' WAHID BUX BROHI, J.---The back ground of this application is that on 21-9-2004, learned Incharge Judge, Special Court-I, C.N.S. Karachi granted bail to accused Rao Khursheed Alam subject to furnishing security in the sum of Rs .1,00,000 and executing P.R. Bond in the like amount. Later on an application was made for modifying the order of `security' to 'surety'. Relying on Khadim Hussain v.
State PLD 2004 Karachi 191, the application was allowed on 28-9-2004 by consent of learned counsel. The accused offered surety against a Toyota Corolla Car, but the learned trial Court did not accept the same and ordered that the surety of immovable property should be furnished.
Aggrieved by the last mentioned order, the accused has approached this Court with the prayer that the trial Court may be directed to accept surety in the shape of moveable property i.e, motor vehicle.
2. We have heard Mr. Maqboo-urRehman, learned counsel for applicant and Mr. Habib Ahmed, learned Assistant Advocate General for the State.
3. At the outset, it needs to be emphasized that the principle laid down in Khadim Hussain's case PLD 2004 Karachi 191 has been misinterpreted by the trail Court, while passing the order dated 28- 9-2004. A careful perusal of the aforesaid decision would reveal that this Court, while passing the above order relied on another order passed in Criminal Bail Application No,114 of 1999 at Circuit Bench Hyderabad and para.12 of the said order, reproduced in the cited authority, at the most, lays down that section 51 of the CNS Act is not to be construed to mean `security' for the purpose of bail should only mean 'cash'. However, in the cited authority it was held as under:-- "It has thus been laid down. That the requirement of furnishing security, in terms of section 51(2) of the CNS Act does not contemplate that the bail amount be necessarily deposited in cash, bank guarantee etc., but the requirement of security can also be satisfied by furnishing the document creating title to a property worth the bail amount."
4. We would, thus, clarify that it was never held by this Court that the term `security' employed by legislature in section 51(2) of CNS Act shall be read as `surety'. All that was laid down in the said case was that the bail amount shall not necessarily be deposited in the form of cash, Bank guarantee etc., but the requirement of security could also be satisfied by furnishing a document creating a title to a property worth the bail amount. Accordingly, we would hold that the order passed by the learned trial Court on 28-9-2004 modifying the term 'security' to `surety' cannot be sustained in law.
5. Nevertheless, the subsequent order by which learned trial Court declined to accept the car towards security is fully justified for, it was a discretion exercised by the Court in accordance with law. The prayer in this application that the trial Court may be called upon to accept moveable property in place of immoveable property cannot be acceded to for the simple reason that it is again for the trial Court to accept the security furnished by the accused. Perhaps, the trial Court has kept in mind the apprehended loss of movable property within a short time which could frustrate the object of security. No illegal order has been passed which can be termed as abuse of process of Court and we do not find a reasonable ground to interfere with the discretionary power exercised by the trial Court. The application is without merits and is accordingly dismissed.