SH. HAKIM ALI, J.--- Nazir Ahmad, the present petitioner had filed a suit in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judger Vehari.In the year 1994, against present respondent No. 1, who was arrayed as defendant No. 3 and the Province of Punjab alongwith Municipal Committee through Administrator, Vehari as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. The suit was filed for the recovery of possession of Shop No. 39 alongwith its verandah situated on the Club Road, Vehari. The ownership of the land was vesting with Municipal Committee, Vehari while the plaintiff had pleaded its tenancy having been leased out to him on 3.4.1963 @ Rs. 20/- per month. Asserting in the plaint it was entered herein by the plaintiff that defendant No. 3, Imdad Hussain (present respondent No. 1) was delivered the possession of the aforesaid shop by him as a partner to a business. It was settled between him and the aforesaid respondent No. 1 that amount would be invested by the plaintiff in the business while work would be done by Imdad Hussain. It was alleged to be an oral contract. It is also the case of the plaintiff/petitioner that Imdad Hussain had got cancelled the allotment of the shop from the name of the plaintiff through an order dated 20.10.1971 passed by the then Commissioner, Multan Division and got allotted the shop in his favour. Challenging the validity of that order dated 20.10.1971 the grounds enumerated in the aforesaid plaint were that the Commissioner, Multan Division had not issued a prior notice, and had not granted an opportunity of hearing, while passing the impugned order dated 20.10.1971. It was further laid down that the Commissioner, Multan Division was not a controlling authority, so his order was a void order. Regarding the cause of action having arisen in July, 1993, it was stated that defendant No. 3, Imdad Hussain had refused to render accounts in that month of the year, so the suit was being filed in the year 1994. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 submitted separate written statements before the learned Civil Judge, Vehari. According to the pleading of Municipal Committee, defendant No. 2, it was narrated that plaintiff had filed an application for getting eviction of defendant No. 3 before the Commissioner, Multan Division on 20.10.1971 and that the aforesaid Commissioner had dismissed the application of the plaintiff, after hearing both the parties, and the shop in dispute was allotted by Administrator, Baldia, Vehari in favour of defendant No. 3 on 21.10.1971. Adding to the above-noted reply, it was stated by defendant No. 3 in his written statement that there was no relationship of partner between the parties and that the plaintiff in fact, had sublet the shop in dispute to the answering defendant No. 3, but when a notice to vacate the shop in dispute was sent by the plaintiff, he had made the complaint before the Commissioner, who had passed the impugned order by which the shop was cancelled from the plaintiff and the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Vehari allotted the shop to him on 21.10.1971. From the pleadings of the parties two preliminary issues in the following form were framed:-
(i) Whether the suit is within time? O.P. Parties.
(ii) Relief.
2. The plaintiff entered into the witness-box as PW.1 while he produced the Record Keeper of Municipal Committee namely, Athar Hussain as PW-2. Documents were produced by the plaintiff as well as defendants in their evidence. The suit was dismissed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Vehari on 13.9.2001, so the appeal by learned Additional District Judge on 6.7.2004, by deciding the preliminary issue of limitation.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has disputed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge on the following grounds:- Firstly, suit was wrongly held to be barred by limitation because it was filed when the relations between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 had become strained in July, 1993, so it was well within limitation.
Secondly, complete issues must have been framed upon all material facts as limitation question was based upon other questions of facts. Refers to 2001 SCMR 772 (Mst. Sughran Bibi v. Mst.
Jameela Begum and others).
