By this single judgment, I propose to % dispose of Writ Petition No, 5700 of 2002 and 494 other similar petitions (of which list is at Annex `A'), as questions of facts and law, broadly speaking, are common in all of them.
2. The petitioners are owners of immovable properties, located within urban areas of the Province of Punjab. By Punjab Finance Act (No, VII) of 1998, Section 5-A was added to the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act (No, V) of 1958, which authorized determination of annual value of buildings and lands for the purpose of levy of tax, commonly known as property tax, "on the basis of such valuation tables and for each localities as may be notified by or under the authority of the Government". It is a common ground between the parties that the Government of the Punjab, in its Excise and Taxation Department, had earlier framed valuation tables, in the purported exercise of power under the aforementioned newly added Section 5-A, primarily on the basis of valuation tables prepared by the Deputy Commissioners of various Districts in the Province, for the purpose of determining the minimum sale price of properties located in their respective Districts. Pursuant to such valuation tables, tax was levied by the assessing authorities and when demands were raised, the same were challenged in this Court'. Challenge to the levy of tax was thrown mainly on the ground that the valuation tables in question determining the gross rental value of the properties, prepared as they were, on the basis of the capital value of the properties, did not qualify the requirements of Section 5-A. The contention raised against the validity of the valuation tables found favour with a learned Judge of this Court, consequently the Writ Petitions were accepted and the demands raised, based on valuation tables prepared on the basis of the capital value of the properties, were declared to be illegal. Nevertheless, it was further observed in the order recorded in Writ Petition No, 1799 of 2004 as follows:-- "This order, however, shall not prevent the Provincial Government from preparing valuation tables which are based on the annual rental value of properties within different rating areas, provided such valuation tables otherwise comply with the provisions of Section 5-A and the other provisions of the Act."
The judgment rendered in the aforementioned Writ Petition is reported as Jamshed Waheed v.
Government of Punjab (PLD 2001 Lahore 395). Another owner, namely Mst. Ameena Jabeen of the same house had also filed Writ Petition No, 682 of 2001 which too was accepted and the judgment is reported as Mst. Ameena Jabeen v. Government of Punjab (NLR 2001 Tax 189). Government of the Punjab, through the Secretary, Excise and Taxation, challenged the aforementioned decision (in Writ Petition No, 4799 of 2001) through Civil Petition No, 1435 of 2001 which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan on the 14t1 of June 2001.
3. Then, on the 13th of October 2001, the following communication was sent by a Section Officer of Excise and Taxation Department, Government of the Punjab, to the Director General, Excise & Taxation, Punjab, Lahore, with copy alongwith its enclosures to District Officers (Directors, Excise & Taxation/Excise & Taxation Officers) in the Punjab, for information and compliance:-- "No, S.0 TAX (E & T) 3-38/91/P-1 Govt. of the Punjab Excise and Taxation Department Dated: Lahore, the 13th October 2001 To, The Director General, Excise & Taxation, Punjab Lahore.
Subject: VALUATION TABLES BASED UPON RENT ABILITY OF IMMOVEABLE PROPRITIES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY TAX.
I am directed to forward herewith the format for the reassessment of urban immovable properties throughout the Punjab as a uniformed formula.
2. It is requested that the same may kindly be forwarded to all the District Officer ("Directors Excise and Taxation/Excise and Taxation Office') for carrying out survey operation in the rating areas under their respective jurisdiction. It is clarified that D.O.S/DDOs will not be authorised to change the figures recorded in the valuation tables, since it will remain the same throughout Punjab.
However, the appellate authority/assessing authority will select combination of classes referred to in column 1 of the evaluation table for grouping the various localities of rating areas under their respective jurisdiction.
3. It is re-affirmed that the valuation lists, based upon the valuation tables will take effect from 1.1.2002.
End. As Above. Sd/- (Imran Aslam)
Section Officer No, & Date: Even A copy alongwith its enclosures is forward to the district officers (Director, Excise and Taxation/Excise lind Taxation Officer) in the Punjab for information and complaints. Sd/- (Imran Aslam) Section Officer"
The "uniformed formula" mentioned in the above-quoted communication was in the following terms:-- "VALUATION TABLE BASED UPON RENTABILITY OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES IN THE RATING AREAS OF PUNJAB GENERAL RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES The figures recorded in the respective column of the valuation table shall be multiplied with the total land area (Sq. yard) and covered area (Sq. feet) of the building the figure arrived at shall be multiplied by 12 to determine the reasonable annual rent.
Since the rentability of following properties is different from that of general residential and commercial properties, therefore at the time of determining their rentability, the figure recorded in the valuation table shall be adopted after following subtraction and addition.
I. PLAZAS AND RENTED OUT MULTI STOREY BUILDINGSReduction of 10% for each floor above and below ground floor/inter-floor subject to a maximum of '50% of the rate specified in valuation table.
II. 20 YEARS OLD PROPERTIES Reduction of 10% of the rate specified in the valuation table subject to condition that there is no addition/alteration in the building during this period.
III. SEASONABLE USE OF PROPERTIES like cotton ginning factories rice husking mills mills, ice factories etc.Reduction of 50% of the rate specified in valuation table.
IV. Buildings and Lands Used as Offices, Educational Institutions.Addition of 50% in the residential rates (self or rented as the case may be)
Specified in the valuation table.
V. HOTELS In case of buildings and lands used for hotels, the rentability shall be made as per following: (i)The rentability of land area under commercial use excluding parking places shall be calculated on the basis of self-commercial rates. (ii) The rentability of covered area of such building other than lodging units, lobbies, dinning halls, kitchens other than the Banquet Hall, Business Halls etc., shall be assessed on the basis of self commercial rates prescribed in the valuation table. (iii) The rentability, of covered area let out to different organization will be assessed on the basis of commercial rates prescribed in the valuation table. (iv) The portions of these units being let out, as lodging units shall be assessed on the basis of existing formula based upon rack rates giving allowance on account of vacancy/service change machinery as the case may be according to the existing procedure.
VI. HOSPITALS & MARRIAGE HALLS, CINEMAS PETROL PUMPS ETC.Commercial rates self or rented as the case may be specified in valuation table. At the time of calculation of Land Area and covered area, the doctors rooms, patient rooms wards operation theatres waiting rooms/bridal rooms, Make-up rooms etc. shall be accounted for.
VII. INDUSTRIAL UNITS Residential rates (self or rented as the case may be) prescribed in the valuation table with following conditions:-- Upto 1 ACRE-- Next 4 ACRE--Above rate.
Reduction of 20% in the above rate.
Exceeding 5 ACRE-- Further reduction of 20% in the above rates.
VIII. AGRICULTURAL LAND. As per existing procedure of fixed rates per Kanal.
Note: Any modification in the valuation table if so required will be notified by the Government."
Two "Proposed Valuation Tables" one for "Commercial" and the other for "Residential" properties were sent with the afore-quoted communication. The same at Annexes 'B' and 'C' respectively. The record made available to this Court shows that a Conference of all the Directors of Excise and Taxation in the Province of Punjab was held on the 27th of October 2001 wherein it was decided that for the localities which could not be covered by categories 'A' to `E' of the two tables (Annexes 'B' to 'C' to this judgment) two more categories i.e, 'F' and `G' be added to the valuation tables.
Accordingly, the Excise and Taxation Department of the Government of the Punjab prescribed for the assessm ent of "Property Tax" rates for the two additional categories, and communicated the same to the concerned officers vide corrigendum, dated the 31st of October 2001 issued to the earlier communication, dated the 13th of October 2001, reproduced above. The two categories added to the earlier valuation tables are at Annexes 'D & `E' to this Judgment.
4. The common grievance of the petitioners in all the petitions is that on the basis of the aforementioned tables, property tax determined by the Department, and being demanded from them, is many times more than what they were actually paying before and, therefore, approached this Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction, challenging the aforementioned communication, dated the 13th of October 2001, and corrigendum thereto, dated the 31st of October 2001, the valuation tables prepared and issued by the Government of the Punjab, as well as the demands of property tax based on the said valuation tables. The petitions which had been filed by then, were pending when on the 19th of March 2003, Government of the Punjab sent out the following communication:- "NO. S.O.TAX (E&T)3-38/91 (P-1) GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB EXCISE & TAXATION DEPARTMENT Dated Lahore, the 19th March, 2003 To
1. The Director General, Excise & Taxation Punjab, Lahore.
2. All Assessing Authorities/Appellate Authorities Under UIP Tax Act, 1958 in the Punjab.
Subject: VALUATION TABLES BASED UPON RENTABILITY OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY TAX. Please refer to this department's notification of even number dated 13.10.2001 on the above subject.
2. Instances have come to the notice of the department where some of the localities as a whole have been assigned a particular category as per valuation table by the Assessing Authority, but such localities have pocket areas which due to their peculiar conditions may have lesser rentability than the one determined on the basis of the category of that locality. It is clarified for the removal of doubt that the Assessing Authority/Appellate Authority may assign a different category to such pocket areas depending on their rentability as was envisaged in the letter under reference. Sd/- (IMRAN ASLAM) SECTION OFFICER (TAX)"
Yet another Notification, dated the 19th of March 2003 was issued. For facility of reference, relevant part thereof is also extracted below:-- "GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB EXCISE & TAXATION DEPARTMENT Dated Lahore, the 19th March, 2003 NOTIFICATION NO. SOTAX (E&T) 3-38/91(P-1). In continuation of this Department's Notification No, SO. Tax (E&T) 3- 38/91(P-I) dated 13.10.2001 regarding Valuation Tables for assessment of UIP Tax under Section 5-A of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958.
