' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- The petitioner seeks leave to appeal from judgment, dated 21- 2-2004 of the Balochistan Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), in Service Appeal No,1 of 2000.
2. The petitioner was appointed' as District and Sessions Judge, by notification, dated 12-8-1997, issued by the Government of Balochistan on the recommendation of the High Court of Balochistan on ad hoc basis for a period of six months or till the regular appointment was made by the Balochistan Public Service Commission, whichever was earlier. His ad hoc appointment was extended from time to time on six monthly basis. The High Court issued Notification, dated 10-8- 1999 whereby further extension of his service was declined. He filed a review petition before the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Balochistan. Thereafter, he preferred Appeal No,1 of 2000 before the Tribunal which was dismissed by the impugned judgment, dated 21-2-2004. Hence this petition. For leave to appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the appeal of the petitioner was heard by a learned Bench of the Tribunal comprising two learned Judges of the High Court of Balochistan and the judgment was reserved. Therefore, the learned Chief Justice of High Court of Balochistan was not justified to withdraw the same for re-hearing by another Bench. The date of announcement of judgment by the Tribunal could not be regarded as the date of hearing was held in the case of Manager Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678.
It was next contended that the High Court had issued show-cause notice to the petitioner based on a fact finding inquiry of the Additional Secretary, Interior Department, and Government of Balochistan in regard to certain allegations against the petitioner. However, the inquiry proceedings against the petitioner were dropped by the High Court. The notification, dated 10-8- 1999 was in the nature of dismissal of the petitioner from service on the basis of certain charges which was not sustainable at law. It was not a case of non-extension of service. The learned counsel relied on the case of Muhammad Siddiq Javaid Chaudhry. v. The Government of West Pakistan PLD 1973 SC 393. It was submitted that the petitioner having completed two years period of probation had become a regular District and Sessions Judge in view of explanation II of rule 8 of the Balochistan Additional/District and Sessions Judges Service Rules, 1980 (since repealed)
(hereinafter referred to as the Service Rules). Therefore, the question of extension or otherwise of the service of the petitioner had become redundant.
4. On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General, Balochistan, as well as learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the High Court argued that the petitioner was appointed on ad hoc basis for a period of six months which was further extended from time to. Time. The notification dated 10-8-1999 issued by the. High Court intimating the petitioner. Of further non-extension of his sad hoc appointment was in conformity with his terms and conditions of sery ice. Therefore, he could not claim to have been confirmed in his appointment as District and Sessions Judge merely because he had completed two years of service as ad hoc appointee. The learned counsel placed reliance on the case of Mian Muhammad Afzal and others v. Government of the Punjab and others 1982 SCM R 408. They further submitted that the petitioner did not have any legal right to insist for continuation of his appointment and that no exception could be taken to the impugned judgment of the Tribunal.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties as well as the learned Advocate-General, Balochistan at length. We find that by notification dated 12-8-1997 issued by the Government of Balochistan S&GAD the appointment of the petitioner as District and Sessions Judge (BS-19) was clearly expressed to be on ad hoc basis for a period of six months or till regular selection was made by the Balochistan Public Service Commission, whichever was earlier. His ad hoc appointment was extended from time to time by notifications, dated 4-2-1998, 29-7-1998 and 6-2-1999 issued by the High Court of Balochistan by virtue of the powers delegated by the Government. His last extension of ad hoc appointment was to expire on 11-8-1999.
6. Sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 5 of the Service Rules as substituted by notification, dated 21-7-1982, provided the following method of recruitment to the post of District and Sessions Judge:-
(2) Appointment to the posts of District and Sessions Judges shall be made:---
(a) by promotion against 50% of the posts on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of High Court from amongst the Senior Additional District and. Sessions Judges.
(b) by transfer against 25% of the posts from the 'officers belonging to Central and Provincial Governments on the recommendation of the Chief Justice: ' Provided that if no suitable officers are available for transfer the appointment against the reserved quota as mentioned in clause (b) may be made by promotion on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court, from amongst the Senior Additional District and Sessions Judges.
(c) by initial recruitment against the remaining 25% of the posts on the recommendation of the Commission with association of the Chief Justice.
(3) In case of ad hoc appointment, the Chief Justice shall advertise the posts and invite applications and after selecting suitable candidates, shall recommend to the Government the names of the candidates, to be appointed on ad hoc basis".
' It would thus be clear that the regular appointment against 25% posts of the District and Sessions Judges were to be made by the initial recruitment on the recommendations of the Balochistan Public Service Commission with association of the Chief Justice. Therefore, it could not be said that the petitioner had become permanent incumbent of the office of District and Sessions Judge by efflux of time.
7. The words "ad hoc appointment" as defined by clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Balochistan Civil Servants Act No:IX of 1974, mean the appointment of a duly qualified person made otherwise than in accordance with prescribed method of recruitment, pending recruitment in accordance with such method. Such an appointment cannot be equated with regular appointment. It is meant for C a particular object. The ad hoc appointment by its very definition is of a qualified person but is not in accordance with rules prescribed for regular appointment for which the recommendation of the Public Service Commission is necessary. There is no rule which can. Entitle the ad hoc appointee to be confirmed in a vacancy during the subsistence of lien of another person on such vacancy. In some cases, it may continue unless regularized by the competent authority in accordance with law. In Federation of Pakistan and another v. Hashim Shah Qureshi 1987 SCM R 156, it was held that mere continuance of employment of a temporary employee for two years or more in service did not ipso facto convert the appointment into permanent one. In the case of MRs, Naila Khalid v. Pakistan through Secretary Defence and others PLD 2003 SC 420, it was laid down that ad hoc appointment did not confer on an appointee any right or interest to continuous appointment, seniority or promotion and that service of such an appointee could be dispensed with at any moment without assigning any reason.A somewhat similar view was taken in the cases of Mian Muhammad Afzal (supra), Ghulam Sarwar v. Province of Punjab 1982 SCM R 46, Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and another v. Abdul Majeed 2001 SCM R 1971 and Muhammad Azam Khan and others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Chief Secretary, N.-W.F.P. Peshawar and 4 others 1998 SCMR 214, Muhammad Azam Ali and 35 others v. Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary and another 1985 SCM R 1408, Saifuddin v. Secretary to Government of the Punjab and others 1982 SCM R 877, Farida Khanum v.
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Education, Islamabad C.P. No,957 of 1999, decided by this Court on 16-6-1999 and Amjad Ali v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and others 2001 SCMR 12. We may also observe that the ad hoc appointment by its very nature is different from that of appointment on probation as held in the case of Muhammad Siddique Ahmed Khan v.
Pakistan Railways 1997 SCM R 1514. The case of Muhammad Siddique Javaid Chaudhry (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner being that of a probationer is distinguishable from the present case involving the cessation of office by the ad hoc appointee. In our opinion, even without the issuance of notification dated 10-8-1999, the petitioner would have ceased to hold the post of District and Sessions Judge after 11-8-1999.
8. As regards withdrawal of the service appeal by the Chief Justice from one Bench of the Tribunal and its entrustment to another, we may observe that section 3(3) of the Balochistan Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act No, VI of 1989 lays down that the Tribunal consists of a Chairman, being the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Balochistan and two members each of whom is the sitting Judges of the High Court of Balochistan. By virtue of Section 4 thereof, the Chairman may, at any stage of hearing of an appeal, may withdraw any appeal pending before a Bench and may make it over to another Bench. Admittedly, the appeal of the petitioner was pending before a Bench of the Tribunal. Therefore, the Chief Justice of High Court of Balochistan, being Chairman of the Tribunal, was empowered to withdraw the same for entrustment to another Bench of the Tribunal. Even otherwise, no prejudice was shown to have been caused by the transfer of the case from one Bench to another. Therefore, the hyper-technical objection taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner, at a belated stage is overruled. The impugned judgment of the Tribunal does not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference by this Court. Even otherwise this is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal.
9. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed and leave to appeal is declined accordingly.