1. G. SAFDAR SHAH, J.-These two leave petitions, in which the questions of law and facts are the same, are directed against the same judgment of the Baluchistan High Court at Quetta, dated 2-9- 1978, and arise in the following circumstances :- The petitioners herein are Coal Dealers, and in order to supply coal to various parts of the country by Railway they naturally required some space at the Spezand Railway Station, Baluchistan, from where they used to load their goods for various destinations. In order to secure for themselves the required space at the said Railway Station, to store and transport their goods to various parts of the country, they entered into agreements with the respondent Railways on 7-6-1976 in pursuance whereof they were allowed the requisite space for a period of one year as licensees. Since the agreements in question were renewable for another year, they applied to the respondent Railways for their renewal for another year in the month of May 1977, and their applications were granted with the result that they became entitled to use the said space allotted to them at the Railway Station Spezand up to 9-6-1977. During the currency of the said contracted period, however, respondent Railways served on them notice on 13-3-1978 to the effect that their said agreements would stand cancelled forthwith under the orders of the Martial Law Authorities. Therefore, they were asked to hand over within a week of the receipt of the said notice the vacant possession of the plots.
2. Upon receipt of the said notice, the petitioners herein filed in the High Court of Baluchistan at Quetta, Constitutional Petitions challenging therein the vires of the said notices on the grounds inter alia that they were issued by the respondent Railways without any lawful authority; that the notices in question were in fact issued at the behest of the Martial ' Law Authorities and consequently the same could not be held to have been issued by the respondent Railways in the exercise of their own jurisdiction; and that the notices in question had been issued under the colourable exercise of their jurisdiction by the respondent Railways. These writ petitions were contested by the respondent Railways and dismissed. The view taken by the High Curt was that the writ petitions in question were incompetent as the relief sought therein was for the enforcement of the contractual rights of the petitioners which relief could not be granted under the Constitutional jurisdiction, as also that the impugned action of the respondent Railways was unexceptionable, as initially the petitioners had succeeded to secure for themselves the storing space at Spezand Railway Station due to the exercise of pernicious influence through the then Minister of Railways, Government of Pakistan, namely, Taj Muhammad Khan Jamali. The learned counsel for the petitioners has taken exception to the said findings of the High Court upon the same grounds which had been urged in the writ petitions. However, we have not been impressed with either of his contentions. The learned counsel concedes that the agreements with the respondent Railways, being written; would be governed by clause 10 thereof which runs as tender :- "10. The Railway Administration shall be at liberty to terminate this Agreement at any time before the expiry thereof on giving one month's previous notice in writing, without assigning any reason, and without being liable to pay any compensation for such termination: Provided that the Licensee(s) shall be entitled to a refund of a proportionate part of the annual sum paid by him/them Provided further that in the event o f the breach of any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement by the Licensee(s) or his/their servants and employees, the Railway Administration shall be entitled to determine this Agreement forthwith without any notice and without being liable to pay any compensation whatsoever and the amount paid by the Licensee(s) in terms of clause 2 as well as the Security Deposit shall stand forfeited to the Railway Administra--petition."
3. Now a look at the language of the said clause would show that the respondent. Railways had reserved to itself the right to terminate the agreements of the petitioners at any time, before the expiry of the contracted period, by giving them a month's notice, without assigning any reason and without being liable to pay them any compensation, although for the unexpired portion of the contracted period they would be entitled to the refund of the proportionate amount of licence fee already paid by them. This being the clear and unambiguous purpose of the said clause 10, evidently the notices served on the petitioners by the respondent Railways were unexceptionable.
4. The other finding of the High Court, viz. That evidently the petitioners had secured for themselves space at Spezand Railway Station by the exercise of pernicious influence through the then Minister of Railways is also based on proper evidence. In this connection reference has been made by the High Court to certain documents to which no objection has been taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners. We are, therefore, in respectful agreement with the finding of the High Court, specially the one by which the High Court rightly held that since the object of the writ petitions was to seek the enforcement of the contractual rights of the petitioners, the writ petitions filed by them would be incompetent, as the said rights could not be enforced by resorting to the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
5. The learned counsel lastly argued that by the summary eviction of the petitioners from the space allotted to them a: Spezand Railway Station, Baluchistan, would mean their financial ruination, and so they should be allowed some reasonable time to arrange their affairs accordingly. We are afraid, this prayer cannot be granted by this Court, as we have no jurisdiction in the matter.
6. However, the petitioners, may apply to the respondent Railways in that behalf and we have no doubt that their application would be given sympathetic consideration.
7. These petitions, therefore, fail and are hereby dismissed.