It is rather an unfortunate case. Admitted facts are that the petitioners filed grievance petitions under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969, against the respondent No,2. These were accepted by the learned Punjab Labour Court No,9, Multan, camp at Dera Ghazi Khan, vide orders dated 14/15-11- 1993. Against these orders, the respondent No,2 filed appeals. All these appeals (14 in total) came up before the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal on 25-6-2001. It was contended on behalf of the respondent No,2 that in view of the insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. The objection found favour with the learned Appellate Tribunal who allowed the appeals, set aside the orders passed by the learned Labour Court with an advice to the petitioners to approach the Federal Service Tribunal.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has acted without lawful authority while passing the impugned orders in complete oblivion of the provisions of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. According to him, the appeal stood abated and it was for the respondent No,2 to have been advised to go to the Service Tribunal. The learned counsel for the respondent No,2 finds it quite difficult to oppose the said contentions.
3. As stated by me above, the petitioners felt aggrieved of termination orders dated 15-1-1993. They filed the grievance petitions which were allowed on 14-11-1993 and 15-11-1993 by the learned Punjab Labour Court No,9, Multan. It was the respondent No,2 who had filed the appeals which were pending before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal on 10-6-1997 when section 2-A was inserted by the Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1997. The effect was that the petitioners were declared to be civil servants by means of the said deeming clause and they were deemed to be civil servants for the purpose of this Act. Now the effect of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 vis-a-vis pending proceedings is dealt with in section 6 of the said Act. It will be appropriate to reproduce the said provisions of law hereunder:-- "6. Abatement of suits and other proceedings: All suits, appeals or applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of this Act shall abate forthwith: ' Provided that any party to such a suit, appeal or application may, within ninety days of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, prefer an appeal to it in respect of any such matter which is in issue in such suit, appeal or application."
A bare reading of the above provisions of law would show that the appeals filed by the respondent No,2 stood abated. The result is that the judgment passed by the learned Labour Court No,9 remained intact. Under the proviso to section 6 of the said Act, it was for the respondent No,2 to have preferred an appeal to the competent Service Tribunal within the period of time prescribed.
Article 212(2) of the Constitution of the country further elaborates the said legal position. Reference may be made to the case of Civil Aviation Authority and 3 others v. Izhar Ahmad and 144 others (2001 SCM R 328).
4. I may further note here that the second limb of the reasoning of the learned Tribunal is also of no avail to respondent No,2 for the simple reason that the plea that the petitioners are working on Ministry of Defence Lines was never taken by the respondent No,2 before the Labour Court. Besides the notification relied upon by the learned Tribunal had no retrospective effect.
5. For all that has been stated above, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 25-6-2001 of the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal is declared to be without lawful authority and is set aside. The result would be that the appeals filed by the respondent No,2 before the said learned Labour Appellate Tribunal stood abated. However, the respondent No,2 can approach the appropriate Service Tribunal in terms of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 read with Article 212(2) of the Constitution. No orders as to costs.