The petitioner Pakistan Security Press Employees' Union is a Trade Union registered under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) comprising of the employees of Pakistan Security Printing Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). The petitioner is also the Collective Bargaining Agent of the aforesaid establishment.
2. It is alleged by the petitioner that it has been functioning as Collective Bargaining Agent of the aforesaid Corporation for the last about 20 years and in course of time has been endeavouring to protect and secure the rights of the employees through legal proceedings, with the result that it has incurred the displeasure of the Management. It is further alleged that the Management has been instrumental to the setting up of a rival pocket Union of workers in the year 1974. A referendum between the two Unions for the replacement of the petitioner as the Collective Bargaining Agent did not succeed, which further infuriated the establishment against the petitioner.
3. In this background when the existing collective agreement between the establishment and the Union expired in March 1975 and the petitioner put forth fresh demands, the Corporation refused to enter into negotiations invok--ing the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952.
Consequently the petitioner moved the National Industrial Relations Commission in Connec--tion with its demands which proceedings are still pending. In the meantime the petitioner filed a complaint against the Corporation before the Sind Labour Court No. III, Karachi in connection with certain alleged unfair labour practices. In these proceedings once again the Corporation invoked the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act. 1952 and challenged the maintainability of the complaint. The Labour Court upheld the objections and dismissed the complaint by its order dated 3-11-1975. According to the petitioner's allegation, by way of retaliatory action and with a view to obtain the cancellation of the registration of the petitioner-Union the Corporation moved the Registrar of Trade Unions, Sind for authorization to lodge a complaint against the petitioner under sections 10 and 13(b) of the Ordinance. On 14-11-1975 the Registrar without notice to the petitioner granted the request and issued the necessary authority under section 13(b) of the Ordinance in the name of the General Manager of the Corporation to lodge complaint against the petitioner under section 10 of the Ordinance. The petitioner challenges the vires and the legality of the action taken by the Registrar in issuing the aforesaid authority. It will be of advantage to set out the impugned authority which reads as under; "GOVERNMENT OF SIND DIRECTORATE OF LABOUR AUTHORITY TO LODGE A COMPLAINT U/S. 13(b) OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDINANCE, 1969 Whereas the undersigned has reasons to believe that the Trade Union named as Pakistan Security Press Employees' Union, Malir, Karachi, has, inter alia,, committed the following contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 :-
(1) Instigating illegal strike on more than one occasions in the Establish--ment, namely, Pakistan Security Printing Corporation Ltd. Malir, Karachi.
(2) The number of outsiders in the executive of the Union is more than 25 % of the total number of members of the executive in violation of rule 5 of Industrial Relations (Sind) Rules, 1973.
Therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in him under clause (b) of section 13 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the undersigned authorises Mr. Hamid Hussain, General Manager of Pakistan Security Printing Corporation Limited, Malir, Karachi to lodge complaint against Pakistan Security Press Employees' Union under section 10 of the I. R. O., 1969 for the above-mentioned contravention of the late.
(Sd.)
(S. M. Mutabar), Registrar of Trade Union, Sind and Director of Labour Sind, Karachi."
Armed with the aforesaid authority the General Manager of the Corporation filed the complaint before the Sind Labour Court No. II, Karachi for cancellation of the registration of the petitioner. The petitioner appeared before the B Court and challenged the maintainability of the proceedings but the Court by its order dated 9-1-1975 deferred the consideration of the legal objections to be decided after recording of evidence on merits. The petitioner then filed the present constitutional petition on 14-1-1976.
4. The registration of a Trade Union can be cancelled under direction of the Labour Court upon a complaint made by the Registrar under section 10 which provides as under :--- "10.---(1) The registration of Trade Union shall be cancelled if the Labour Court so directs upon a complaint in writing made by the Registrar that the Trade Union has-
(i) contravened or has been registered in contravention of any of the provisions of this Ordinance or the rules, or
(ii) contravened any of the provisions of its constitution ; or
(iii) made in its constitution any provision which is inconsistent with this Ordinance or the rules.
(2) . . . . . ---------------------------------------------------.
5. Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of the petition raised the following contentions :---------
(1) The permission granted by the Registrar to the General Manager of the Corporation is ultra vires the powers of the Registrar under section 13 of the Ordinance inasmuch as he cannot delegate the authority to file a complaint under section 10 to a person other than an officer subordinate to him and in any case not to the Management, which will obviously militate against the spirit of the law.
(2) The complaint filed under section 10 of the Ordinance in pursuance of the authority issued by the Registrar is itself not maintainable and the proceedings thereon are coram non judice.
(3) Even if it is assumed although not conceded, that the Registrar was competent to authorise the Management to file the complaint, the order issuing the authority was bad in law as it was passed without notice to the petitioner.
