' NUR AHMAD SHAH (MEMBER-II).---This is an appeal under section 4 Sindh Service Tribunal Act, 1973. The facts are: The appellant, while posted as Sale Inspector, SASO, Thatta was charge- sheeted for inefficiency, negligence and misconduct, on 10-2-1999. He was accused of shortages and adulteration of stocks in his charge. The shortages initially amounted to Rs.3,286,292. Of this he paid Rs.1,742, 450. For the remaining amount viz 1,543,842 he under-took to mortgage the godown owned by his son and already in the possession of SADO. Later, on 22-1-1998 he stated in the affidavit that he would pay the amount in three instalments upto 31-3-1998, but failed to make the payment. The Chief Minister ordered for his prosecution and arrest. The case against him was registered with the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE), Thatta. Meanwhile, the final stock taking revealed the total shortages and adulteration to the tune Rs.8,607,610. He denied the charge and attributed it to his strained relations with his boss Abdul Raheem Rahojo who, it would be worthwhile to point out was charge-sheeted separately for inefficiency, negligence, corruption and misconduct. About his depositing Rs.1,742, 450 toward the loss and the execution of affidavit of the mortgage of his son's plot, he stated that he did so to oblige Rahojo. He further stated that under a double lock key system then in vogue, Rahojo was equally responsible for the safe custody of .Stocks. He admitted to have been on bail in the case of corruption filed against him before the Special Judge Anti-Corruption Hyderabad. His reply was rejected as unsatisfactory and he was served with the Final Show-cause notice followed by a personal hearing before the Authority who imposed on his the major penalty of dismissal A from service. He challenged his dismissal before the Secretary, Agriculture who did not decide the matter within 90 days. Therefore, this appeal.
2. Heard Mr. Rasool Bux Uner for the appellant and A.A.-G., Mrs. Tabassum Ghazanfar and Mr. Moula Bux Khosa for the respondents. Perused the record.
3. The main contention of the Counsel for appellant was that no inquiry was held against the appellant and so the E&D Rules were violated. He stated that under the double lock key system, the appellant was not the sole custodian of the stocks. He further argued that impugned order which was passed by the Managing Director was illegal because the authority in his case was the Deputy Director and not the Managing Director. He, in support of his submissions, relies upon 1990 SCMR 1701; 1990 PLC (C.S.) 717; 1985 PLC (C.S.) 188; 1985 PLC (C.S.) 366; 1980 SCMR 850; PLD 1971 SC 176.
4. The Counsel for the respondents states that the appeal is time-barred by 3 days and there is no request for condonation of delay. This being a case of confession, he contends, there was no need for an inquiry. He relied on 2002 SCMR 684 and 2003 SCMR 41 in this behalf. He argues that the appellant as in-charge of the godowns is mainly responsible for the safe custody of stocks and he cannot shift the responsibility. He relies on 2002 SCMR 886.
5. The appellant was dismissed from service on 20-5-1999 and he submitted a departmental appeal on 21-6-1999 which remained undecided within a statutory period of 90 days. He approached the Tribunal on 19-10-1999. The appeal is, thus, well within time viz 120 days from the date of his filing the departmental appeal. The respondent's plea that the appeal is time-barred is, thus, groundless.
6. The appellant was charge-sheeted on 10-2-1999. In the statement of allegations attached with the charge-sheet, he was accused of the shortage of stocks worth Rs.3,286,292. Of this, he paid Rs.1,742, 450 and undertook to pay the remaining amount for which he was prepared to mortgage his son's plot valued at Rs.2,000,000. On 22-1-1998, he gave an affidavit before the FCM Mirpur Sakro to the effect that he would pay the said amount in three instalments upto 31-3-1998. On his failure to make the payment, the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE), Thatta registered a case against him under section 409 P.P.C. r.w. Section 5 (2) Act-II, 1947. In his reply to the charge-sheet he admitted to have paid Rs.1,742,450 besides facing trial before the Special Judge for Anti- Corruption, Hyderabad.
7. In his memo of appeal, however, he has purposely avoided to mention the payment made by him. He has studiedly omitted any reference to the Anti-corruption case pending against him.
Instead, he has laid emphasis on not holding any inquiry into the matter.
