' Z. A. CHANNA , J.-This constitutional petition seeks to challenge the cancellation by the Managing Committee of the Bahaduryar Jang Co-operative Housing Society, the third respondent, of the plot allotted in the Society to the petitioner and the orders passed by the Provincial Government in revision, dated 6-12-1968 and 21-5-1969, dismissing the revision petitions filed by the petitioner, and arises in the following circumstances :-
2. One Murtaza Ali was a member of the Bahaduryar Jang Co-operative Housing Society, hereinafter referred to as the Society. He, however, sold his shares in the Society to the petitioner.
On the basis of this sale, the Administrator of the Society (the Managing Committee of the Society having been superseded and its duties assigned to an Administrator by the Registrar of Co- operative Societies) confirmed the allotment of Plot No, 209, Block No, 3, in the Society, alongwith 4 shares, in the name of the petitioner, by his order dated 25-1-1958. It appears that the Managing Committee of the Society was subsequently revived and by its letter, dated 29-1-1963, the Managing Committee cancelled the allotment of the plot in question in favour of the respondent on the ground that the allotment of the plot to him was both illegal and unjustified. The petitioner made a representation against the said cancellation to the Registrar and the Registrar, acting under section 54 of the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, referred the issue to his nominee, Mr. Shirazi. The latter, after hearing the petitioner and the Society, gave an Award on 21-3- 1963, holding that the allotment of the plot in favour of the petitioner was valid and lawful and the Society should not disturb the allotment in any manner. As the fourth respondent to whom the plot in question had been allotted by the Society, had not been made a party to this Award, the Registrar, presumably acting under section 54-A of the Act, referred the dispute back to Mr. Shirazi with the direction to make the fourth respondent a party and. Give him an opportunity of hearing.
Mr. Shirazi, after joining the fourth respondent as party, gave fresh Award on 10-12-1966, in which he reiterated the view taken by him in his previous Award. Against the said Award, the fourth respondent preferred an appeal which was heard by the Deputy Registrar, who set aside the Award, by his order dated 6-12-1968, and held that the allotment in favour of the petitioner had been rightly cancelled and the Society's allotment in favour of the fourth respondent was upheld.
The main ground for passing this order was that neither possession of the plot had been given to the petitioner nor the plot had been validly allotted to him. The allotment in favour of the fourth respondent was upheld on the ground that he was the member allottee of a plot which he had surrendered on the ground that he wanted to a bigger plot and his request was considered to be genuine. Against the decision of the Deputy Registrar, the petitioner filed a revision petition to the Government which was dismissed, vide order dated 14-2-1969, on the ground that the facts did not justify interference with the decision of the Deputy Registrar. The petitioner thereafter filed a second revision petition to Government on 24-2-1969, which came to be dismissed by the Government, vide its order dated 21-5-1969.
2. We have heard Mr. Hassan Zafar, the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Azhar Siddiqui, who represented respondent No, 3, Mr. M. M. Siddiqui, who appeared for respondent No, 4 and Mr. Hassan Inamullah, who appeared on behalf of the learned Advocate-General and respondents Nos, 1 and 2. The contentions raised by Mr. Hassan Zafar were-
(i) that the order of cancellation was passed by the third respondent without giving him an opportunity of hearing ; and (ii)that similarly, his two revision petitions were dismissed by the Government without giving him an opportunity of hearing.
3. Mr. Hassan Zafar admitted that there was no statutory requirement for hearing by the Society or the Government but he relied upon the principle of natural justice enshrined in the maxim audi alteram partem, which has been made a part of our legal system, except in cases where its application is specifically excluded. It was observed by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Shaikh Abdul Rahman v. The Collector and Deputy Commissioner, Bahawalnagar and others and reiterated in the case of the Province of East Pakistan v. Noor Ahmed that the principle enshrined in the maxim, audi aiteram partem is presumed to be embodied in every statute in the absence of any provision to the contrary. In the latter case of the University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "From a careful review of the decisions cited before us it appears that wherever any person or body of persons is empowered to take decisions after ex post facto investigation into facts which would result in consequences affecting the person, property or other right of another person, then in the absence of any express words in the enactment giving such power excluding the application of the principles of natural justice, the Courts of law are inclined generally to imply that the power so given is coupled with the duty to act in accordance with such principles of natural justice as may be applicable in the facts and circumstances of a given case."
4. However, the principles of natural justice are not of universal application nor do they require that opportunity of hearing must be given to a party at every stage of the proceedings. In the case of Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan , it was hold by majority decision that rule of natural justice may be relaxed in cases of emergency, and the hearing may be postponed to a period after taking such action as the emergency may want. In that case, it was held that if the emergency wanted a notification declaring an association could be issued under section 3 or the Criminal Law Amdendment Act, 1908, without giving an opportunity of hearing to the association or its office-bearers, but after the notification is issued, such an opportunity must be given.1 2 3 4
5. The difference in cases where there is statutory requirement for a hearing and in cases where the right of hearing is founded on the principle of natural justice has been succinctly brought out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan v. Jan Muhammad . In two earlier unreported cases, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had held that the Commissioner was net bound to give a hearing to a party before referring his case to a Tribunal under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963, as the party has been given a right of hearing before the Government on appeal against the reference by the Commissioner. However, in the reported case, their Lordships held that as an order of reference by the Commissioner was a proceeding under the aforesaid Act, and as the Act itself, in section 25, requires that in all proceedings under the Act before the Tribunal, the District Magistrate, the Commissioner and the Government, the parties would be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner of their choice, a fortiori, a party would be entitled to be heard and represented by a counsel before the Commissioner could pass an order referring a case to the Tribunal.