6. Now as seen from the perusal of section 10 of the Ordinance the law confers the power to move for the cancellation of the registration of a Trade Union upon the Registrar on specified grounds.
However, while providing for the powers and functions of the Registrar section 13, Inter alia, confers the power on the Registrar "to lodge, or authorise any person to lodge, com--plaints with the Labour Courts for action against Trade Unions for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practice or violation of any provision of this Ordinance". It was in purported exercise of this power that the Registrar issued the impugned authority.
7. In connection with the first contention mentioned above, Mr. Shahen--shah Hussain, first urged that clauses (b) and (cc) of section 13 must be read together and the words "any person" as used in clause (b) must be construed to mean any officer subordinate to the Registrar. The material part of section 13 reads as follows :---- "13. The following shall be the powers and functions of the Registrar :- (a)---------------------------------------------------------
(b) to lodge, or authorise any person to lodge, complaints with the Labour Court or Commission for action, including prosecution against Trade Unions, employers workers or other persons for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practice or violation of any provision of this Ordi--nance or for expending the funds of a Trade Union in contravention of the provisions of its constitution ;
(cc) to inspect the accounts and records of the registered Trade Unions, or investigate or hold such enquiry as he deems fit, either himself or through any officer subordinate to and authorised in writing in this behalf by him."
Learned counsel sought the aid of the rule of ejusdem generic and argued that the words "any person" are words of general import and take their meaning from the particular and specific words used by the law maker in the following clause (cc). On a plain reading of the provisions contained in clause (b) and clause (cc) it is clear to me that these clauses relate to two different aria distinct functions or powers of the Registrar and do not deal with the same subject-matter. Consequently, in my opinion the argument on the basis or the rule of ejusdem generic is wholly misconceived.
Clause (b) of section 13 deals with the power or function of the Registrar to lodge complaints with the Labour Court or Commission for action against the specified persons and further gives him the power to authorise any person to lodge such complaints On the other hand clause (cc) deals with the power of Registrar to inspect the accounts and records of the Trade Unions and in this behalf confers upon him the additional power to hold enquiries either himself or "through an officer subordinate to him and authorised in writing in this behalf". In the context of the wording of clause
(cc) obviously the Registrar in the very nature of things would be permitted to investigate or hold enquiries either himself or through any subordinate officer. On the other hand clause (b) deals with the complaints to another authority, namely, the Labour Court of the Commission for action under the law and therefore, it was not necessary to restrict the power of the Registrar to authorise the lodging of the complaints to subordinate officers.
8. It may further be pointed out that the words "or authorise any person to lodge" were originally inserted in-.Clause (b) of section 13 of the Ordinance by the Amending Ordinance XXIV of 1975 and by the same Ordinance a new subsection (13) was also added in section 22 empowering the Registrar to "authorise in writing an officer" to perform all or any of his functions under that section.
Mr. A. R. Kazi, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3, therefore, argued and rightly so that wherever the law maker thought it fit to empower the Registrar to authorise the perform-- ance of his functions by an officer, such provision was specifically made. It is, therefore, clear that the words "any person" cannot be given a restricted meaning and confine the same to officers generally or the officers subordinate to the Registrar. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in State v. Zia- ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49) observed that the general rule is that if words are used in one clause of a statute to convey one particular sense then if those same word or words having the same import are not used in an other clause then the intention of the law maker is to make a departure.
Consistent with this rule of interpretation obviously the Legislature by using the words "any person" in clause (b) of section 13 intended to give the Registrar unrestricted power to authorise any one, whether a private citizen or an officer subordinate to him, to lodge the complaint. However, in clause (cc) of that section by using different language the power of the Registrar was restricted to hold an enquiry through an officer subordinate to him. The words "any person" as they occur in Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. Were compared with the words "a party" used in sub-rule (2) of the said rule in Fehmida Khatoon v. Additional Deputy Commissioner (PLD 1975 Lah.945) and it was held that the words "any person" do not relate to a party in the suit or the proceedings but mean any person irrespective of the fact whether he has been a party in the suit or proceedings, for the purpose of filing review application under sub-rule (1). On the other band the words "a party" occurring in sub-rule (2) pertain to a person who is already a party in a suit or proceedings who may file a review application against the judgment or order made against him, if he does not want to fill appeal against the same. On a parity of reasoning I have come to the conclusion that the words "any person" used in clause (b) of section 13 cannot be given the restricted meaning as canvassed on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, the Registrar is competent to authorise any person, even other than an officer subordinate to him to lodge complaint for action against the Trade Union or other persons specified in section 13 (b) before the Labour Court or Commission in relation to the matters mentioned therein.