2. In exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (1) and (1-A) of Section 10 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, the Government of the Punjab. is pleased to appoint a Committee comprising Additional Director General, Excise .& Taxation, Deputy Secretary (Technical) Excise and Taxation Department and District Officer, Excise and Taxation concerned as "Appellate Authority" in respect of exceptional cases where the annual value of the particular property determined on the basis of the category of the locality in which it falls as per Valuation Tables appears to be excessive in view of any peculiar disability affecting the rentability of that property.
3. In exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, the Government of the Punjab is pleased to appoint Director General Excise & Taxation, Punjab to exercise the powers of "Revisional Authority" in respect of the orders of the "Appellate Authority" referred to in Para 2 above.
4. The powers of "Appellate Authority" land "Revisional Authority" in all other cases shall continue to be exercised by "Collector" and "Commissioner" as notified vide this department's Notifications No, SOAI ( E&T) 3-116-2000 dated 22.12.2001.
SAMI SAEED SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF. THE PUNJAB EXCISE & TAXATION DEPARTMENT No, & Date Even A copy is forwarded to the Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Punjab, Lahore for publication in the official Gazette and to supply 50 printed copies of the Notification to Excise & Taxation Department. Sd/- (IMRAN ASLAM) SECTION OFFICER (TAX)"
From a reading of the above Notification, it appears that the original communication, dated the 13th of October 2001 had also been "notified. Be that as it may, it is nobody's case that any of the aforementioned communications or the valuation tables have not been "notified."
5. Mr. Alamgir, Advocate, who led the side of the writ petitioners, challenged the vires and constitutionality of the newly added Section 5-A of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act (No, V) of 1958, which was the source of power for the impugned valuation tables, by contending that it was bad for want of guidelines; it was over-board, rather too bald; it lent itself to nakedness; it conferred un-channeled and arbitrary discretion on the Government, and being patently violative of the Preamble of the Constitution as well as its Articles 4, 8 and 25, the same is liable to be struck down, even on the ground of excessive or impermissible delegation of legislative power of Provincial Assembly of the Province of Punjab. It was further contended that the valuation tables prepared pursuant to Section 5-A, besides being equally bad, were discriminatory in nature and are, therefore, liable to be scrapped. The Board-based arguments of Mr. Alamgir were adopted by M/s Ejaz Feroze, Azmat Saeed, Ahmad Sibtain Fazli, Sahibzada Anwar Hameed, Muhammad Azhar Siddique, Mustaq Ahmad Tahirkheli, Farooq Ahmad Chishti Qureshi, Tariq Rahim and Ishtiaq Ahmad, Advocates, who appeared for their respective clients in other Writ Petitions. Learned counsel appearing in _other cases also adopted the arguments of Mr. Alamgir. A long catena of reported decisions from abroad and of domestic Superior Courts was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of their contentions.
6. On the other hand, Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, learned Advocate-General assisted by Ch. Aamir Rehman, learned Addl. A.G., Mr. Tahir Mahmood, learned Assistant Advocate-General and Mrs. Erum Sajjad Gul, Advocate, besides Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal, Advocate who represented the respondent- Excise & Taxation Department, vehemently contended that delegated legislation had never been struck down for want of standards or guiding principles and that in a taxation matter it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive/departmental functionaries of the Government to work out details of categories of the properties, categories them in a reasonable manner without any discrimination, and to determine details of tax to be levied. According to them, neither Section 5-A is ultra vires any provision of the Constitution nor the same is liable to be struck down on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative functions. Further, that the valuation tables having been prepared after due deliberations and taking into account-ground realities, the same are also not liable to be struck down on any ground whatsoever, including the attack based on alleged discrimination. They also relied on a long chain of reported decisions from foreign jurisdictions as well as of our own Superior Courts to which reference will be made presently.
7. Section 5-A of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act 1958, impugned in these petitions, though small one, but most abused, reads as follows:-- "5-A. Valuation Tables to Ascertain Annual Value-- Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5 the annual value may be determined on the basis of such valuation tables and for such localities as may be notified by or under the authority of the Government."
Learned Advocate-General submitted that the background for the legislation in dispute was the collective consciousness to up-root corruption, if not in its entirety, at least to minimize the same as far as possible and to do away with the feel-good factor, which had a long stay in this Department, and to ensure a somewhat, clean atmosphere aimed at collecting revenue, within the permissible limits, to be spent on development programmes and the wellbeing of the citizens of the country, which is sheet anchor to the strength of the social fabric and the erotic doctrine of sip every flower and change every hour and the philosophy of philandering self-fulfillment unless combated on the militant basis of gender justice, are fraught with catastrophic possibilities. Support for this submission was sought from the "Statement of Objects and Reasons read out by the Minister Incharge at the time the Bill was introduced, providing inter alia for "introduction of a new simplified system of assessm ent of property tax" and to "mobilize reasonable additional financial resources for the Province and taxing the rich without affecting the common man." Learned Advocate- General supported by Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal canvassed that the amendment has been brought about with a view to promoting fiscal reform to get rid of International Lending Institutions and to ensure welfare of common man which is the policy of the present regime, ensuring transparency in the levy and collection of property tax without any discrimination whatsoever; curtailing wide range of discretion of the assessing authorities, and thereby to combat with corruption. Moreover, in the earlier round of litigation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has mandated that Section 5-A of the Act is not to be considered in isolation but has to be read conjunctively with the other provisions of the Act. Besides, in order to unveil the evil which the legislature intended to punish, a conspectus of the Act and the Rules, to the extent relevant, is necessary to appropriate to the controversy between the parties. Section 3 is the charging section. Its subsection (1) authorizes Government (which, as defined in Section 2(d) means the concerned Provincial Government) to specify urban area (an urban area, as defined by Section 2(1) means an area within the boundaries of a Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee, Cantonment Board, Small town Committee, or other authority (not being a District Board) legally entitled to or entrusted by Government with the control or management of a municipal or a local fund) where tax shall be levied under the Act.
Government has the power to divide one urban area into two or more rating areas, or several urban areas may be grouped as one rating area. Sub-section (2) lays down that "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) there shall be levied, charged and paid, a tax on the annual value of buildings and lands in a rating area at the rate of twenty per cent of such annual value". sub-section (3) then provides that "in case of property of the annual value not exceeding twelve thousand rupees, other than the property referred to in sub-section (3) a deduction of two hundred and seventy rupees from the annual value shall be allowed." By virtue of sub-section (4) the Government "may, by notification, for reasons to be recorded remit in whole or in part, the payment of the tax by any class of persons in respect of any category of property". According to the Explanation, the "annual value for the purpose of this section shall be the aggregate annual value of all buildings and lands owned by the same person in the rating area". In view of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 3, payment of tax is the liability of the "owner of buildings and lands". "A rebate equal to five per cent of the amount of annual tax for a financial year" is allowed by sub- section (5) "if the amount of annual tax is paid in lump sum on or before the 31st day of August of the financial year". Lastly, sub-section (7) laid down that "from the first day of July 1998, for calculating tax on owner occupied properties the annual value shall be increased by twenty five per cent of the annual value existing on the said day". Section 4 of the Act excepts properties in respect of which tax is not leviable. In view of the provisions of Section 5, "annual value of any land or building' is to be ascertained "by estimating the gross annual rent at which such land or building together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use or enjoyment with such building might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year" less certain allowances which an assessing authority in the given circumstances can allow. Section 6 makes provision that "there shall be an assessing authority for every rating area" and that it "shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as are conferred on it by this Act or the Rules made thereunder." Then comes the procedural part, which according to the learned counsel for the petitioners should have been observed by the Government before finalizing valuation tables, whereas learned counsel for the Department has argued that it had no application to the "valuation tables", but the procedure had to be followed while drawing up "valuation lists". Whereas the title of Section 7 reads: "Making and operation of valuation lists" it lays down that a valuation list shall be made by the prescribed authority in accordance with the Rules for every rating area so as to come into force either on the 1st day of July or on the 1st day of January, and that valuation list shall ensure for a period of five years, whereafter next succeeding valuation list shall come into force. The provisions to sub- section (1) of Section 7 authorize the Government to reduce or extend the period between two successive valuation lists for any rating area, cancel and direct preparation of a new list in the event the existing one is lost or destroyed by operation of circumstances beyond control and order recovery of tax on the basis of either of the said two lists. Government can also, by order, divide any rating area into parts for the purposes of a new valuation list and to determine when the next following list shall be made and shall come into force. By virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 7, a valuation list comes into force on the 1st of July or 1st of January next following the date on which it is finally approved by the assessing authority, and is to remain in force until superseded by a new valuation list. sub-section (3) added in the year 1976, is confined to properties located in Cantonment Boards, and lays down that a list according to which house tax was being charged by a Cantonment Board before the 1st of July 1975 shall be deemed to be a list under the Act until a new list is prepared Rule 5 of the Rules inter alia fixes responsibility of the assessing authority to prepare a property register in Form P.T.1. from the rating area and enter therein the necessary particulars, separately for each unit of property. It is a common ground between the, parties that Register P.T. 1 is, in fact, the "valuation list." Rule 6 lays down a comprehensive procedure for preparation of "draft valuation lists" to be observed by the assessing authority. In order to prepare a valuation list, the assessing authority has to divide a rating area, if necessary, into sub-divisions of mohallahs; a particular number is to be allotted to reach property, with reference to subdivision, mohallah or street in which it is located, and the number so allotted to a property is to be marked on some conspicuous part of the property, and, after ascertaining the name of the owner and if the occupier thereof is other than the owner, his name is also ascertained, and the same are then entered in a register, commonly called P.T.2. If a property is owned by more owners than one, names of all are recorded in the said register, alongwith the extent of share of each one of them in the property. Section 18 of the Act then requires that in any case where a new valuation list is intended to be made for any rating area, the assessing authority shall give a public notice, which, in view of the provisions of Rule 6, has to be in Form P.T.3. It also serves as a notice to the owner, occupier or lessee to file a return in the prescribed Form called as P.T. 4. vide Rule 6. The return is to be filed before the assessing authority within a period of thirty days from the date of service of notice. If no return is filed, the assessing authority has been authorized by sub-section (3) of Section 18 to value the property in such manner as it deems fit." But this discretion is guided by Clause (e) of Rule 6 of the Rules which lays down that the "assessing authority shall make an enquiry about the gross annual rent earned or which could reasonably be earned in respect of the property during the financial year immediately preceding the current financial year." Clause (f) of Rule 6 authorizes the assessing authority to take into consideration any such further data that may be available for the purpose of determination of the gross annual rent at which any property in the rating area may reasonably be expected to be let from year to year, if in its opinion the average gross annual rent of such property as ascertained under Clause (e) be not fair or reasonable when compared with such rent of any other property in that locality. Form P.T. 5 has been prescribed for the draft valuation list. Section 8(1) read with Rule 7 enjoin upon the assessing authority to publish draft valuation list, by giving public notice of the place where such list may be inspected. sub- Section (2) of Section 8, read with Rule 7(1) confer a right on a person aggrieved by any entry in the draft valuation list, or by the insertion therein or omission therefrom of any matter, to lodge an objection with the assessing authority at any time before the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the draft valuation list is published. The public notice has also to mention the date or dates or and the place at which objections thereto are to be heard by the assessing authority. In special circumstances, the period of thirty days can be extended to a maximum of thirty days.
Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 also lays down the mode how a "public notice" is to be given, which besides other modes, provides for publication of notice in at least one English and one Urdu daily newspaper. Register in Form P.T. 6 has been prescribed for the purpose wherein the date of publication of the draft valuation list has to be noted. A draft valuation list is open to inspection free of any fee, by an owner or occupier of any property included in the list, or his duly authorized agent at the office of the assessing authority during office hours, and they are allowed to make extracts from it. The objections contemplated by Subjection (2) of Section 8 can be filed on a plain judicial paper bearing a nominal, rather negligible Court fee, stating briefly the grounds of objection, and upon receipt by the assessing authority are entered in a prescribed register in Form P.T.7 maintained for the purpose. Rule 10 makes provision about the authorities, including the assessing authority, which are to hear objections and the manner in which the same are to be heard. Upon disposal of objections, the order, with date, is to be recorded in the aforementioned prescribed register in Form P.T.7. Rule 11 then provides that the final valuation list shall be prepared in Form P.T.1 and shall be authenticated by the assessing authority before the 1st day of July or the 1st day of January, as the case may be. Such a valuation list is regarded as a conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein subject, of course, to the alteration to which reference May be made presently.
Rule 11(3) makes open to inspection such an authenticated list. Although an authenticated valuation list is otherwise final, but the assessing authority has been empowered vide Section 9 to correct any clerical or arithmetical error therein; to correct any erroneous insertion or omission of any description; to make such additions to or corrections in the list as appear to the assessing authority to be necessary by reason of (i) a new building being erected after the completion of the valuation list (ii) a building included in the valuation list being destroyed or substantially damaged or altered since its value was last previously determined, and (iii) any change in the ownership or use of any building or land. However, before making any amendment, not less than four days' notice to the owner of the building or the land in the prescribed Form P.T. 13 has been made a mandatory- requirement vide proviso to Section 9 of the Act, read with Rule 9 of the Rules, with a right to file objections, and disposal thereof in terms of Rules 8 and 10 as discussed above. Rule 14 empowers the Government to employ any person to determine the annual value of any property situated in any rating area in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. The person so appointed is authorized by virtue of the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 to enter, survey and value any land or building in the rating area which the assessing authority may, direct him to survey and value. Rule 15 enjoins upon an assessing authority to maintain for each rating area a tax demand and receipt register in Form P.T.
8. Under Section 14 of the Act, read with Rule 17 of the Rules a tenant can be called upon to deposit rent to liquidate liability of any owner of any building or land in arrears. Section 15 read with Rule 16, authorizes the prescribed authority to impose and recover fixed penalty for default in payment of tax. Notice of demand has to be in Form P.T. 9.
Finally Section 10(1) of the Act confers a right of appeal on a person aggrieved by an order of the appropriate authority upon objections made before that authority under Sections 8, 9, 14 and 15, to be filed within thirty days from the date of such order to the prescribed authority. Moreover, in view of sub-section (1-A) any person aggrieved by any entry in the valuation list prepared under Section 7 or by the insertion therein or omission therefrom of any matter, or otherwise with respect to the list, can prefer an appeal within sixty days. Under sub-section (2) of Section 10, the nominated authority of its own motion, or on an application made within a period of one year from the date of the proceedings or the order, can exercise the power of revision. This is the whole scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
8. A perusal of Section 5-A would reveal that by its enactment, Provincial Government has been authorized to prepare and notify "valuation tables" which may serve as the basis for determining the "annual value" of the lands and buildings liable to levy of property tax. Thus, the legislature has made its intention clear that the primary purpose of enactment of Section 5-A is to determine the annual value of the lands and buildings, and the valuation tables to be prepared by the Government, in exercise of its power under the newly introduced provision, are to serve as basis for such determination. As will be shown hereinafter, the valuation tables prepared by the Government in exercise of this power have laid down criteria for determination of tax for different categories of properties, both for commercial and residential. It has been left to the assessing authority concerned to determine as to which category particular property situate within a particular locality belongs. Once the category in which a property falls is identified, tax has to be levied according to the uniform formula chalked out in the valuation table concerned. It is in this background that the vices of Section 5-A are to be examined keeping in view the principles enunciated on the subject from time to time.
9. Before proceeding further, it may be observed that no frontal attack has been made on the competence of the Provincial Legislature to legislate on the subject. Firstly, the Ares of Section 5-A have been assailed on the ground that the legislature has abdicated its own legislative power and conferred on the Government itself an unguided, unbridled, uncanalised vague, vagarious and blanket power to prepare and notify valuation tables, without there being any guidelines having been provided by the legislature itself for the purpose. I would hurriedly strike a note that if Section 5-A falls, the valuation tables must fall, because the stream cannot rise higher than the source. The question of excessive and unbridled delegation of legislative power had been the subject of various decisions here in this country as well as in foreign jurisdiction. Two decisions of Supreme Court of United States reported as Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 UC 388) and Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States (295 U.S. 495) and dissenting views expressed by Indian Supreme Court in the cases of Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema (AIR 1965 SC 1107), New Manek Chowk Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and others (AIR 1967 SC 1801), Messrs Devi Das Gopal Krishan etc. v. State of Punjab and others (AIR 1967 SC 1895) and Messrs Galan Trading Co. (Pvt,) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabba (AIR 1967 SC 691) support the submissions made on behalf of the writ-petitioners.
10.So far as the two decisions of the Supreme Court of United States are concerned, in the subsequent decisions reported as Fehey v. Mallonee (332 US 245), St. Louis, I.N. & S.R. Co. v. Taylor (2001 US 281) and Mckinly v. United States (249 US 397), the principles laid down in the earlier two decisions were not only disapproved, but contentions founded on the ground of want of standards in the delegated legislation were repelled.
Needless to add that Marshall, C.J. of United States' Supreme Court is reported to have said as early as 1825 in Wayman v. Southard (23 U.S.10) as follows:-- "It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunal powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative But congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the Legislature may rightfully exercise itself.
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the Legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details."
Again, in Cincinnati, W & Z. Co. v. Commissioner [(1852) 1 Ohio St. 77) the following observations appear:-- "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what is shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to 'be exercised under and in pursuance of the law".