8. There can be no cavil with the appellant's plea that a regular inquiry should have preceded the imposition of major penalty on him. The inquiry no doubt becomes mandatory in charges based on disputed facts or when the witnesses are required to be examined. In the instant case, the charge derives strength from the admitted facts and documents. The appellant admittedly, on his own, sold the stocks to the growers on credit, and, thus, caused the loss. He paid more than half of the embezzled amount from his pocket.
9. The remaining amount he was prepared to pay in instalments, and gave the affidavit to this effect before the Magistrate. This clearly was tantamount to confession. In the case-law reported in 2003 SCMR 41, the apex Court held, "No one would like to make any admission against his own interest unless the same was true." Same view was earlier taken in 2002 SCMR 886 (Akbar Khan v/s Federation of Pakistan and others). No useful purpose would have been achieved from a regular inquiry in these circumstances. Nor did the facts of the case require examination of any witness.
The question of furnishing a copy of the inquiry repot or allowing the appellant to cross examine the witness (s) would not arise. The case laws cited by the appellant's Counsel relates to the cases in which the charges were contested which necessitated a thorough probe by an inquiry officer or Committee and are, therefore, irrelevant.
10. In fact, in this case, the inquiry would have only delayed the action. In Nawab Khan and others v.
Government of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 222) it was held, "If the charge is founded on admitted documents/facts no full-fledged inquiry is required." The inquiry was, thus, rightly dispensed with, and the case was dealt with under sub-rule (3) of rule 5 E&D Rules, 1973 which reads: "If the authorised officer decides that it is not necessary to have an inquiry conducted through an Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee, he shall--
(a) by order in writing, inform the accused of the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and the grounds of the action; and
(b) give him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against that action."
11. The appellant was served with a charge-sheet accompanied with the list of allegations. There was no ambiguity either about the allegations or the punishment proposed to be imposed on him.
The appellant was afforded the opportunity of personal hearing both in the charge-sheet as well as in the Final Show-cause notice and he did avail of it. Thus, no material prejudice was caused to him. Nor the dictates of justice were violated.
12. The stocks were held under the double lock key system. One of the keys lay with District Agriculture Supply Officer (DASO) who is respondent No.2 in this appeal, and the other key was admittedly with the appellant. Thus both were jointly and severally responsible for the safety of stocks. Indeed, the purpose of the double lock key system was to make doubly sure that the stocks were immune from pilferage or wastage by making the DASO and the Sales Inspector equally responsible. Neither could move the stocks without each other's collaboration or connivance. They were, rather, to keep an eye on each other against any misappropriation or theft of stocks. Thus, in no way diminished the appellant's responsibility. He, as incharge of the godowns was primarily answerable for the stocks in his custody despite the double lock key system. He cannot shift responsibility to the co-key holder viz DASO. Reference is invited to the case-law discussed in 2002 SCMR 886. It would not be out of place to mention that the DASO as the co-key holder, too, was punished under the E&D Rules.
13. The appellant's Counsel has questioned the vires of the impugned order on the ground that the appellant was charge-sheeted by the District Agriculture Supply Officer as Authorised Officer, so the Authority in his case would be the Deputy Director. Instead, the punishment was imposed by the Managing Director and this the appellant's Counsel regards as illegal. In the E&D Rules as applicable to the SASO officials, DASO is the Authorised Officer and Deputy Director is the Authoritiy for the officials in BS-15 and below. The appellant being in BS-11, the Authority competent to impose major penalty in his case is the Deputy Director as rightly pointed out by the appellant's Counsel.
However, under sub-rule (6) of rule 5 E&D Rules, if two or more civil servants are proceeded against jointly, an authorised officer or an authority in respect of the senior most civil servant among them shall be the authorised officer or the authority, as the case may be, in respect of all such civil servants. In the instant case, the appellant's boss DASO who was in BS-16, too, was proceeded against for inefficiency and corruption on the similar grounds. They were served with one and the same Final Show-cause notice. It was issued by the Deputy Director in his capacity as an authorised officer for the DASO. The Managing Director being the Authority in respect of the Senior co-accused viz DASO acted as Authority for the appellant as well in compliance with sub-rule (6) rule 5 E&D Rules quoted above. Thus, no illegality was committed. There was no irregularity in it either which could have vitiated the proceedings.
14. We, as a result of the above discussion, hold the impugned order fully sustainable in law and dismiss the appeal with no order as to the costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.