1. ORDHR M. SALEBM CHAUDHARY (CHAIRMAN).--This appeal by Government As directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Administrative Civil Judge Bahawalpur, dated 5-9-1973 setting aside the order of Divisional Forest Officer, Bahawalpur dated 3-8-1971 dismissing the present respondent from service. The Government had preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Bahawalpur which was declared to have abated on 4-7-1974 by the aforesaid Court in view of the provision contained in the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Act, 1974, read wits Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The present appeal, in `he first instance, appeared to have been instituted before this Tribunal some where in Septem--ber, 1974, and was refilled after removing the defects pointed out by the Tribunal on 10-10-1974. The learned Government pleader submitted that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent from service as passed on 13-10-1971 by the Divisional Forest Officer, Bahawalpur, was wholly against the evidence on the record. He submitted that although the dismissal order passed by the D. F. O. Mr. Abdul Ghani was struck down on the ground that he having been associated with the preliminary proceedings against the appellant was disqualified to act as Competent Authority but it was a mere formality inas--much as the present respondent had admitted his fault and had asked for pardon. He placed on record copy of the statement Exh. D-6 of the present respondent dated 22-7-1971 in which he had categorical--ly conceded that he had been issuing false challan on 1-1-1971 on the asking of Range Officer although he stood transferred from the beat since 26-6- 1970 to Bahawalpur Forest School. He admitted to have issued proper challans for 12000 C. Ft. Only whereas the Contractor had lifted 38000 c. Ft. Till his transfer. Thus it resulted in unauthorised lifting of 26000 C. Ft. Of wood in excess by the Contractor. However, according to Challan Book the total quantity of wood lifted by the contractor comes to 49975 C. Ft. The appellant appears to have asked for pardon for this offence. The learned Government Pleader argued that in the face of the above statement,, the Competent Authority was hardly required to make any adjust fiction as to the fault of the accused civil servant. Thus it has not resulted in any prejudice to the present respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Masood Ahmed Riaz has nothing to say alleged that the order passed b the D.F.O. Ass incompetent and the Respondent could not be penalised unless the order is passed by an unbiased Authority. We are not inclined to hold that the D. F. O. Was not qualified to pass the impugned order. We are C rather of the view that there was no disqualification on the part of D. F. O. Concerned and the trial Court erroneously declared his order as without Jurisdiction. We are amply fortified in our conclusions above by the following dictum of the Supreme Judicial Council appearing at pages 605-606 of In re: The President v. Mr. Justice Shaukat All (P D 1971 SC 585): "The mere assertion of bias can never be sufficient to disqualify a Judge in hearing a cause or matter. In the absence of any pecuniary or pro--prietary interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, it is, essential that a real likelihood of bias must be shown. The mere fact that the Council had scrutinised the declaration of assets is not sufficient to establish such likelihood of bias, for, if it were so, then no Judge, who issues a rule in a motion or issues a notice to show cause in any other proceeding or frame a charge in a trial, can ever hear that matter or con--duct that trial. The reason is that a preliminary inquiry intended to deter--mine whether prima facie case has been made out or not is a safeguard against the commencement of wholly unwarranted final proceedings against a person. To say that a charge should be framed against a person amounts to saying nothing more than that the person should be tried in respect of it. Anybody who knows the difference between a prima facie case and its final trial would reject the objection as misconceived. We accordingly reject them as misconceived."
2. The legal position enunciated above is abundantly clear to repel the objection of bias against Mr. Abdul Ghani, D. F. O. Who conducted the preliminary enquiry and also passed the final order impugned in this appeal.
3. In the circumstances, the appeal is accepted and the Judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 5-9-1973 is hereby vacated. There will be no order as to costs.