' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.--- This petition has been filed for leave to appeal against the judgment, dated 27th June, 2000 passed in Review Application No,22-C of 2000 and judgment, dated 21st March, 2000 passed in Civil Revision No,1026 of 1997, passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore.
2. Learned counsel appearing for caveat, at the very outset, objected on the maintainability of the petition against the judgment, dated 21st March, 2000 on the ground of limitation. Undoubtedly against this order the petition is hopelessly barred by time and no request for condonation of delay has been made. Similarly, learned counsel pointed out that as far as the judgment in Review Application, dated 27th June, 2000 is concerned; no interference is called for because it does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect. In this behalf reliance was placed on Ghulam Hussain v. Ashiq Ali Khan PLD 1980. SC 198 and Sadiq Ali Shah v. Sardar Khalid Umar and others 1982 SCM R 995.
3. When we confronted the learned counsel for petitioner with the above objection on behalf of the caveat, he stated that the doctrine of merger will be applicable and the order passed in Civil Revision, dated 21st March, 2000 would be deemed to have been merged into the order of dismissal of Review Application, dated 27th June, 2000.
4. We are not inclined to subscribe to the view point of the learned counsel for petitioner, in view of the judgments, so relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for caveat. For convenience relevant para. From the case of Ghulam Hussain (ibid) is reproduced herein below:--- "(7) The present petition against the basic order of the High. Court, dated 14-12-1977 is barred by 395 days and there is no application or prayer either for condonation of delay or to set aside that order as such. When confronted with this situation, the learned counsel argued that the present is the petition against the order, dated 12-2-1978 refusing to review the previous order, dated 14-12- 1977 and in its own turn is within limitation as that order. This may be so but while seeking leave to appeal against order refusing to review the main previous order, in fact the object of the petitioner is to seek vacation of the said previous order which by efflux of time had become final. The fact that in review the Court further affirmed the aforesaid order is immaterial inasmuch as a refusal to review the same will not give a fresh period of limitation to challenge it. In this peculiar situation therefore, when the previous order has become binding on the petitioners, they cannot be allowed to bypass, it by simply pleading that the present petition is against order refusing to review the same because while stating so there intention is to point and errors and mistakes in the basic order which were sought to be removed through a review application but which failed. There may be cases where for instance petition of review may be refused merely for want of jurisdiction in which of course a petition may lie but will be on ground that it has no jurisdiction whereas in fact and in law it had such jurisdiction. In those cases a petition against refusal to review will not be a petition directly or indirectly against the main previous order on merits but only against the order in review itself. The position in the instant case is however different. Here the question is not of lack of jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain review, but after entertaining it refusing the same on the ground that no case for review on merits exists. Such a decision will essentially compel to suitor to challenge the previms order itself to point out the mistakes allegedly existing therein, which exercise obviously cannot be resorted to if the period of limitation for challenging the main previous order has run out and because you cannot do that indirectly which you cannot be directly. A more proper course in such situation will be to file a petition for leave to appeal against the basic previous order and apply fa:: extension of time under section 5 of the Limitation Act IX of 1908 on the ground that the petition had in good faith and with due diligence allowed to him on the principle of section 14 of the aforesaid Act etc. See Dwarka Das Kedar Bux v. Gajanan Jagannath and others AIR 1946 Cal. 10, which was a case of a petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council where time taken in review of judgment sought to be appealed against was allowing Brij Indra Singh v. Lala Kanshi Ram and others AIR 1917 PC 156, which in its own turn approved Balwant Singh and another Gumani Ram ILR 5 All. 591, Karam Bakhsh v. Daulat Ram 183 PR 1888 and in re: Brojandar v. Coomar Ray (1867) 7 WR 529, this course has not been adopted in this case, it is obvious, that such a belated and deficient petition must fail."
5. In view of above discussion, it is held that as the petition is hopelessly barred by time and no application has been moved for condonation of delay, therefore, merely for the reason that a Review Application was filed, the time cannot be extended as the petition against the original order is barred .By time, as such no relief can be given to the petitioner in instant proceedings.
' Thus for the forgoing reason, petition is dismissed and leave declined.