1. M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).-In this appeal by the Government the decree and judgment passed on 6-2-1974 by Ch. Muhammad Ali, Civil Judge, Class I, Multan in Civil Suit No. 386 of 1973 granting declaration to the respondent Muhammad Ajmal Alvi, Excise and Taxation Officer, Multan that his reversion from the post of Excise and Taxation Officer as ordered by the Government vide order dated 30th of May 1973, was illegal and ultra vires is sought to be challenged before us. The appellant had earlier preferred an appeal against the aforesaid decree and judgment in the Court of Additional District Judge, Multan which was declared to have abated on 15-II-1974. The appellant ultimately preferred this appeal before us on 20-12-19/4. This appeal was admitted on 28-I1-1975 subject to objection as to the limitation by the respondent.
2. The counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection as to the limitation on the ground that under the proviso to section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, the appeal stood abated on the establishment of this Tribunal i.e. 22-7-1974 and no formal abatement order was necessary as held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Sheikh Masud Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan (PLD1976SC195). Thus the last date for filing the appeal by the appellant was 19-10-1974 and the appeal having been filed on 20-12-1974 was grossly barred by time and merits to be rejected on the same ground. According to the learned counsel appellant has failed to account for the delay.
3. The learned Government Pleader on behalf of the appellant contended that the case of the Government before the civil Court was that since the issue involved pertained to the fitness of the respondent who held the post of Excise and Taxation Officer therefore it was not a case of abatement as the issue 'did riot fall within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. However their objection was overruled by the civil Court only on 15-11-1974. According to the Government Pleader the practice of the Tribunal was to insist upon the judgment of the civil Court in the cases in which the issue of abatement was involved. He further submitted that the Special Government Pleader, Multan informed the Solicitor after obtaining the copy of the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Multan vide his letter dated 25-11-1974 and after obtaining the copies of the necessary documents the appeal was filed on 20-12-1974 before this Tribunal. Thus the delay had been adequately explained and the same merits to be condoned as per explanation contained in the application filed by the appellant under section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 9 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act of 1974.
4. After hearing both the parties we do no feel convinced that the appellant has succeeded in making out a case for the condonation of delay. In the first instance the appeal abated on 22-7- 1974 and thereafter the appellant was entitled to avail the period of 90 days as a matter of right which expired somewhere on 19-10-1974. The subsequent order passed by' the civil Court on 15-11- 1974 could only be a ground for condoning the delay but even allowing that time the conduct of the appellant thereafter was not that of responsible diligence. There is nothing on the record to show as to how much time was spent by the Special Government Pleader in obtaining the copy of the judgment nor any certified copy of the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Multan has been placed on the record. Thus we are not satisfied that a period of 10 days taken by the Special Government Pleader to inform the Solicitor Punjab was reasonable or that the same was actually consumed in obtaining copy of the judgment. After 4th December 1974 the explanation offered by the appellant is that the time was spent for obtaining necessary copies of the relevant documents.
5. We have perused the file. There is not a single document from which it could be shown that the same were not with the appellant and had been obtained during the time commencing from 4th December ending with 18th December 1974 when the appeal was actually drafted and drawn. In the absence of any such evidence it is not possible for us to accept that the delay incurred by the appellant from 4th December onward was due to sufficient cause. Needless to point out that the appellant was under obligation to explain the delay for each and ever day. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the appeal is barred by time and the same accordingly dismissed in lmine.