Though re-iterated that Congress could not delegate legislature power, the Supreme Court of United States upheld in Field v. Clarke, (143 US 649) the grant of power to the President, to charge duty on imports. Again, in J. W. Hampton v. United States, (1927) 72 Law Ed 624 = 276 US 394); the Congress gave power to the President to make changes in the rates provided in the Tariff Act of 1922. That was challenged as a forbidden delegation of legislative power to executive authority. But the challenge was negatived by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Congress had laid down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person authorized to fix the rate of customs duties on imported merchandise was to conform. In that case the President could vary the rates with the aid of his advisers after proper investigation on the ground of differences of cost of production in the United States and abroad and to make such increases and deceases in rates of duty as were found necessary to equalize the cost of production. The limit of such change was also fixed upto 50 per centum of the rates specified in the law. This case does not support the proposition that rates of tax can be delegated to a subordinate authority without any guidance, though it is an authority for the proposition that this can be done if guidance is given for the purpose. In United States v. Shreveport Grian Elevator & Co. (287 US 77) delegation of legislative power was justified lay drawing distinction between the legislative powers and subsidiary powers to fill up the details, or to find facts to carry out the policies declared by the legislature. In the context, the Court is reported to have said that:-- "The Congress may declare its will and after fixing a primary standard devolve upon administrative officers the power to fill up the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations."
In United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative Inc. (307 US 533) the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to establish prices of agricultural commodities by reference to several factors including "other economic conditions", which expression, however, was left unspecified. Further, the selection of the commodities to be regulated by the Secretary, the areas in which the commodities could be regulated and the period of regulation were left to the judgment of the Secretary. The Court held that it was not beyond the powers of Congress to leave all these determination to a designated administrator with the standards named in the enactment and, further, that-- "for the purpose of determining whether legislation involving questions of economic adjustment involves as invalid delegation of legislative power, each enactment must be considered to determine whether it states the purpose which the Legislature sought to accomplish and the standards by which that purpose is to be worked out with sufficient exactness to enable those charged with the enforcement of the law to understand these limits.
In Sunshine Anthractie Coal Company v. Adkins (310 US 381), under the provisions of Section 4 of Bituminous Coal Act, 1937 the administrative agency was empowered to fix maximum prices when in public interest it deemed it necessary or in order to protect the consumer against unreasonable high prices. The Court held that there was no invalid delegation of legislative power, and in saying so observed:-- "Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility the effectiveness of both the legislative and administrative process would become endangered if Congress were under Constitutional compulsion of filling in the details beyond the liberal prescription here. Then the burden of minutes would be apt to clog the administration of the law and deprive the agency of that flexibility and dispatch which are its salient virtues. For these reasons we hold that the standards with which.
Congress has supplied the Commission are plainly valid."
In Yakus v. United States (321 US 414), the Emergency Price Control Act of 194 sought to stabilize prices, to eliminate profiteering, to ensure that the defined appropriations are not dissipated by excessive prices, to protect persons with relatively fixed and limited incomes and to prevent a post emergency collapse of values. The Administrator was given power to fix prices which, in his judgment, were generally "fair" and "equitable" and would effectuate the purpose of the Act. The Act provided no direct answer to the question whether prices should be allowed to go up by 5 per cent 20 per cent, or 100 per cent. Nor did the Act answer such fundamental questions as to whether prices should be fixed below cost, whether profits on products should be eliminated, or whether profits on whole industries should be eliminated, or drastically reduced. Despite absence of any standards on these questions, the Court upheld the delegation, saying merely that Congress had stated the legislative object-maximum price fixing and had laid down standards to guide the administrative determination for the exercise of the price fixing power, and the particular price to be established. The United States Supreme Court has even upheld delegation in cases where the Legislature had failed to prescribe any intelligible principles of legislation at all. In such cases the Supreme Court had justified its decision by saying that "Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonable and practicable." In Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (236 US 230) the vagueness of the principles of legislation was acknowledged but its limits were restated in this way: "While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which separatestheir exercise is not easy to define in words.
It is best recognized in illustration. Undoubtedly the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss "sufficiency, both in provision and execution."
In Mckinley v. U.S. (249 US 397) by an Act of Congress, the Secretary of War was authorized-- "to do every thing by him deemed necessary to suppress and prevent the keeping or setting up of houses of 'ill fame'.....within such distance as he may deemed needful of any military camp Violation of any rule promulgated by the Secretary was made a misdemeanour. The Court rejected the plea of unlawful delegation with the remarks that-- "Congress having adopted restriction;in the statute may leave details to the regulation of the head of an executive department."
Fahey u. Mullonee (332 US 245) the Home Owners' Loan Act, 1933 gave of a board power to provide through rules and regulations for the liquidation of savings and loan association and the appointment of conservators or receivers to take charge of the association. Congress had declared no policy with respect to liquidation or appointment of conservators. No criterion was to all established. The Court held that- "It may be that explicit standards would have been a desirable assurance of responsible administration. The provisions are regulatory. They do not deal with unprecedented economic problems of varied industries. They deal with problems of insecurity and mismanagement which are as old as banking enterprise. Adiscretion to make regulations to guide supervisory action in such matters may be constitutionally permissible while it might not be allowable to authorize creation of new crimes in uncharted fields."
In American Trucking Association v. United States (344 US 298) power was granted to the Commissioner of Interstate Commerce "to administer, execute and enforce all provisions of this Act, to make all necessary orders in connection therewith, and to prescribe rules, regulations and procedure for such administration". The Commissioner issued a set of rules drastically changing motor carrier practices in the leasing of equipment. The rules inter alia seriously affected the carriers of agricultural commodities, but the Supreme Court upheld the rules even though the effect of the rules was to derive some operators out of business. In repelling the contention that the rules were discriminatory in nature, the Court observed as follows: "We hold then that the promulgation of these rules for authorized carriers falls within the Commission's power, despite the absence of specific reference to leasing practices in the ActThe grant of general rule-making power necessary for enforcement compels this result."
It may be noted that the Court neither found nor attempted to find any standards, general policy or intelligible principles in the statute. Another important example of a statute without any guiding standards is given in the case of Arizona v. California (373 US 546). The problem in that case was the apportionment of water amongst South Western States and the question was what to do in time of shortage. The statute contained limits on the Secretary's power but no standards were provided to guide the exercise of power by the Secretary within those limits. The majority of the Court held: "While the Secretary must follow the standards (limits) set out in the Act, he nevertheless is free to choose among the recognized methods of apportionment or to devise reasonable methods of his own."
In effect what the Court held was that the Congress had prescribed no methods of apportionment but had left the Secretary entirely free to devise reasonable methods of his own. The Court upheld the power of the Secretary to choose or to create his own standards and guides or methods and said so in these words: "None of this is to say that in case of shortage, the Secretary cannot adopt a method of apportion or, that he may not lay stress upon priority of use, local laws and customs, or any other factors that might be helpful in reaching an informed judgment."
The decision reported as Minnesota Ex el. Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, Milwankee & St. Paul Railway Co. (38 Minn 28 137 N W 782) which concerned delegation of legislative power to impose taxes and rates, is almost on all fours. The Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled as follows:-- "The power of taxation is legislative, but this does not require the Legislature itself to assess the value of each man's property, or determine his share of the tax. The exercise of the police power in requiring persons who follow certain occupation to obtain a licence is legislative; but nothing is more common than to delegate to certain officers or boards the power to ascertain and to determine whether persons have the proper qualifications as to learning, skill, or moral character, and to grant or refuse a licence according as they find the facts to be. The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt miles and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation' of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law."
"For a popular Legislature that meets only once in two years, and then only for 60 days, to attempt to fix rates, would result only in the most ill-advised and haphazard action, productive of the greatest inconveniences and injustice alike to the railways and the public. If such a power is to be exercised at all, it can only be satisfactorily done by a board or commission, constantly in session, whose time is exclusively given to the subject, and who, after investigation of the facts, can fix rates with reference to the peculiar circumstances of each road, and each particular kind of business, and who can change or modify these rates to suit the ever-varying conditions of traffic."
Our Legislature has gone a step further than most others, and vested our commission with full power to determine what rates are equal and reasonable in each particular case. Whether this was wise or not is not for us to say; but in doing so we cannot see that they have transcended their Constitutional authority. They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be winch would not be allowable--but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The Legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the law and what it shall be".
In American Jurisprudence (2nd) and Corpus Juris Secundum, Section 43 of 42-American Jurisprudence at page 336, the theory of delegation of legislative powers has been succinctly stated as follows: "In considering the true test as to whether a power is strictly legislative or whether it is administrative and merely relates to the execution of the law, the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring of authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The inherent necessities of governmental co-ordination must fix the extent and character of the assistance which the Legislature may seek from another branch of the Government. While the Legislature may not divest itself of its proper functions or delegate its general legislative authority, there are questions which are beyond determination by the Legislature and which must necessarily be left to the determination' of executive or administrative agencies; and the Legislature may authorize' others to do those things which it might properly, yet cannot understandingly or advantageously, do itself, Legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the Legislature cannot deal directly, and where the Legislature legislates and indicates its will, it may delegate administrative authorities the power to fill up the details, within prescribed limits, by the determination of facts or the enactment of rules, and regulations.
At 'page 562 of 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, the following observations appear:-- "With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplications of the subjects of Governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the Legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the Courts."
With regard to taxation, it is stated in 51 American Jurisprudence 199 that:-- "A statute which gives to the administrative officers a discretionary power to employ a certain procedure for the assessm ent or collection of certain taxes which the Legislature has established is not objectionable."
On the same subject it is stated in 16 Corpus Juris Secundum 625-26 that:- "Legislature may fix a rule of taxation and leave to an administrative body to promulgate rules for its administration and effectuation and to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends."