6. It was contended by Mr. Azhar Siddiqui for the third respondent that the contention of the petitioner that he had not been given an opportunity of hearing by the Managing Committee of the Society before the order of cancellation of his plot was passed is false and that as many as 3 notices were issued to the petitioner requiring him to satisfy the Committee that the allotment in his favour was legal and appropriate. He produced for our inspection from the record of the society the 3 notices dated 18-3-1959, 24-3-1959 and 15-12-1959, possibly, these notices were issued but there is no evidence that these notices were in fact served upon the petitioner. Be that as it may, the petitioner was admittedly heard both by the Registrar's nominee, when the matter was referred to him under section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act, and also by the Deputy Registrar in appeal. Section 54 of the Act provides that every dispute between a Society and its member, touching the affairs of the Society shall be referred to the Registrar, who may decide the dispute himself or refer it to his nominee for decision. In view of this provision of law, we think that the Registrars' nominee and the Deputy Registrar are appropriate forums where opportunity of hearing is to be provided and since in the instant case the petitioner was heard before both these forums, we consider that the failure, if any, to give a hearing to the petitioner before the order of cancellation was passed by the Committee does not vitiate the action of the Committee and there has been sufficient compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem.
7. Coming next to the proceedings before the Government, neither a copy of the first revision petition filed by the petitioner before the Government has been produced before us nor is there anything on the record to indicate on what date it was filed and what were its contents.
' We have, however, been shown a copy of the order, dated 7-2-1969 passed by the Government on this revision application, dismissing the same on the ground that the facts did not justify interference with the decision of the Deputy Registrar. We have noticed from the order of the Government that the revision petition was filed only against the 4th respondent and the third respondent was not made a party. As regards the second revision petition, which was filed on 24- 2-1969, it was dismissed by the Government, vide its order dated 21-5-1969, mainly on the ground that a second revision petition did not lie. Mr. Hassan Zafar was unable to point out to us any provision of law whereby a second revision petition could be made to the Government under the Cooperative Societies Act. We find on the contrary that section 64-AA makes orders passed in appeal under section 64 or in revision under section 64-A final and conclusive. We are thus of the view that there is no provision in the Act for entertaining by the Government the second revision petition.
8. We are also of the view that right of hearing before the Government in revision is neither a requirement of the law nor is required on the principle of natural justice. The Government has merely declined to interfere in revision and thus passed no adverse order against the petitioner.5 The adverse order was passed by the Deputy Registrar, where admitted the petitioner had full opportunity of being heard, and the Government has merely taken the view that no interference with that order was called for. The principle of audi alteram partem comes into play where a person has been condemned unheard. The petitioner has not' been condemned by the Government if at all he was condemned, this was done by the Deputy Registrar, where admittedly he was heard. As such, we are of the view that the principle of natural justice has not been violated by the Government. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Atta Muhamma Qureshi v.
Settlement Commissioner, which was a case under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, that a revising authority cannot make any adverse order against a person without giving him an opportunity to show cause against it. In that case the argument that the appellant had an opportunity of being heard by the Settlement Commissioner, which was sufficient redress for his grievance, was repelled on the ground that the argument may be well-founded when the grievance is made to rest on the principle of natural justice, but when there is an absolute requirement of the Statute that no adverse order can be passed by the revising authority without giving the party concerned an opportunity of hearing and it is defied, the order passed is a nullity.
We may refer to the exercise or refusal to exercise by the Chief Settlement Commissioner of his revisional powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Muhammad v. Moula Bux , that section 20 of the Act lays no obligation on the Chief Settlement Commissioner to exercise his original powers unless he is directed to do so by the Central Government, and if he, therefore, decline to exercise his powers of revision in a particular case, he has a discretion to do so and the order in question could give no cause of action to the appellant to ask for a writ from the High Court to quash the order.
These authorities, in our humble view, support the view that we have taken that there was sufficient compliance with the principle of natural justice when the petitioner was heard by the Deputy Registrar and no illegality requiring our interference was committed by the Government in not offering the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.
9. Mr. Azhar Siddiqui also defended the action of the Society in cancelling the allotment of the plot in favour of the petitioner on merits. He submitted that according to Bye-Law 7 of the Society, only members were entitled to allotment of plots. Under the bye-laws, only those persons were deemed to be members, who had either signed the Memorandum of Association of the Society or who had been accepted as members of the Society by the Managing Committee, on their making an application in this behalf to the Society and sending to the Society with their applications a membership fee of Rs,
10. It was contended by Mr. Azhar Siddiqui that inasmuch as the petitioner had not submitted an application for membership to the Managing Committee nor he had sent to the Society the required membership fee, he was not a member of the Society and therefore not entitled for plot, and as such the order of the Administrator confirming the allotment of plot No, 319 in his favour was invalid. On scrutiny of the Bye-laws, we find that this objection is not unfounded.
10. We would also like to point out that respondent No, 4 has since raised a substantial construction on the plot in question, which has been completed. This position is admitted by the petitioner as appears from the order of this Court dated 8-9-1970. The petitioner should, in view of the construction which was being raised by the 4th respondent, not have allowed almost a year to elapse between the dismissal by the Government of his second revision petition and the constitutional petition which he had filed in the High Court.
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that we find no merit in this petition, we would accordingly dismiss the same with costs. It is needless to add that the petitioner will be entitled to refund of the deposit made by him to the Society, together with admissible interest, as ordered by the Deputy Registrar. 6 7 1 PLD 1964 SC 461 PLD 1964 SC 451 PLD 1965 SC 90 PLD 1964 SC 673 PLD 1969 SC 333 PLD 1971 SC 61 PLD 1963 SC 311