Thirdly, order dated 20.10.1971 was appealable but no appeal was filed, as it was not an order passed under Land Revenue Act. The order dated 20.10.1971 was nullity and void ab initio in the eye of law. Against that void order, no limitation was to commence. To support his assertion, he has relied upon 1996 SCMR 856 (Muhammad Shafi v. Mushtaq Ahmed through Legal Heirs and others) and PLD 1969 Lah. 1039 (Hussain Bakhsh and others v. Settlement Commissioner and another). It has also been stated by the learned counsel that before passing the impugned order dated 20.10.1971, petitioner was not granted an opportunity of hearing, so the order was void in the eye of law. For that proposition he has referred to 1986 SCMR 962 (Mst. Rehmat Bibi and others v. Punnu Khan and others). In the presence of an allotment order, no fresh allotment could be made of the property in dispute in favour of lmdad Hussain, defendant No. 3. For it he has cited 1975 SCMR 173 (Muhammad Bashir v. Muhammad Khan and others). Nonspeaking order has got no legal value and is not valid. For that purpose he has quoted 2000 CLC 1783 (Sardar Ghulam Baqir Ali Khan v.
Secretary. To Government Punjab, Cooperative Department, Lahore and 2 others).
4. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel and perused the record minutely.
5. It is an admitted fact that the ownership of the shop had belonged to Municipal Committee i.e. Baldia and the petitioner was only a lessee of that shop, who was allegedly allotted the shop in the year 1963. There is no evidence brought on the record to prove the factum of partnership having been entered into between plaintiff and defendant No. 3, and the delivery of the shop to defendant No. 3 on that basis. An important document in the shape of application filed by Nazir Ahmad, plaintiff on 20.10.1971 has been brought on record as Exh.D-1, which is a material document and settles the matter in dispute. In the aforesaid application, which was addressed to the Commissioner it was stated that the possession of the shop was delivered to Imdad Hussain gratuitously, who was an ex-servant of the applicant. It was also noted in the aforesaid application that Imdad Hussain had refused to vacate the shop and was in illegal possession, against whom notice was also issued, so an order be issued to Administrator, Municipal Committee, Vehari for getting the shop vacated from aforesaid Imdad Hussain, and for the delivery of its possession to the applicant. There is also an order of Administrator upon it, who had noted that the claim of the applicant was rejected by the worthy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, Multan on 20.10.1971. There is yet another application, which has been brought into the evidence as Exh.D-2, which was filed by Nazir Ahmad, plaintiff, under Section 111 of the Municipal Ordinance, through which he had prayed that the recommendation in favour of Imdad Hussain by the Administrator be turned down and he be granted the lease and possession of the shop in dispute. This application is dated 30.11.1971. There is another order of Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Multan upon the application of Nazir Ahmad v. Administrator, which was passed on 22.12.1971, directing the parties to appear before the Commissioner en 3.1.1972. Another order has also been found which was passed by the Commissioner, by which the application moved under Section 111 of the Municipal Ordinance by Nazir Ahmad was dismissed in default, as he had failed to appear in person or through his counsel. There is also a postal telegram on the record, which was brought as Exh.D-4, which was sent by Nazir Ahmad, plaintiff to Imdad Hussain to vacate and handover the possession of shop, otherwise legal action would be initiated by him. From all these documents, it is proved that the petitioner had lost the possession of the shop in dispute in the year 1971, and Imdad Hussain was allotted/leased out the shop in dispute by Administrator on 21.10.1971. After the order dated 20.10.1971 passed by the Commissioner, the cause of action had arisen in the year 1971 to the plaintiff/petitioner.
He had lost the battle for the recovery of possession from Municipal officials/authorities but remained mum till the filing of the present suit in the year 1993. He was cognizant of the fact that he was filing the suit after 23 long years which had elapsed from 1971 till the institution of the suit in the year 1994. So, to cover the point of limitation, he concocted a story of oral partnership allegedly entered into between him and defendant No. 3, which story was itself contradicted by the above- noted documentary evidence especially, the applications filed by him as Exh.D-1 and Exh.D-2 in which no partnership story was narrated rather delivery of possession of the shop in dispute to Imdad Hussain was made as an act of gratis. Since the year 1971 till the year 1994, why the petitioner/plaintiff has not filed the suit or approached the competent forum has not been explained..Meaning thereby, the plaintiff/petitioner had accepted the allotment in favour of Imdad Hussain, defendant No. 3 by his own action and acquiescence.
6. According to Article 142 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner/plaintiff was bound to file the suit within twelve years of his dispossession or from discontinuance of his possession. The petitioner/plaintiff had lost the possession of the disputed property in the year 1971, so he had discontinued possession of that shop in dispute from the year 1971. He was, therefore, bound to file the suit for possession uptill the year 1983, but he took no steps to recover the possession uptill that time. Accordingly, the suit was correctly and rightly held barred by limitation by the learned Courts below. For this view, I am supported by AIR 1938 Calcutta 206 (Ramendra Prosad Basu and others v.
Baradaprosad Basu and others).
7. The plaintiff was bound to prove his possession within twelve years preceding the filing of the date of the suit. For that proposition vide 1987 SCMR 1791 (Mst. Shah Sultana and others v. Abdul Khaliq and another) and PLD 1994 Quetta 26 (Afzal Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Fahim and 4 others) are referred. Suit, which is filed after twelve years from its dispossession or discontinuance of the possession cannot be entertained and has to be dismissed. For that see PLD 1996 Kar. 458 (Allah Bakhsh and 4 others v. Dr. Abdul Waheed and another).
8. As regards the grievance of the petitioner that all the issues were not framed, it could be raised now at this stage. It was for the plaintiff/petitioner to raise such an issue before the learned Trial Court, as no such complaint was made at that stage, it is now too late in the day to challenge the impugned judgment and decree on this ground.
9. So far the ground taken by the petitioner that the order dated zU.10.1971 was void and there was no bar of limitation to corns into the way of the plaintiff/petitioner to file a suit against such a void order is to my mind is the wrong perception and interpretation of law. Petitioner has failed to show as to how this order was void, although he was himself filing application before the learned Commissioner. A person, who comes across with an adverse, even it be a void order, having been passed against him and being used, implemented and affecting him adversely in his interest yet he does not take any steps, to get it washed or does not take any action to get it cancelled, set it aside or annulled within the prescribed period of limitation, cannot claim the exemption of limitation, after the expiry of limitation. It would not be conducive to the better administration of justice that the persons/parties be allowed to come to the Court as and when they desire to get an order cancelled, ignoring or by-passing the mandatory provision of law of limitation. The order may be void or voidable, valid or invalid, if its sustenance in the field or on the screen has produced or changed the scene or the circ,umstances, materialiy, it has to be noted with concern and has to be stayed and stalled, to be get it set aside within the prescribed period of limitation otherwise their would be no end to litigation and the provisions of law of limitation would be negated in its effective application. A person/party, who has consented or acquiesced in a void order, by getting the running of limitation and permitting it to be expired, waiving or abandoning his right to take the necessary, needed and required action within the fixed period of limitation, cannot be permitted after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation, to rise and raise and file a suit or take any proceedings, after the end of limitation. The Courts cannot grant a free hand, and free passage of time to such persons, who are not vigilant for their rights, because the life lies in actions and actions die without life. Law of limitation requires life to actions and the prescription is the impetus to action. Law which has prescribed some limitation for actions, those actions are acceptable to the Courts, which are taken within its consonance.
10. There is no denying to the fact that void orders are nullity in the eye of law and limitation does not run against such orders and those need not be set aside and those orders can be ignored with impunity as expounded by the apex Court of the country. But it has to be kept in mind that when a void order has been challenged before any forum, authority or Court and the party remains unsuccessful to get it set aside, and does not take any further step, in such an event, it shall be presumed that party has accepted it and that order would not only attain finality but validity also between the parties. In such case, that order would be binding upon both the parties. Against that order, limitation shall be presumed to have been commenced. Party to it shall not be allowed to challenge its validity or void ness after the expiry of limitation.
10. Accordingly, the concurrent decrees and judgments, delivered by learned Courts below are_ re not liable to be cancelled, the result of which is dismissed in limine of the instant revision petition.
Civil .