By quoting the following observations of the Supreme Court made in Sunshine Anthracite Opal v.
Adkins (310 US 381):-- "Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of Legislative power does not become a futility."
Kenneth Culp Davis has stated in "Administrative Law and Government" (1960 Edition p. 55) that:-- "Congress may and does lawfully delegate legislative power to administrative agencies. Lawyers who try to win cases by arguing that congressional delegations are un-Constitutional almost invariably, do more harm than good to their clients' interest. Unrealistic verbiage in some of the older judicial opinions should not now be taken seriously."
"In only two cases in all American history have congressional delegations to public authorities been held invalid--Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 293 US 388, 55 S Ct. 241, 79 L Ed. 446 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corpn. v. United States, 295 US 495, 55 S Ct. 837, 79 L Ed. 1470 (1935). Neither delegation was to a regularly constituted administrative agency which followed established procedure designed to afford the customary safeguards to affected parties. The Panama's case was influenced by exceptional executive disorganization and in absence of such a special factor would not be followed today The Schechter's case involved excessive delegation of the kind that Congress is not likely again to make "In absence of palpable abuse or true congressional abdication, the non-delegation doctrine to which the Supreme Court has in the past often paid lip service is without practical force."
11.The crux of the principle, based on case-law from American jurisdiction, has been lucidly summed up in one sentence by Elihu Root when he stated that "the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually retrieved from the field and given up the fight [see (1916) 41 A B A R 368). (Emphasis added).
12.So far as case-law from across the border is concerned, the first case of the Indian Supreme Court under the post-Independence Constitution is reported as In re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (AIR 1951 S.C. 332). It was held in that case that it could not be said that an unlimited right of delegation was inherent in the legislative power itself; that this was not warranted by the provisions of the Constitution, which vested the power of legislation either in Parliament or State legislatures, and that the legitimacy of delegation depended upon its being used as an ancillary measure which the legislative considered to be necessary for the purpose of exercising its legislative powers effectively and completely. It was observed that the legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative function. Exactly what constituted "essential legislative function" it was held further, was difficult to define in general terms, but this much was clear that the essential legislative function must at least consist of the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct; that where the law passed by the legislature declared the legislative policy and laid down the standard which was enacted into a rule of law, it could leave the task of subordinate legislation, which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute, to subordinate bodies, i,e,, the making of rules, regulations or bye-laws; that the subordinate authority must do so within the frame-work of the law which makes the delegation, and such subordinate legislation has to be consistent with the law under which it is made and cannot go beyond the limits of the policy and standard laid down in the law. A rider was added that if the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearance or a standard is laid down, the Court would not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case. The next case is Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1954 SC 465) where Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was attacked as un- Constitutional on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. It was held that the Act, there impugned, had laid down the principle, and that the principle was the .maintenance or increase in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. It was further held that this sufficiently formulated the legislative policy and the ambit and the character of that Act was such that the details of that policy could only be worked out by delegating that power to a subordinate authority within the frame-work of that policy. A perusal of the judgment shows that the Court resorted escorted to the preamble and the body of the enactment to come to the conclusion that the Act sufficiently formulated the legislative policy and that being so, the details of the policy could be left to be worked out by selected instrumentalities, which were, in fact, selected in very broad terms. On these premises it was held that Section 3 of the impugned Act was not ultra vires the legislature on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. In Raj Narain Singh, Chairman, Patna Administration Committee (AIR 1954 SC 569) the same question arose and it was held that an executive authority can be authorized by a statute to modify either existing or future laws but not in any essential feature. As to what constitutes an essential feature, it was held that no general principle can be enunciated except that the executive authority cannot change the policy of a statute, but subject to this limitation the executive can be entrusted with the function of extending an Act or part of an Act to any area either with or without modification. In Bhatnagars & Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India and others (AIR 1957 S.C. 478) where the Constitutionality of Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, was attacked, the Court held as follows: "Legislation which is conditional, properly so-called, must be distinguished from legislation which is delegated. Where the Legislature provides and lays down principles underlying the provisions of a particular statute and also affords guidance for the implementation or enforcement of the said principles, it is open to the Legislature to leave the actual implementation or enforcement to its chosen delegate. The time when the provision should be implemented, the period during Which it should be implemented or the place where it should be applied can, in appropriate cases, be validly left by the Legislature to its delegate. If the Court can find a reasonably clear statement of policy underlying the provisions of the Act either in the provisions of the Act or in the preamble, then any part of the Act cannot be attacked on the ground of delegated legislation by suggesting that questions of policy have been left to the delegate."
In Banarsi Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1958 SC 909), the Indian Supreme Court had to deal with a taxation statute, C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. Section 6(1) of that Act provided that tax shall not be payable on the sale of goods specified in Schedule II. But sub-section (2) of Section 6 conferred power on the State Government to amend the Schedule by notification. It was held that conferment of such power was not un-Constitutional as it was competent for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine the details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be levied and the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods etc. Another case of importance from the Indian jurisdiction is that of Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Muni( )al Corporation, Poona (AIR, 1959 SC 586) in which Section 59 (1) (xi) of the Bombay District Municipalities Act (III of 1901), which gave taxing powers to the Municipalities, was challenged on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative functions.
The Court, however, upheld the validity of this provision on the ground that the legislative policy, for the purposes of imposition of taxes by the Municipalities, was ascertainable from the expression "for the purpose of this Act," which expression, according to the Court, "pointed out the object for which taxes could be levied by the Municipalities." Doubtless, in Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf), Lal Khan v. Union of India (AIR 1960 SC 544) a provision of the Act impugned therein was struck down on the ground that the Legislature had established no criterion or standard and had not prescribed any principle on which the particular disease or condition was to be specified. The principle that the legislature could not delegate unguided power to a subordinate body was the basis of the decision. In Vasantla Maganbhat Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay (AIR 1961 SC 4) the question of delegation of legislative power was resolved thus: "Although the power of delegation is a constituent element of the legislative power, it is well settled that' a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case and before it can delegate any subsidiary or ancillary powers to a delegate of its choice, it must lay down the legislative policy and principle so as to afford the delegate proper guidance in implementing the same. A statute challenged on the ground of excessive delegation must therefore be subjected to two tests (i) whether it delegates essential legislative function or power and (ii) whether the legislature has enunciated its policy and principle for the guidance of the delegate."
In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. State Industrial ,Tribunal U.P. and others (AIR 1961 SC 1381), use of such expression as "public safety" "convenience", and "maintenance of public order or supplies or services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment' were held to be sufficient indication of the legislative policy and guidance for the purpose of conferment of powers on the State Government to make certain provisions by general or special orders under the statute attacked in the case." In Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi (AIR 1961 SC 1602), in connection with the Slkim Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, it was observed that "so long as the legislature indicated in the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the legislation was skeletal or that every detail of the application of law to a particular case, was not laid down in the enactment itself or the fact that a discretion was left to those entrusted with administering the law, afforded no basis either for the contention that there had been an excessive delegation of legislative power so as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested was uncanalised and unguided so as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate." The next case to which reference may be made is Devidas Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1895). There the law on the subject of excessive delegation was summarized thus at p. 1901 of the Report:-- "The Constitution confers a power and imposes a duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously, it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare State, it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation: It must necessarily delegate the working out of the details to the executive or any other agency. But there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An overburdened legislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may unduly over step the limits of delegation. It may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self-effacement of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a Court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits. But the said liberal construction should not be carried by the Courts to the extent of always trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities. It is the duty of the Court to strike down without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature."
It may be added that Devi Das's case did not differ from the Liberty Cinema case. What was held there was that there could be no general principle that merely the needs of the delegate could necessarily and always be a guideline. It was further held that each statute has to be examined to find out whether there are guidelines therein which prevent delegation from being excessive.
However, as I am particularly concerned with the fixation of rates of a tax, I may refer to certain cases which deal with this aspect of the matter. In Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1958 SC 909) the Indian Supreme Court observed as follows: "Now the authorities are clear that it is not un-Constitutional for the legislature to leave to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods, and the like." (Underlining is by me).
There is an important case from Indian jurisdiction reported as Municipal Board, Hapur v.
