1. All these petitions involved common questions of law relating to Cancellation of sanctions for execution of leases in respect of lands in possession of the petitioners under the Old Grant Policy. It appears that occupancy rights in certain properties in Cantonment Areas were conferred upon civilians under Old Grant Policy. In 1996 the Respondent No,1 issued a policy to enable such occupants to obtain lease-hold rights for a period of 99 years in such properties upon fulfillment of certain conditions. According to the aforesaid policy an evaluation committee was required to determine the market value of the properties within six months and the occupants (prospective lessees) could complete lease formalities within one year after the finalization of the market rates failing which the sites were liable to be resumed. All the petitioners appear to be aggrieved by notices issued by the Military Estates Officer, Karachi Circle, requiring the occupants/petitioners to pay fabulous sums of money within a short span of time at the risk of resumption of plots. In some of them such notices have been followed by the actual orders of the resumption. In C.P.No,D-809 of 2003 die petitioner received a notice dated 16-6-2003 wherein he was called upon to pay more than Rs,523 millions up to 30-6-2003 "failing which sanction will lapse automatically." In C.P. No,D-983 of 2003 a notice for an amount of Rs,227,968,000 was demanded to be paid within two days i,e, 30-6-2003(the day following the issuance of notice 29th June, 2003 being a Sunday). In C.P. No,D-986 of 2003 a similar demand of Rs,183,920,000 was required to be fulfilled within the same period. In the same notice some part of the land was sought to be resumed. In C.P.No,D-1111 of 2003 the petitioner was called upon to pay Rs,217,399,200 in the same terms.
2. An identical notice was served upon the petitioner in C.P.No,D-1019 of 2003 demanding payment of Rs,309,760,000,00. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned notices were not only violative of the provisions of the policy dated 17th July, 1996 but were also mala fide. Though, Mr. Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui, learned Deputy Attorney-General, did appear on behalf of the respondents but he was unfortunately handicapped by the fact that appropriate instructions were not communicated to him by any responsible officer of the respondents. We may mention that C.P.No,809 of 2003 was admitted on 30-6-2003 and notices to respondents were directed. On 28- 8-2003 Mr. Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui, learned Deputy Attorney-General, appeared, waived notice and requested for time to obtain instructions. On 9-9-2003 he requested for further adjournment on the ground that he had not yet received comments from the concerned officer and the matter was adjourned for today with the specific observation that he was expected to obtain necessary comments failing which the Court might constrain to proceed in their absence. Today, however, no comments were filed and one Mr. Aamir Niaz, Sub Divisional Officer, Military Estates Office, appeared and only further time was requested. It was urged that appropriate instructions could not be communicated during the time granted earlier. We are afraid we cannot accept this plea in view of the facts of this case and the specific observations made in the Court order dated 9-9-2003. It needs to be realized that such orders are required to be treated seriously, Moreover, while Courts have been granting reasonable indulgence to Government departments to file comments, it would be ridiculous to assume that while a department of the Government needs three months to file para wise comments in Court, a citizen should be required to deposit hundreds of millions of rupees immediately on the working day following receipt of a notice. This fact by itself establishes that the impugned order of the Military Estates Officer was tainted with mala fide and cannot be upheld. It is apparent that one day's time was granted only to ensure that nobody should be able to make the required deposit. Before examining the other contentions it may be pertinent to refer the guideline "(g) and (h)" of the Policy of Conversion dated 18th July, 1996 which reads as follows:-
(g) Evaluation Committee will determine the market rate within six months, on the basis of market price collected by the Circle offices from Revenue Authorities, Estate agents, etc.
(h) The prospective lessee will complete the lease formalities within a period of one year after finalization of the market rate, failing which the site is liable to be resumed under the terms of the grant/Code lease. It was argued that the valuation of the properties by the appropriate committee was patently arbitrary. In this context all learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the Valuation Table evolved by, the Collectors in the District of Karachi pursuant to section 27-A of the Stamp Act 1899 and contended that the valuation made by the respondents exceeded at least 30 times the valuation of the most expensive land in Karachi. Learned Deputy Attorney-General on the other hand argued that the Evaluation Committee under the policy was required to assess the market value and not to follow the conservative table prepared by Collectors. In any event, he argued that this Court cannot undertake evaluation in Constitutional jurisdiction. Indeed, we A agree with him as regards the correctness of the proposition. Nevertheless, it needs to be kept in view that the table maintained by the Revenue Authorities, though not binding is required to be taken into consideration by the Evaluation Committee in terms of Clause (g) of the Policy. At the same time we would observe that in case evaluation is found to be, ex facie, arbitrarily this Court will not hesitate in striking it down. In any event, it is clear that the policy required the Evaluation Committee to determine the market rate within six months of its announcement and it has not been shown whether the amount claimed was premised on the market price prevailing within the relevant period or only that made at the time of issuance of the impugned notices. There is also force in the petitioners' contention that while they had applied for finalizing evaluation the respondents delayed matters for more than six years. We would, therefore, hold the evaluation made to be without lawful authority and direct the respondents to evaluate the properties afresh in accordance with the policy and after enabling affected- persons an opportunity of being heard.
3. Accordingly, the impugned notices are also liable to be set aside. It may at the same time be clarified that clause (h) of the Policy enables a prospective lessee to complete lease formalities within a period of one year after finalization of market rate and, therefore, a notice requiring the petitioners to complete the lease within one year and not one day should have been issued.
4. Learned Deputy Attorney-General attempted to argue that the petitioners did not acquire any vested rights in the properties occupied by them. Without going into the question whether the policy conferred any right or not we would simply observe that this fact by itself does not absolve the respondents from performing their duties honestly, reasonably, fairly and in the public interest.
5. Their failure to do so can always be enforced by the Courts. All the petitions are accordingly allowed and the respondents are expected to finalize evaluation within six months. The petitions stand disposed of along with the listed applications.