9. It was however, contended next on behalf of the petitioner that even if the expression "any person" is construed widely as contended for, on behalf of the respondent then the provisions of section 13(b) being general provisions would be attracted only if there is no express provision for a particular matter in the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Counsel argued that sec--tion 10 is an express provision pertaining to the cancellation of the registration of a Trade Union and hence a sui generis and self-contained provision of law, which will prevail as against the general provisions contained in clause (b) of section 13. Upon a proper consideration of the relevant provisions contained in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, I find considerable force in this contention. In the case of Zia-ur-Rahman, already referred to in connection with the first argument, at page 89 of the report the Supreme Court reiterated the well-established rule of interpretation that where in a statute there are both general provisions as well as special provisions for meeting a particular situation, then it is the special provisions which must be applied to that particular case or situation instead of general provisions. This rule is contained in the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant which in other words, in the context of the argument advanced would mean that the general provision will not be construed to detract from the effect of the special provisions contained in the statute. Now the plain reading of section 10 of the Ordinance shows that this section was designed to make provision only for the cancellation of registration of a Trade Union.
As to the manner for achieving the object the prerequisites laid down by the section are that a complaint in writing be made by the Registrar to the Labour Court that the Trade Union is guilty of one of the acts specified in the section. A comparison with section'10 of the provisions of section 13(b) shows that the Registrar has been empowered to lodge or authorise any person to lodge complaints with, inter alia, the Labour Court for action against a Trade Union and others for the following :--
(i) any alleged offence.
(ii) any unfair labour practice.
(iii) violation of any provisions of the Ordinance.
(vi)expending the funds of Trade Union in contravention of the provisions of its constitution.
It will be noticed that section 13(b) does not refer to contravention of any rule or the provision of the constitution of the Trade Union which are included as grounds for cancellation of registration under section 10. Clearly, therefore, the complaints regarding the contravention of the rules or its own constitution by the Trade Union will not be a complaint within the purview of section 13(b). It, therefore, follows that in case of a complain which includes these two grounds or either of them can only be lodged undo section 10 by the Registrar himself and the Registrar is not entitled to authorise any other person for making such type of complaint. In then circumstances, will it be reasonable to interpret section 13(b) so as to hold that the Registrar would be competent only in regard to some of the ground mentioned in section 10(1) to authorise other persons to make a complaint there ? To my mind such a situation cannot be countenanced in view of the settled rule of interpretation that in construing a statute unreasonable and inconvenient results are to be avoided. This strengthens the conclusion that section 10 is a self-contained special provision dealing with the cancellation of registration whereas section 13(b) is a general J provision empowering the Registrar in all other cases to authorise any person to lodge a complaint.
10. The Petitioner has placed on record the letter of authority issued by the Registrar under section 13(b) (Annexure "E") which shows that the Registrar has taken into consideration the violation of rule 5 of Industrial Relations (Sind) Rules, 1973, as one of the grounds for authorising the respondent to lodge complaint against the petitioner. The complaint filed before the Labour Court by the General Manager of the respondent is also on the record as Annexure "F" which also clearly speaks of the petitioner's having allegedly contravened among other things, the provisions of its own constitution. It would, therefore, appear that the petitioner is being proceeded against, inter alia, on the dual grounds of violation of the rules and its constitution. Both these matters are outside the scope, of section 13(b) and clearly, therefore, the Registrar had no jurisdiction, in any view of the matter, to authorise any other person to lodge the complaint. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the further contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner.
11. Mr. A. R. Kazi, contended that the present Constitutional Petition does not lie as efficacious statutory remedy is available to the petitioner under section 11 of the Ordinance by way of appeal against the final order that may be passed by the Labour Court. In Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v.
Pakistan (PLD 1972 SC 279), it was observed : "The rule that the High Court will not entertain a writ Petition when other appropriate remedy is yet available is not a rule of law barring jurisdiction but a rule by which the Court regulates its jurisdiction. One of the well-recognised exceptions to the general rule is a case where an order is attacked on the ground that it was wholly without authority. . . A question of jurisdiction is a matter for Review, which is based not on the merits but on the legality of the lower authority' proceedings," In view of the dictum lad down by the Supreme Court the objection raised by the learned counsel is not tenable as in the present case also the petitioner challenges the legality of the proceedings and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the complaint.
12. For the foregoing reasons I have come to the conclusion that the impugned order of the Registrar dated 14-I1-1975 authorising the filing of the complaint is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Similarly the proceedings taken upon the complaint are coram non judice and accordingly shall stand quashed. It will, however, be open to the Registrar to file a proper complaint against the petitioner if he deems it fit to do so. The petition is allowed with no order as to costs.