of the land comprised in his tenancy without payment of any compensation as corresponds to his share of the produce where he pays rent in the form of a share of the produce;
(c) of the entire land comprised in his tenancy on payment of compensation to the landlord in cash at such rates and which such periods as may be prescribed by the Government by rules framed for the purpose, where he pays rent only in cash;
(0) of the whole or a portion of the land comprised in his tenancy on payment of Such compensation in such form and within such time to the landlords as may be determined by Government by rules framed under this Act, where he pays rent partly in cash and partly in the form of a share of the produce."
5. As far other occupancy tenants falling in clauses (c) and (d) of subsection (2) above, section 114(3) is relevant. The same is reproduced as under:-- "114(3). So long as Government does not frame rules for purposes of clauses (c) and (d) of subsection (2), an occupancy tenancy falling under any of these clat,, -s shall, notwithstanding the provision made in subsection (1), continue to subsist, and the landlord and the occupancy tenant shall continue to enjoy the same rights, and be subject to the same liabilities, as before."
6. In the present case, from Exh.D.2 it is clear that the order of the Deput Settlement Commissioner/Collector, Daska, dated 15-2-1978 whereby the appellant was conferred ownership rights, was subject to payment of Rs.1,155. This itself shows that the appellant did not automatically become owner of the suit-land upon enactment of the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1952. By virtue of the provisions of section 114(3) reproduced above, the earliest date on which title can be deemed to have come to vest in him, is 15-2-1978. It, therefore, follows that he was not owner of the estate at the time of the impugned sale dated 14-7-1977 and, therefore, had no right of preemption on the basis of ownership of the suit-land.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant next argued that before the learned lower Appellate Court the appellant had filed an application under Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C. Seeking permission to amend the plaint with the object of asserting a right of preemption on the ground that the appellant was an occupancy tenant. The said application was rightly rejected by the learned first Appellate Court for reasons noted in the impugned judgment. The mere fact that the Court had the power to allow amendment, does not mean that the application ought to have been allowed, regardless of the equities and circumstances of this case. Learned counsel was unable to point out any illegality in the dismissal of the appellant's application.
8. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find that the impugned judgments and decrees are consistent with the law and are unexceptionable. Furthermore, learned counsel fo; the appellant was unable to show any of the grounds set out in section 100, C.P.C. Which would justify interference in the impugned decrees. This appeal, as a consequence, is dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.