Raghuvendra Kripal (AIR 1966 SC 693), where the U.P. Municipalities Act No, 2 of 1916, gave power to the municipality to fix rates of tax and provided an elaborate procedure for doing so and also provided for sanction of Government. But one provision of that statute raised a conclusive presumption that the procedure prescribed had been gone through on a certain notification being issued by Government, and the question arose whether by reason of such a conclusive presumption there was not a delegation of essential legislative function. In that case the majority while dealing with the question of excessive delegation observed that the taxes in question were local taxes for local needs for which local enquires had to be made and so they were left to the representatives of the local population which would bear the tax. It was further observed that such taxes must vary from town to town from one Board to another, and from one commodity to another. In the circumstances, delegation as to the fixing of rate of tax to the Municipal Board was upheld as permissible delegation. The minority judgment also accepted these propositions and observed that though generally speaking, the rate of tax was one of the essentials of taxing power given to the legislature, it must be recognized that there might be situations where the legislature might delegate to a subordinate authority that power under proper safeguards. It was also observed that in the matter of local taxation, like taxation by municipal boards, district boards and bodies of that character, there was pre-eminently a case for delegating the fixation of the rate of tax to the. local body, the reason for this being that problems of different municipalities might be different and one municipality might require one kind of tax at a particular rate at a particular time while another municipality might need another kind of tax at another rate at some other time. It was further observed that "the legislature can in the case of taxation by local bodies delegate even the authority to fix the rate to the local body provided it has taken care to specify the safeguards for the purpose". The difference between the majority and the minority only was that the majority thought that the conclusive presumption raised by one of the provisions was valid while the minority thought that by reason of the conclusive presumption all the safeguards were wiped out at one spoke and therefore it became a case of excessive delegation. There is yet another important case from Indian jurisdiction, reported as Municipal. Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills (AIR 1968 SC 1232). This case would bear detailed examination, as it expresses the latest trends in the Indian jurisdiction on the subject of delegated legislation. The question at issue was the vires of Section 150 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (No, LXVI) of 1957 which empowered the corporation to levy any of the optional taxes by prescribing the maximum rates of tax to be levied; to fix classes of persons or the descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed; and to lay down the system of assessments and exemptions, if any, which may be granted. Wanchoo, C.J., and Shelat, J. expressed themselves as follows: "The principle is well established that the Legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the Courts should not interfere. What guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the Court has to deal including its preamble. Further, the nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the matter of delegation. What form the guidance should take is again a matter which cannot be stated in general terms. It will depend upon the circumstances of each statute under consideration. In some cases guidance in broad general terms may be enough. In other cases more detailed guidance may be necessary. In the field of taxation the guidance may take the form of providing maximum rates of tax upto which a local body may be given the discretion to make its choice, or it may take the form of providing for consultation with the people of the local area and then fixingrates after such consultation. It may also take the form of subjecting the rate to be fixed by the local body to the approval of Government which acts as a watch-dog on the actions of the local body in this matter on behalf of the Legislature."
From above, it will appear that the Indian Courts have held that powers of the Legislature under written Constitution to make laws within the allotted field are in the nature of plenary and sovereign powers.
13.In Hodge v. The Queen [(1884) 9 A.C. 117] their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had held that the powers of Provincial Legislature in the British dominions and colonies were as plenary and ample within the limits prescribed by the Imperial Act as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its powers possessed; that within the limits assigned to them the Local Legislatures were supreme and had the same powers as the Imperial Parliament to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make bye-laws or resolutions as to subjects specified within its legislative authority, which authority, it was observed, was ancillary to legislation, and without it an attempt to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them out might become oppressive, or absolutely fail.
14.So far as our own Superior Courts are concerned, reference in the first instance, may be made to East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan (PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 41) where Control of Shipping Act (No, XXVI of 1947), which conferred power on the Central Government to make rules providing for the forms of licence for taking a ship to sea from a post or place within or outside Pakistan, the manner in which the shipping rates were to be fixed, the Constitution and functions of a Board to advise the Central Government in respect of such rates etc. The then Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan took the view that the Act could not be attacked on the ground of unauthorized delegation of legislative power, as the Act proceeded on a definite policy, namely, the policy of placing the ships, for the period of the emergency, substantially at the disposal of the Government to enable it to direct what classes of cargo or passengers may be carried, to know the exact position of a Pakistan ship at a particular time and to claim priority for Government cargo and passengers. In Sheikh Muhammad Ismail and others v. The Chief Cotton Inspector and others (PLD 1961 Supreme Court 178) pursuant to Rule 26(1) framed by the Provincial Government under Section 30 of the West Punjab Cotton (Control) Act (No, IV of 1949), which provided for imposition of fees by the Government on the occupiers of factories, the Managers of Companies and cotton dealers to cover the cost of the staff appointed under the Act, or for improvement of agriculture relating to the cotton crop grown in West Punjab, the Provincial Government issued notifications from time to time imposing fee on unpinned cotton received in factories for ginning. It was contended that Section 30 of the Act amounted to excessive and un-Constitutional delegation of power to the executive in so far as it left unguided discretion to the Government to pick and choose, out of certain categories of persons mentioned in the section, for imposition of the fee, there being no guideline laid down by the legislative authority in this respect. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held. that Section 30 of the impugned Act sufficiently indicated the legislative policy by mentioning the categories of persons on whom the fee may be imposed, and that so long as the rule-making authority limits itself to the levy of the fee to these categories, it cannot be said that an unfettered discretion had been bestowed on the executive authority, and that "choice of persons" from amongst indicated categories is within the permissible limits of delegation. Dealing with the question that the rate of fee had been left to be determined by the executive authority, their Lordships observed that the statutory practice of leaving the power to specify rates of fee to be imposed to the relevant executive agency has a respectable ancestry", as is evident from several statutes such as Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act (III of 1872), Section 17 of the Official Trustees Act (II of 1913), Sections 79 and 199 of the Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878) and Section 57 of the Patents and Designs Act (II of 1911). In the result, it was held that delegation of this nature does not involve the delegation of an essential legislative power, and that the fixation of the fee has, of necessity, to be left to the executive authority because of the variability of the schemes which may be taken in hand from year to year under the Act, and thus entailing differences in the expenditure incurred thereon. The question of delegation of legislative power was examined thread-bare by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported as Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari (PL?
1966 Supreme Court 854). The background in which the vires of Section 57 of the Electoral College Act (No, IV of 1964) came under examination was that Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, by Chapter 2, Part VII, constituted an Electoral College of Pakistan. Under Article 158 (4) of that Constitution, the Members of the Electoral College were required to be invested with functions in relation to local Governments, besides those of being the College for the election of the President and of the National and Provincial Assemblies. Section 57 of the Electoral College Act gave effect to this mandate of the Constitution by providing that the Provincial Government, for the purpose of conferring on the Members of the Electoral College functions in relation to matters of Local Government, may arrange:--
(a) the Electoral units in the rural and urban areas into groups, so that it is a Union, or as the case may be a Town, and
(b) declare, by notification in 'the official Gazette that the Members of the Electoral Units within the Union or Town shall constitute the Union Council, or as the case may be a Town Committee for the Town.
Section 57 was attacked before the East Pakistan High Court inter cilia on the ground that Section 57 was hit by the doctrine of excessive and impermissible delegation of legislative powers, and that, by delegating the power of grouping to the Provincial Government, the Central Government had abdicated in favour of the Provincial Government in respect of its legislative functions and thereby effaced itself. These two objections were sought to rest on another objection, that is, that in delegating its functions the National Assembly had failed to lay down any legislative principles, policies or norms according to which the Provincial Government should act. Chief Justice A.R.
Cornelius held that the concept of excessive delegation, which was derived from Judge-made law, in the United States, and where it had lost much of its authority, must be applied in this country with the greatest circumspection, in that laws of the Legislatures in this country are made in continuation of pre-existing laws dating from the early nineteenth century, and that this rule, if it has to be applied, should be applied after the fullest consideration of the entire administrative and legislative complex, not only as it exists after the making of the law in question, but with reference to the immediately preceding conditions and in relation to the technique employed. It was further held that where excessive delegation is pleaded, it should be established that this delegation has led to the defeat of the requirement of "reasonable restriction" in relation to the exercise of a fundamental right. Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rehman held that it had been the consistent policy of the Legislatures in this country to delegate to the Provincial Government powers to set up and demarcate areas of local authorities, as this function, by its very nature, could not properly be performed by the legislature itself, as the legislature could not be expected the be aware of the varying local conditions and administrative conveniences pertaining to each individual local area.
Dealing with the question whether Section 57 could be avoided on the ground of impermissible delegation or delegation of an essential legislative function, his lordship held that this section, to the extent that it delegated the function of demarcation of local Government areas, had dealt only with administrative functions. On the larger question of impermissible delegation, or delegation of essential legislative functions, it was held that if the subject-matter of legislation is within the competence of the legislature, then it can certainly legislate in any one of the generally accepted forms of legislation, either directly or referentially, absolutely or conditionally, within its own sphere of legislation, and that it has always been recognized under all systems of legislation that the legislature may well leave it to some external authority to implement its policy or to determine a state of things on which the law intends to make its action depend, or to fix in its discretion the time at which the law is to come into operation, the area over which it is extend and the manner in which it is to be carried into effect. Referring to the American doctrine of delegation of legislative power, his lordship noted that in the American system itself the doctrine had undergone considerable change and that it has now come to be recognized that there may be practical difficulties for the legislature in providing for every minute detail, and so legislative power may be exerted through the intervention of fact-finding administrative instrumentality requisite to the consummation of the legislative object. It was further observed that though the legislature may validly delegate legislative functions to an external authority, it cannot abdicate but subject to this, if the legislature has sufficiently expressed its view and exercised its judgment as to the territorial extent, scope and subject-matter of the legislation, the provision of details, particularly when details are by their very, nature not capable of being laid down by the legislature itself, can well be left to be done by another agency in whom the legislature places confidence and further, the power of delegation may vary from case to case according to the scope of the authority of the delegating body, the variety, conditions and circumstances which a particular law is intended to meet, and the status and authority of the body to which the power is delegated, and according to the nature of the law, that is, whether it is penal or regulatory in character, and that in case of an expert in whom the legislature has confidence, a greater latitude may be conferred upon the legislature for the purpose of delegating legislative powers, so that the purpose of the legislation may be carried out adequately and effectively. The conclusion at which their lordships arrived at was that the powers of the legislatures in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent have - always been as plenary as the powers of legislation exercised by the British Parliament, and that even essential legislative functions may be delegated to an external authority subject, however, to the condition that the legislature does not altogether abdicate from its legislative functions or totally efface itself.
In Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1983 SC 358) the law was laid down thus: "From the aforesaid analysis of the judgments it would appear that it is too late in the day to maintain that the Legislature cannot delegate authority to subordinate or outside authorities for carrying the laws enacted by it into effect and operation, in view of the long history of legislative.
Practice committing the rule-making powers having the force of law, to such subordinate functionaries or agencies. As held in Hodge v. Regina by the Privy Council as early as 1883, such power of delegation is inherent and ancillary to legislation. It is also futile to seek and apply the Constitutional theories underlying the doctrine of impermissible delegation of legislative power as applied under the American system as these theories were irrelevant in our system (As obtaining under the 1962 Constitution). It is now well established as observed by Hamoodur Rahman, J. (as he then was) in Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari (PLD 1966 SC 854) that the powers of the Legislatures in the Indo-Pak subcontinent have always been as plenary as those of the British Parliament. Mr. A.K. Borhi in his argument also did not put his contention as high as to canvass a total absence of power to delegate any part of the legislative function in connection with a particular statute to outside authorities by the Legislature. But his submission was, as mentioned hereinbefore, that the impugned provisions were invalid inasmuch as the Legislature had effaced itself and abdicated its essential legislative function in favour of a subordinate authority i,e, Central Board of Revenue who has been given power to levy and collect the duty in question in all its dimensions, leaving it unfettered discretion to formulate its own policy and standards according to which the tax was to be levied."
"The Board being a responsible body with the expert knowledge in the working of the existing scheme, was an appropriate agency in which the Legislature reposed confidence, to carry out the legislative purpose of levying and collecting duties on production capacity in lieu of the duties it was empowered under sub-section (1) of Section 3 to levy and collect. The aspect that the concept of production capacity as the basis for taxes and duties, being a new and untried idea in the realm of taxation, cannot be lost sight of. Apparently the production capacity of plants, machinery, undertakings, establishments and installations, was a complex matter depending on a number of variables and consideration of different factors, like condition of such plants and machinery, working conditions, category-wise national average annual production, past annual production etc. and many other factors arising from time to time so that in their very nature laying down of detailed guidelines for determination of such production capacity were incapable of being ascertained by the Legislature itself, which could not be expected to undertake such unwieldy and cumbersome task with the limited time at its disposal. In entrusting such a task to a body more suited for such work can the Legislature be said to have effected itself or abdicated its legislative function? As already pointed out there is authority for the proposition that in such circumstances, the Legislature will be within its Constitutional limits to employ appropriate agency to accomplish its legislative purpose. There can be no manner of doubt that the Legislature intended to introduce the new concept of capacity tax and fulfilled its legislative obligation by making provision for the same in clear and unambiguous terms. It, therefore, did not delegate its essential legislative function contrary to the terms of the instrument which had constituted. it." I may now refer to a Division Bench decision of this Court. Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969, which laid down that the "Central Government, subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions, if any, as it thanks fit to impose, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any goods imported into, or exported from Pakistan or into or from any specified part or station or area therein, from the whole or any part of the customs-duties chargeable thereon", and Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act 1951 as amended by Finance Act 1990, laying down that "The Federal Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any taxable supplies made by a registered person in Pakistan or any goods or class of goods, from the whole or any of the tax chargeable under this Act, subject to such conditions and limitations may be specified" and that "The Board may, by special order in each case stating the reason, exempt any supply from the payment of the whole or any part of the tax chargeable under this Act" were challenged in this Court in the case reported as Mian Anwar-ul-Haq Ramay v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 MLD 2135), amongst others, on the ground that the same were ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as the power to exempt from import duty and payment of tax were the legislative powers and functions which had to be exercised and performed by the Parliament and could not be delegated to any organ of the State.
In other words, Constitutionality of the said two provisions was challenged on the ground of excessive delegation. After reviewing the case-law on the subject, the contention that the same conferred unfettered and uncontrolled power on the executive without providing any guidelines for exercise of those powers, was repelled and Constitutionality of the said two provisions was upheld by observing as follows: "While presenting this argument learned counsel for the petitioner lost sight of the fact that we have a written Constitution which lays down expressly the scope and the limits within which the three organs of the State i,e, Legislature, judiciary and executive are to perform their functions and those limits are well-defined and no organ of the State can overstep those limits in performing its functions. This being the position, the law is firmly settled that it is not for the Court to question the wisdom of legislature in enacting provision of any law in any manner and their judicial function in this regard primarily is to confine to the interpretation of the law as it is. This Court owes its creation to Article 175 of the Constitution, sub-Article (2) of which provides negative mandatory command that this Court shall not have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law. Under Article 199 of the Constitution under which this petition has been made, this, Court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare any law or any custom or usage having the force of law as void to the extent so far as it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution known as the fundamental rights beyond which the jurisdiction of this Court to examine the vires of law in our view does not extend. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any provision of the Constitution by which the legislature is required to lay down guidelines in the law to regulate the exercise of power which it confers on the executive. In the absence of any such provision, it is difficult to hold that this Court has the jurisdiction to declare any provisions of law as ultra vires of the Constitution on that score...."
"Neither Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 nor Section 7 of the Sales-Tax Act, 1951 are ex facie discriminatory provisions, therefore, merely because they are capable of being administered discriminatory cannot be declared to be ultra vires..."
The following rider in Paragraph 12 of the judgment (pages 2142-43 of the Report) is also worth special notice: "Before parting with the discussion on this aspect of the case we may observe that we should not be understood to have held that the absence of any guidelines for exercise of discretionary power conferred under the Statute gives to the authority concerned a free hand to exercise the same arbitrarily and whimsically. We may state here that in our considered view to which no exception can be taken the authority is required to exercise power reasonable, justly and fairly on the basis of relevant considerations having legal nexus with the object of law, with wisdom and maturity keeping in view above all the interest of the State. In our opinion those principles shall be read in the Statute as guiding principle to regulate the exercise of powers conferred on the functionaries of the State and they are so fundamental in character that they need not be expressly provided in the. Statute itself. Ch. Muhammad Farooq, the learned Deputy Attorney-General when questioned as a matter of principle did not dispute the correctness of this proposition."
Lastly, reference may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 582), wherein, after reviewing exhaustively the case-law on the subject from foreign jurisdiction as well as of our own Superior Courts, the following broad-based principles have been laid down in Paragraph 31 of the judgment, at pages 675-679 of the Report:- "From the above case-law and the treatises, inter alia the following principles of law are deducible: --
(i) That in view of wide variety of diverse economic criteria, which are to be considered for the formulation of a fiscal policy, Legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matter, events, etc. for taxation. But with all this latitude certain irreducible desiderata of equality shall govern classification for differential treatment in taxation law as well.
(ii) That Courts while interpreting laws relating to economic activities view the same with greater latitude than the laws relating to civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc., keeping in view the complexity of economic problems which do not admit of solution through any, doctrinaire or strait jacket formula as pointed out by Holmes, .J., in one of his judgments.
(iii) That Frankfurter J., in Morey u. Doud (1957) U.S. 457 has remarked that in the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to the legislative judgment"; (iv)That the Legislature is competent to classify persons or properties into different categories subject to different rates of tax. But if the same class of property similarly situated is subject to an incidence of taxation, which results in inequality amongst holders of the same kind of property, it is liable to be struck down on account of infringement of the fundamental right relating to equality.
(v) That "a State does not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It is allowed to pick and choose districts objects, persons, methods and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably"
(Whilli's. Constitutional Law).
(vi)That the tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are less rigorous. If there is equality and uniformity within each group founded on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law, the Constitutional mandate that a law should not be discriminatory is fulfilled.
(vii) That the policy of a tax, in its operation, may result in hardships or advantages or disadvantages to individual assessees which are accidental and inevitable. Simplicter this fact will not constitute violation of any of the fundamental rights.
(viii) That while interpreting Constitutional provisions Court should keep in mind, social setting of the country, growing requirements of the society/nation, burning problems of the day and the complex issues facing the people, which the Legislature in its wisdom through legislation seeks to solve. The judicial approach should be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather than rigid.
(ix) That the law should be saved ?ether than be destroyed an the Court must lean in favour of upholding the Constitutionality of a legislation; keeping in view that the rule of Constitutional interpretation is that there is presumption in favour of the Constitutionality of the legislative enactments unless ex facie it is violative of Constitutional provision.
(x) That as per dictionary the word 'income' means "a thing that comes in". Its natural meaning embraces any profit or gain which is actually received. However, while construing the above word used in an entry in a legislative list, the above restricted meaning cannot be applied keeping in view that the allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but by way of mere simplex enumeration of broad categories.
(xi)That the expression "income" includes not merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of a property but also what one saves by using it oneself. For example, use of a house by its owner.
(xii) That what is not "income" under the Income-Tax Act can be made "income" by a Finance Act.
