' SYED JAMSHED ALI, J.---The judgment and decree dated 2-11-2000 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore has been assailed in this appeal which arises out of the following circumstances.
2. On 14-12-1999, the respondent herein filed a suit against the appellant under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of an amount of Rs.49,44,410 on the basis of a promissory note. The appellant entered appearance and applied for leave to appear and defend. His application was allowed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 6-10-2000 on the condition of furnishing surety bonds by the appellant in the sum of Rs.50,00,000 with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the said Court on or before 2-11-2000. It was made clear to the appellant that in case of his failure, the application (for leave to appear and defend) shall be considered to have been dismissed. On 2-11-2000, the appellant moved two applications. One for review of the order dated 6-10-2000 for furnishing one instead of two sureties and second for extension of time to comply with the order dated 6-10-2000. The ground urged therein was that the appellant remained confined to bed due to serious illness on account of bad throat, flue and fever, in spite of his illness, he made all possible efforts to arrange two sureties but he could arrange only one surety. This application was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 2-11-2000 and the suit filed by respondent was decreed vide separate judgment dated 2-11-2000. The learned trial Court also took into consideration the fact that the appellant has admitted execution of the promissory note. His defence that he had paid the amount and on account of cordial relations between the parties did not demand return of the original documents from the plaintiff was also considered. Reliance was also placed on Col. (Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmad and others v. Sheikh Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCM R 2832.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that leave to appear and defend was granted to the appellant by taking into consideration undertaking dated 10-3-1997 according to which the appellant had received back the suit amount from the appellant, thereby disclosing a plausible defence. It is maintained that the amount involved was huge and, therefore, in the circumstances the learned trial Court ought to have exercised discretion in favour of the appellant.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent has opposed this appeal. According to him, the appellant had sufficient time at his disposal to comply with the order dated 6-10-2000 of the learned trial Court. It is further maintained that vide order dated 17-4-2001 this Court stayed execution of the impugned decree subject to the deposit of the decretal amount within one month but even the said order was not complied with.
5. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The applications of the appellant were duly considered and the learned trial Court held that the appellant had 27 days for submission of the sureties and if the appellant thought that the order dated 6-10-2000 was harsh an application could have been moved on 6-10-2000 or a couple .Nf days thereafter, the appellant remained "dormant until today i.e. 2-11-2000" and to prove his bona fide, the appellant failed to annex or present even one surety bond. As far as the plea of illness is concerned, it was observed that the appellant had not produced any medical certificate to show that he was confined to bed from 6-10-2000 until 2-11-2000 and was unable to make arrangements to furnish the surety bonds. The learned trial Court found no justification for either extension of time or for the review of the order dated 6-10-2000. The grant of extension or modification of the order dated 6-10-2000 was within the discretion of the learned trial Court. From the perusal of the order dated 2-11-2000 and record of the case, we are of the view that exercise of discretion by the learned trial Court was neither illegal nor arbitrary to warrant interference. We may add that inability to arrange sureties could not be accepted as a legitimate ground for extension of time. We, accordingly, see no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. No order as to costs.