' Brief facts out of which the present I.C.A. Arises are that respondent filed Writ Petition No.10896 of 1996, which was accepted by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 5-3-1997. Present appellant being aggrieved filed I.C.A. No.314 of 1997, which was accepted by the Division Bench vide order dated 25-2-1998 and the judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside and the case was remanded to the learned Single Judge to decide the case afresh. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Constitutional petition vide judgment dated 14-1-2000. Respondents being aggrieved filed Civil Review Petition No.5 of 2000 and also filed I.C.A. No.68 of 2000. Civil Review Petition was accepted by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 9-5-2000. Consequently, respondents had withdrawn I.C.A. No.68 of 2000 vide order dated 10-9-2001. Appellant being aggrieved filed I.C.A. No.512 of 2000 against the order dated 9-5-2000, which was passed by the learned Single Judge in Review Petition No.5 of 2000 filed by the respondents, which was also accepted by the Division Bench vide order dated 19-9-2001 in view of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Review Petition. Appellant being aggrieved filed Civil Petition No.3702-L of 2001 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order dated 19-9-2001. During the pendency of Civil Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court respondent also filed C.M. No.1 of 2001 for modification of order dated 19-9-2001, which was accepted vide order dated 4-3-2002 and word "accepted" in order dated 19-9-2001 was substituted by the word "rejected". The Hon'ble Supreme Court converted the petition of the appellant in appeal which was allowed vide order dated 10-4- 2003 wherein the order dated 19-9-2001 was set aside and the case was remanded to this Court to decide the I.C.A. No.512 of 2000 afresh on merits.
2. Learned counsel of the respondents raised a preliminary objection that I.C.A. Is not maintainable in view of section 3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as the impunged order being challenged by the appellant in this appeal, was passed by the learned Single Judge in Review Application filed by the respondent. In support of his contention he relied upon 1986 SCMR 1478 (Lahore Development Authority v. Fahmeeda Khatoon and others).
3. Learned counsel of the appellant submits that Hon'ble Supreme Court directed this Court to decide the appeal of the appellant afresh on merits vide order dated 10-4-2003, therefore, appellant could not be non-suited on the ground of maintainability. He further urges that appeal be decided on merits instead of non-suiting the appellant on technical ground.
4. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel of the parties.
5. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the relevant section of the Law Reforms Ordinance to resolve the controversy between the parties.
"1. An appeal shall lie to the Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
2. An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single Judge of that Court under [clause (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan] not being an order made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (b) of the clause: ' Provided that the appeal referred to in this subsection shall not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article [199] arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided for at least one appeal [or the revision or one review] to any Court, Tribunal or authority against the original order.
Perusal of subsection (1) of section 3 shows that an appeal is competent before a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court, wherein the order passed by a Single Judge while exercising original civil jurisdiction is challenged. In the instant case, the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge while exercising his power of review of an order passed in a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. It is thus evident that neither the order sought to be reviewed nor the order of review, were orders which could be termed as order to have been passed in original civil jurisdiction, therefore, the case is not covered under subsection (1) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.
6. Under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, an appeal before a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court is also competent against an order made by a Single Judge under clause (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution. However, this is subject to the conditions mentioned in the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3. Meaning thereby, that if an order is passed by High Court in a Constitutional petition, it is challengeable before a Bench of two or more Judges, provided it fulfils the condition provided in proviso to subsection (2). But if such an order passed in Constitutional jurisdiction was challenged through a review, then an order passed in review acquires a different status and cannot be equated with an order passed under clause (1) of Article
199. Therefore, it is evident that an order passed in review is not appealable under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.
7. The question of law in somewhat similar circumstances has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case reported as Employees Management Group, Pak-Saudi Fertilizers Limited through the Ministry of Privatization (Privatization Commission), Pak. Secretariat, Islamabad and others) (2002 YLR 1487 Lahore). The relevant observation is as follows:-- "4. We have considered the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record ourselves. We are of the view that the appeal is not competent as the learned Single Judge has not exercised its original civil jurisdiction at the time of passing the impugned order. In arriving to this conclusion we are fortified by the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Begum D.F. Hassan v. Habib Bank Limited Lahore (PLD 1974 Lahore 117)."
' It is also settled principle of law that Constitutional jurisdiction though original jurisdiction is distinct from the civil jurisdiction as observed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Ahmad Khan's case PLD 1968 Supreme Court 171. The jurisdiction must obviously be described in Constitutional jurisdiction of an original kind, therefore, Intra-Court Appeal is not maintainable as per principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Khushi's case 1990 ALD 207(1). These proceedings are not akin the original nature of proceedings referred in section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. It is not conceivable that any order passed by this Court on the review petition would be an order in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction amenable to I.C.A., therefore, this appeal is incompetent and the same is dismissed.
8. For what has been discussed above, this appeal is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed.