KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-The dispute in this case is about 71 kanals and 17 marlas of evacuee land in Chak No. 279/RB, Khurd Tehsil and District Lyallpur (now Faisalabad). It is not necessary to go into the lengthy details of this property and for the purpose of the present order, it will be sufficient to mention that Rehmatullah (a claimant displaced person) pre--decessor-in-interest of respondents 2 to 5 filed an application on 3-10-1965, pointing out evacuee character -of this - land and claiming its allotment as he bad still enough unsatisfied units of his duly verified claim for the land left by him in India. At this place it may be mentioned that the land in dispute was a Lambardari square which had been allotted to an evacuee (Balwant Singh under Mule Breeding Conditions) and in the context aforesaid a question arose whether this type of property was also to be treated as an evacuee property allotable under the refugee/settlement laws or not. The application of Rehmatullah was duly entertained on which Patwari gave his report with regard to particular field numbers available for transfer on 4-11-1965 ; the Girdawar made his report on 5-11- 1965 and the Tehsildar endorsing the aforesaid report put up the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for proper orders on 8-11-1965. However, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner sent the case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for advice on 9-1-1967. The Deputy Secretary to the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 28-4-1967 replied and directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that as this was obviously an evacuee land, it "may be utilized for - the satisfaction of deserving claims". Consequently the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 20-5-1967, after referring to the order of the Deputy Secretary wrote to the Tehsildar/Assistant Settlement Commissioner (Land) that- the case was moved on the application of Rehmatullall son of Nizatm Din of Chak No. 279/R. B.
Tehsil Lyallpur. Later on Bashir, Suleman sons of Jamila and Afzal Hussain have also joined the case for allotment of the same land. You are accordingly requested to proceed with the matter considering the right of the applicants accordingly."
2. It appears that the Local Colonization Officers again moved in the matter with the result that after some protracted correspondence on 24-12-1968, Secretary Colonies (Board of Revenue)' ordered that Lambardari square of Balwant Singh was a state property which was to be dealt with under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act V of 1912 and 'the statements of conditions issued thereunder, and was not an evacuee property and as such could not be allotted to any refugee claim holder in lieu of his claim.
3. As this had the effect of jeopardizing the claim of Rehmatullah arid overriding the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, therefore, feeling aggrieved from the aforesaid order/ communication he filed a Writ Petition bearing No: 730-R/ I 970 which was accepted by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 21-5-1975 who declared the aforesaid communication/order as to be without lawful authority with a further observation that... "it will be now for the settlement authority to dispose of the application, filed by the petitioner (Rehmatullah) in accordance with law."
It may be mentioned that during the pendency of that writ petition (Rehmatullah) died on 20-4- 1972 and his legal representatives (now respondents) who were brought on record pursued the same.
4. It further appears that during the pendency of the writ petition of Rehmatullah aforesaid the present petitioner Nawab Din appeared on the scene and succeeded in getting the land in dispute on tender basis from the local colony officials under the Colonization of the Government Lands (Punjab) Act, for the year 1970-71 which term went on extending from year to year up to 1974.
5. A further development which took place was that on 28-1-1975, there was promulgated Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act XIV of 1975 (hereinafter called the Act or Act of 1975) which came into force with effect from 1-7-1974. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, since section 3 (1) of that Act conferred a right of sale of evacuee land to a person who had been in its occupation continuously for four harvests "immediately preceding Kharif 1973" therefore, his client on 1-12-1975 filed an application to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for the sale of this land to him. The matter after departmental processing reached the learned Member, Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner/ Secretary (Rural) who held that according to the existing policy, the petitioner was not eligible for the purchase of the land in dispute. The order/ communication of the Member Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Com--missioner is dated 20- 10-1977. (Here it may be reminded that the application of Rehmatullah dated 3-10-1965 remained undisposed of due to the over--lapping interventions made and developments created by the present petitioner).
6. However, to continue with the pursuit of the present petitioner, he at that juncture filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 1565-R/1977 in which he prayed that----- "the order of the Honourable Member, Board of Revenue/Chief Settle--ment Commissioner conveyed through Memo. No. 244/77/875/RL dated 20-1L`-1977 may be declared as having been passed without lawful authority and as of no legal consequence. It is further prayed that a direction may be issued to the respondent that the land in dispute may be transferred by means of sale at the rate of Rs. 100 per unit."
In the writ petition successors-in-interest of Rematullah figured as respondents-(though impleaded later on 18-12-1977)-and it was averred that the petitioner apprehended "his ejectment from the land in dispute and the allotment of the land in favour of the successors-in-interest of Rehmatullah. At an earlier place it was pleaded that--- "so such land cannot be transferred to a claimant who might be holding a verified claim and such claim can be satisfied as provided in the law by receiving cash compensation."
Still at another place it was indicated that the petitioner was aware of the order of the High Court dated 21-5-1975 passed in Writ Petition No. 730-R/1970 filed by Rehmatullab, and it was averred "and his Lordship also directed that the application of the deceased (Rehmatullah) for the allotment against his verified claim be disposed in accordance with law" An impression was expressed in para. 5 of the writ petition that Rehmatullah "probably" claimed as an "informant" In corresponding para. 5 of the written-statement filed by heirs of Rehmatullah it was conceded that it was on the information of Rehmatullah that the case was referred to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for examining its availability for allotment, who then passed order on 28-4-1967 above referred to, whereunder, the case was further forwarded by order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 20-5-1967 to the Tehsildar Assistant Settlement Commissioner to decide the rights of the applicants accordingly. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court shows that Rehmatullah had also pleaded that already being an allottee in this Chak where his 617 units were still unsatisfied, in the circumstances, be was eligible to get this land.
7. In that Writ Petition No. 1565-R/1977 the petitioner had prayed for an order of status quo which was granted to him on 8-11-1977. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 13-12-1978, who held that according to Act XIV of 1975 only such land could be allotted to a person which had become "available for disposal" immediately before the repeal of the laws mentioned therein. The date of the repeal of the laws mentioned in that Act was 1-7-1974. It was held that as the application of Rehmatullah was still pending and had not been adjudicated upon, therefore, the proceedings of that application were saved under section 2 (2) of the Act with the result that the land in dispute was still subjudice on the relevant date and had not become available for disposal under that Act but had to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Act repealed (in this case Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act XLVII of 1958).
8. The petitioner has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal against the same to this Court.
9. From what has been stated above it is evident that now it is, a common ground that the land in dispute is an evacuee property (or to be more precise erstwhile evacuee property) and both parties claim its transfer as such and on that basis. The short question which thus arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner has a preferential right for its transfer as against Rehmatullah who was a claimant displaced person.
10. Learned counsel has referred to section-2 (1) of the Act which inter alia repeals the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act XLVII of 1958. Section 2 (2) then states that - "upon the repeal of the aforesaid Acts and Regulations, all proceedings which, immediately before such repeal, may be pending before the authorities appointed thereunder shall stand transferred for final disposal to such officers as may be notified by the Provincial Govern--ment in the official Gazette and all cases decided by the Supreme Court or a High Court after such repeal which would have been remanded to any such authority in the absence of such repeal shall be remanded to the officers notified as aforesaid."
Subsection (3) lays down that- "any proceedings transferred or remanded to an officer in pursuance of subsection (2) shall be disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Act or Regulation hereby repealed to which the proceedings =elate- and subsection (4) provides that- "the final orders passed under subsection (3) shall be executed by the Board of Revenue of the Province in accordance with the provisions of the Act or Regulation hereby repealed to which the proceedings related."
Learned counsel argues that the word "proceedings" used in subsection (2) of section 2 means only judicial proceedings, and according to him the mere fact that certain Produce Index Units of a claim holder have remained unsatisfied and he wants allotment of land against the same would not make unsatisfied units as proceedings pending somewhere. According to the learned counsel the "proceedings" saved were those which were of judicial nature, and as no proceedings of that nature were pending before any authority regarding this land on or before the relevant date therefore it was a land available for transfer to him.
11. We have given our due consideration to the arguments advanced but find no force in the same.
Subsection (1) of section 2 repeals 7 laws namely-----
(i) the Regulation of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 (III of 1956) ;
(ii) the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956 (XLII of 1956) ;
(iii) the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 (XII of 1957) ;
(iv) the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (XXVIII of 1958) ;
(v) the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 (XLVII of 1958) ;
(vi) the Scrutiny of Claims (Evacuee Property) Regulation, 1961 ; and
(vii) the Price of Evacuee Property and Public Dues (Recovery) Regulation, 1971.
After repealing the above laws then comes subsection (2) which has been reproduced above. The intention of that subsection (2) is to save "all proceedings" pending before the authority appointed thereunder, i.e. Under the aforesaid Acts and Regulations which have been repealed. Now it is obvious that the repealed laws had conferred various substantive rights in favour of persons mentioned therein, and confining ourselves to the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, the said Act and the schemes framed thereunder or recognised or adopted by or under that Act bestowed a right on a claim holder to have allotment of erstwhile evacuee land in lieu of the land left by him in India both as a claimant in his own right and also as an informant. This is a valuable statutory right which the Courts in Pakistan have consistently been enforcing. The detailed procedure for enforcement of that right is contained in the relevant Act, and various schemes on the subject. It was under those scheme(s) and the Act that Rehmatullah claimant displaced persons formally applied in writing pointing out the evacuee character and for the transfer of the land in dispute, which at the relevant time, according to him was available for allotment under the aforesaid laws and was so held later in Writ Petition No. 737-R of 1970 decided on 21-5-1975. The institution of an application for allotment in the circumstances above mentioned was therefore institution of a legal proceeding in which the entitlement of the applicant or applicants and the suitability And availability of the land in dispute was to be examined and which later aspect was in fact judicially so examined by the High Court in the earlier writ petition. Then came the stage of transferring the land, obviously after keeping in view the claims and applications of rival contestants if any. Orders of making allotment or refusing allotment were, it is well known, appealable and revisable under Act XLVII of 1958 and at some earlier stage revision petition could also be instituted in the High Court under section 21 of that Act against the same (though this provision was later on repealed). The Settlement authorities in this way acted in a quasi judicial manner and their proceedings were not merely of an executive or administrative nature. These proceedings dealt not only with valuable rights of claimants displace persons, but also with a very valuable kind of property which ,form back-bone of the country's economy and wealth. To call these proceedings merely of executive nature, in the very context of law relevant on the subject, is not justified in the present case. The affixation of word "all" before the word "proceedings" does not authorise exclusion of any type of proceedings from the ambit of that word by making a division of the kind of judicial C proceedings and executive proceedings, so long as those were proceedings under that Act dealing with the settlement of land and deciding the eligibility of an applicant for its transfer. In Shah Nawaz and others v. Member, Board of Revenue (PLD 1978 SC 266) though the connotation of the word "proceedings" was not expressly debated or argued but pendency of an application of an informant who wanted reward of his mukhbari was considered by this Court as "pending proceedings" which were held to have preference over another new applicant whose turn, as in this case; under section 3 could come only if the land was not settled upon or given to an earlier applicant proceedings about whose entitlement were still pending immediately before the date of repeal of the previous relevant law.
12. At this place we would like to observe that connotation of word "proceedings" is to be understood with reference to the text, the law, the subject-matter, and the intention of the Legislature discernible from the overall examination of the aims and objects of the relevant enactment under scrutiny. In our view, subsections (2) and (3) of section 2 leave no room for doubt, that their intention was to allow the cases of old applicants for allotment of land which were pending on the relevant date of repeal, to continue so as to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act repealed to which the proceedings related. There is no ambiguity in this case that the application of Rehmatullah for claiming the land in, dispute was under Act XLVII of 1958 and as such it was to continue under the same Act despite its repeal. When the words used in the statute are "all D proceedings" it is not justified to diminish the totality of those proceedings by introducing jurisprudential concepts, for example of judicial proceedings, quasi-judicial proceedings, executive proceedings, administrative proceedings, penal proceedings, fiscal proceedings, and proceedings before a Court etc. The focus should remain on the words deployed in the statute and sot long as the proceedings are under the Act repealed ; before the competent authorities ; and are of the kind and for the purpose indicated in that Act, for the enforcement of rights mentioned therein on the applicants concerned, the are the proceedings which are saved so as to continue under the relevant law repealed. The provision made is of the kind which is contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act X of 1897 where it has never been doubted that legal proceedings for enforcement of substantive rights are such proceedings which can continue after the repeal of the enactment under which they were initiated and were pending at the relevant time.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Muhammad Mehdi v. Dr. Habibur Rehman and 2 others (PLD 1978 Quetta 8), for the proposition that the word proceedings always means judicial proceedings. In that case an informant filed a mukhbari application on 22-8-1973 before the Chief Settlement Commissioner alleging that the property in dispute had been obtained by the respondent therein by misrepresenting that it was an evacuee plot though it was really a house. It was further pleaded that the respondent had already obtained another evacuee house and as such he could not be given two evacuee houses. On this application the Chief Settlement Commissioner called for a report, but as the same was not submitted within a reasonable time the applicant repeated his application again on 10-3-1975 and 13-3-1975. The Chief Settlement Commissioner treating it as pending case by his order dated 19-6-1975, held that "the application is admitted as pending". The respondent challenged this order by means of a writ petition and a learned Single Judge of the Quetta High Court held that as the application was pending on administrative and not judicial side therefore it was not saved by the words "pending proceedings" as used in section 2 (2) of Act XIV of 1975. It was further held that these words meant only "judicial proceedings", and not administrative proceedings. It was also noticed that on 22-8-1973, when the original application had been filed, the Chief Settlement Commissioner had no revisional jurisdiction which had since been taken away by Ordinance II of 1962 with effect from 30-6-1962, and as such any application filed before him on, 22-8-1973 was an application before an authority who had no jurisdiction or competence to entertain the same. The decision it will thus appear could be justified on this ground alone namely that there were no pending proceedings before a competent authority, but with due respect, not that there were no "proceedings" due to their being on the administrative side, because whether on administrative side or on judicial side such an application on 22-8-1973 could not have at all been filed before the authority before whom it was filed for the relief and transfer claimed therein. The test in such a case it will thus appear is to see whether the proceedings concerned were proceedings under the relevant Act irrespective of their nature and not whether they are of administrative or judicial character. The ground aforesaid therefore was not available in that case and the same in this respect cannot be supported on this count, because precedents are available to show that the word "proceedings" is wider than the word "case" and may also include administrative proceedings. Ram Narain v. Director of Consolidation (AIR 1965 All 172).
14. As against the case of Muhammad Mehdi mentioned above learned counsel for the respondents referred to fan Muhammad and an other v. Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1948 Lab. 1455) (five Judges) where the connotation of word "proceedings" was examined in detail. The following passage in that judgment is quite instructive and is reproduced below :---- "Reference was made to Bhai Kirpal Singh v. Risaldar Ajaipal Singh and others AIR 1928 Lah. 627 where it was observed that the words "suit, proceeding and other words of similar connotation have different meanings in different Statutes and it is not possible to lay down a general rule of interpretation which may be applicable to all cases. In each particular case the question has to be decided in reference to the context and that meaning is to be preferred which will best fit in with it."
In Stroud's Legal Dictionary, Vol. III, page 1561, it is pointed out that "proceeding" may mean according to the context either "any action" or "any proceeding in the action". According to Emperor v. Fazlur Rehman and others AIR 1937 Pesh. 52 the term "proceeding" includes : "the whole bundle of actions taken and recorded by the Court from the moment of taking cognizance of the case until its disposal." According to Prem's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. III, page 1310 the word "proceeding" can be given a narrow or a wide import depending upon the nature and scope of an enactment in which it is used and in the particular context of the language of the enactment in which it appears.
It may in some enactments mean an action or that which initiates an action and in other enactments it may also mean a step in an action". It is further mentioned therein that in Pryor v.
City Offices Co. (1883) 10 Q B D 504 the phrase 'in any proceeding' was construed as a general phrase meant to cover every step in an action and is equivalent to the word `action'. In R. S. C. Order LXIV, rule 13, `proceeding'. Is used as meaning 'a step in an action, i.e., semble a step `towards' and not `after judgment' Houiston v. Woodward 1885 Law Notes 15. In the American Publication `Words and Phrases', at page 83, the term `proceeding' is defined : "The term `proceeding' is a very comprehensive term, and, generally speaking, means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right, and hence it necessarily embraces the requisite steps by which judicial action is invoked." A `proceeding' would include every step taken towards the further progress of a cause in Court or before a Tribunal, where it may be pending. It is the step towards the objective to be achieved, say for instance the judgment in a pending ruit. The proceeding commences with the first step by which the machinery of the law is put into motion in order to take cognizance of the case. It is indeed a comprehensive expression and includes all possible steps in the action under the law, from its commencement to the execution of the judgment."
The above is a correct enunciation of law on the subject and we hereby endorse the same.
15. Examining the present case in the light of the law above explained and the entire context, it is evident, that Rehmatullah was enforcing his right to have transfer of an evacuee land in lieu of his duly verified claim for land left by him in India. As such a transfer could be claimed only under Act XLVII of 1958, therefore, his application for transfer was both from the point of view of an informant' and on other merits under that Act.. Rehmatullah fell within the category of "displaced person" as defined in its section 2(3) ; the authority whom he approached was "settlement authority" as defined in section 2(6) ; the "scheme" under which he claimed was a scheme under section 2(7); "settlement" which he wanted was a settle rent under section 2(8) read with sections 12 and 15 of the Act ; "verified" claim which he wanted to be satisfied fell within the definition of word "satisfied" as contained in section 2(9). Without repeating the facts already above--mentioned, the case of Rehmatullah stood remitted or remanded by order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 28-4-1967 and of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 20-5-1967 to the Tehsildar, Lyallpur, with a direction that- "You are accordingly requested to proceed with the matter considering the right of the applicants accordingly."
How can the petitioner, in these circumstances state that the case of Rehmatullah was not a "proceeding" under Act XLVII of 1958, or that it was not pending before the relevant date on the subject. It may be mentioned that after dealing with the evacuee character of the land, even the High Court had remanded the case with an observation that---- "It will be now for the settlement authority to dispose of the application filed by the petitioner (Rehmatullah) in accordance with law."
If in the interregnum the petitioner succeeded to get this land on tender basis from year to year (illegally under the Colonization Act from local Colonization Officers) and in this way created a blockade in the disposal of the much earlier instituted case of Rehmatullah, whom as High Court observed, he made to run from "pillar to post", he cannot plead that the case of Rehmatullah ceased to remain pending because he had been interven--ing in the same in various forms.
Similarly when proceedings after earlier remand order of High Court were to be taken up, he himself obtained an order in his subsequent writ petition in the form of maintenance of status quo on 8-11-1977 from the High Court which had the effect of staying further proceedings of Rahmatullah's case. The High Court in the circumstances was fully justified in holding that the land in dispute was not "available land" within the contemplation of section 3 of Act XIV of 1975, inasmuch as the case of Rehmatullah and this land were still sub judicee on or before the relevant date, and as such petitioner had no locus stands to claim for its transfer. The petitioner, it appears neither in law nor in equity has any right to have this land, as against Rehmatullah to whose successors---in-interest, after the end of the relevant litigation in the High Court it was rightly ultimately allotted and transferred on 28-12-1978.
16. Though the whole emphasis of the learned counsel was on earlier portion of subsection (2) of section 2 of Act XIV of 1975, which talked of and saved proceedings pending, to be precise, before Settlement Officers under Land Settlement Act XLVII of 1958 on the relevant date of its repeal, but the later portion of that subsection dealt with cases (to be) decided by the E Supreme Court and the High Court after the repeal of that Act namely Land Settlement Act, and laid down that those shall also be decided accordingly by the authority mentioned therein. The present was a case of later category, which had bean remanded by High Court on 21-5-1975 and there was thus no bar in finalising its adjudication in terms of the order of remand. In that view of the matter the whole exercise by the learned counsel for the petitioner solely with reference to earlier portion of section 2(2) was not quite apt. However, our order shows that we have examined the case from both the aspects above-mentioned and hold that looked at from whatever angle the proceedings after the remand order of the High Court do not suffer from any illegality whatsoever.
17. Towards the fag end of the case, the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue that Rehmatullah was not eligible to the transfer of this land because he had got his claim form transferred to Sind and obtained land there which was still being held by him or his successors-in- --interest. This plea was strongly repudiated by the learned counsel for the respondents who submitted that the claim was brought back long ago. As the point was not raised by the petitioner in the High Court in the course of his Writ Petition No. 1455-R/1977 despite the fact that he was refuting l entitlement of Rehmatullah on all possible counts except the one now presently sought to be urged, we cannot attend to this plea.
18. Another similar objection raised was that the Chief Settlement Commissioner bad banned all further allotments of evacuee land by means of a memo dated 25-6-1973 and from that point of view no allotment to Rehmatullah could be made. Learned counsel for the respondents has repudiated this plea and submitted that this ban was later lifted and did not apply to pending cases and more particularly to this case. This point also was not raised in the High Court and cannot be allowed to be urged now. In the present case we are concerned with Act XIV of 1975 which authorised pending proceedings to continue .Under the old law and also took note -of cases to be remanded in future by the Supreme Court and High Court and thus saved the present case which was sub judice both before the Settlement Authority and the High Court, on the relevant date and obviously had to be processed and taken up after remand order of the High Court dated 21-5- 1975, as laid down in section 2(2) of the Act. This is what exactly the Settlement Authority did in this case, and their action and order in the circumstances cannot be taken exception to.
19. The result is that this petition has no merit and is dismissed.