An exemption granted by the Income-Tax Act can be withdrawn by the Finance Act the efficacy of that exemption may be reduced by the imposition of a new charge, of course, subject to Constitutional limitations.
(xiii) That the question, whether a particular kind of receipt is income or not would depend for its answer on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. If the nature of the receipt and its source are not satisfactorily explained by an assessee, facts which are generally within his peculiar knowledge, the Income-Tax Officer may legitimately presume that the amount in question is an income of the assessee from an undisclosed source.
(xiv) That the expression "clothes make the man" would be more nearly right if it were "Income makes the man". Knowledge about the income of a person will reveal most about him. It is a barometer evaluate about his habits and views.
(xv) In Haig's language income is "the increase or accretion in one's power to satisfy his wants in a given period insofar as that power consist of (a) money itself or (b) anything susceptible of valuation in terms of money, whereas Simons equates personal income with algebraic sum of consumption and change is net worth."
(xvi) That the process of income determination is often expressed as one of the matching costs and revenues. It involves the process of working out costs used in connection with the earning of the revenue in a particular accounting period.
(xvii) That generally the effect of a deeming provision in a taxing statute is that it brings within the tax net an amount which ordinarily would not have been treated as an income. In other words, it brings with the net of chargeability income not actually accrued but which was supposedly to have accrued nationally.
(xviii) That when a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be restored to.
(xix) That where a person is deemed to be something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the Act required him to be treated as he were with all inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.
(xx)That the legal fictions are limited for a definite purpose. They cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which they are created.
(xxi) That income-tax is a tax on a person in relation to his income. It is a tax imposed upon a person (natural or artificial) in relation to his income.
(xxii) That any legislation whereby either the prices of marketable commodities .are fixed in such a way as to bring them below the cost of production and thereby make it impossible for a citizens to carry on his business or tax is imposed to such a way so as to result in acquiring property of those on whom the incidence of taxation fell, then such legislation would be violative of the fundamental rights to carry on business and to hold property as guaranteed in the Constitution.
(xxiii) That the taxing power is unlimited as long as it does not amount to confiscation and that the Legislature does not have the power to tax to the point of confiscation.
(xxiv) That the word 'reasonable' is a relative generic term difficult of adequate definition. It inter cilia connotes agreeable to reasons; conformable to reason; having the faculty of reason; rational; thinking, speaking, or acting rationally; or according to the dictates of reason; sensible; just; proper and equitable or to act within the Constitutional bounds.
(xxv) That a direct tax is one which is demanded from the very person, who it is intended or desired should pay it, whereas indirect taxes are those, which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expenses of another, like custom duties, excise taxes and sales tax, which are borne by the consumers.
(xxvi) That levy of building tax on the basis of the covered area without taking into consideration, the class to which a particular building belongs, the nature of construction, the purpose for which it is used, its situation and its capacity for profitable use and other relevant circumstances bearing on the matters of taxation is not sustainable in law for want of reasonable classification.
(xxvii) That there is a clear distinction between the subject-matter of a tax and the standard by which the amount of tax is measured keeping in view the practical difficulties, which are encountered by the Revenue to locate the persons and to collect the tax due in certain trades, if the Legislature in its wisdom thought that is would facilitate the collection of tax due from specified traders on a presumptive basis, the same is not violative of the Fundamental Right relating to equality.
(xxviii) That denial of reliefs provided by Sections 28 to 43-C of the Indian Income-Tax Act to the particular business or trades covered by Section 44-AC thereof without showing some basis fair and rational and without having nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature, held unfair, arbitrary disproportionate to the prevalent evil and constitutes denial of equal treatment.
Consequently, the Indian Supreme Court did not press into service nonobsinate clause of Section 44-AC by applying theory of reading down as a rule of interpretation.
(xxix) That it is an accepted canon of taxation to levy tax on the basic of ability to pay. The Section 115-J and 115-JA incorporated in Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, were intended and designed to bring within the tax net the companies, which though making huge profits and also declaring substantial dividends but have been managing their affairs in such a way by availing of tax concessions etc., as to avoid payment of income-tax.
(xxx) That the theory of reading down is a rule of interpretation which is resorted to by the Courts when they find a provision read literally seems to offend a fundamental right or falls outside the competence of the particular Legislature.
(xxxi) That though the Legislature has the prerogative to decide the questions of quantum of tax, the conditions subject to which it is levied, the manner in which it is sought to be recovered, but if a taxing statute is plainly discriminatory or provides no procedural machinery for assessment and levy of the tax or that is confiscatory the Court may strike down the impugned statute as un- Constitutional.
(xxxii) That the rule of interpretation that while interpreting an entry in a Legislative List it should be given widest possible meaning does not mean that Parliament can choose to tax as income as item which in no rational sense can be regarded as a citizen's income. The item taxed should rationally be capable of being considered as the income of a citizen.
(xxxiii) That before charging tax, an assessee must by shown to have received income or the same has arisen and accrued or deemed to be so under the statute. Any amount which cannot be treated as above is not an income and, therefore, cannot be subject to tax.
(xxxiv) That there is a marked distinction between a tax on gross revenue and a tax on income, which for taxation purposes, means gains and profits. There may be considerable gross revenues, but no income taxable by an income-tax in the accepted sense."
In Paragraph 32 of the judgment it was further observed as follows:- "We have summarised hereinabove in para 31 the ratio decidendi of the above discussed cases and certain pertinent observations made therein. A perusal of above sub-paras (i) to (xxx) of para 31 indicates that the same do not advance the case of the appellants. On the contrary, they reinforce the principle of law that the legislature, particularly in economic activities, enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matters, events etc., for taxation, the presumption is in favour of the validity of the legislation. The burden to prove that the same is invalid is on the person who alleges it."
A review of the case-law, therefore, leads to the conclusion that legislative function consists of the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct and cannot be delegated by the legislature. The legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purpose and objects of the Act. The increasing complexity of moderation, administration, the difficulty of passing complicated measures through the method of parliamentary debate and discussion, and the number of details and technical matters which must of necessity be provided for in statutes, have led to an increase in the practice of entrusting power to executive or other agencies to make subordinate or ancillary legislation. By entrusting that power to the Government, the legislature does not delegate its essential legislative functions.
While testing the wires of a statute, no abstract standard, no general pattern and no hard and fast rule can be set down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the statute, the extent or urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the applicability of the statute in generality to all in similar circumstances or the exercise of pick and choose by it and thereby landing on discrimination, and the prevailing conditions at the time, should inter into the judicial verdict. In view of the analysis of the provisions of Sections 3, 5 and 5-A, it cannot be said that there are no guidelines in the scheme and provisions of the Act; that Section 5-A confers blanket, unguided, uncanalised, vague and vagarious power on the Provincial Government. It is trite law that every possible effort should be made by the Court to save the law rather than to scuttle it. Viewed in the above perspective and tested on the touchstone of principles enunciated in the foregoing decisions, particularly of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, it cannot be held that Section 5-A of the Act is ultra vires any provision of the Constitution, the legislative power of the Provincial Assembly, or any other provision of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that Section 5-A of the Act is not liable to be struck down on the ground of impermissible delegations of power.
15. As a final bid to stigmatize the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that since the same infringes upon the order provisions of the Act, Section 5 in particular, it is a spoke in the wheel of effective administration of the scheme of the Act itself and is thus void to the extent it offends against and violates the existing statute. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed, amongst others, on Emirates Bank International, PJSC v.
Excise and Taxation Officer and Assistant Collector 1st Class Karachi [(PLJ 2002 Karachi 84 (DB)]. In that case according to Section 11 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1964, as originally enacted, Professional Tax was leviable on classes of persons mentioned therein at the rate not exceeding Rs, 30.00. Later on, by an amendment made by Section 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1975, the rates of the said Tax chargeable from various categories of professions, traders callings and employment were enhanced from Rs, 30.00 to Rs, 50.00 in some cases, and to Rs, 100.00 in other cases. Subsequently, by Section 5 the Sindh Finance Act, 1994, Tax was levied on all Limited Companies, Modarbas, Mutual Funds and any other body corporate and the rate of Tax was ad valorem on the amount of paid-up capital or paid up share and reserve having been assessed to income-tax in the preceding years whichever was more, ranging from Rs, 5,000.00 minimum to Rs, 5,00,000.00 maximum. Section 6 of 1975-Act and Section 5 of 1994-Act were challenged on the grounds (i) that the same were ultra vires the provisions to Section 2 of Profession Tax Limitation Act 1941 which was an existing Federal Statute, and (ii) that the same offended against. Article 163 of the Constitution as well. It was found that whereas Section 2 of the 1941-Act placed limitation inter alia on the power of Provincial Assembly to impose Professional Tax on categories mentioned therein exceeding Rs, 50.00 per annum, Article 163 of the Constitution prohibited a Provincial Assembly to travel into the domain of the Parliament, and since both the amendments introduced in the years 1975 and 1994 were through Provincial Statutes, the same were ultra vires Article 163 of the Constitution and the existing Federal Statute, i,e, Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941. In the context, it was observed that when there is a conflict between a Statute and any provision of the Constitution, then the provision of the Constitution is to prevail as it is the Supreme Law of the land and all other laws whether Federal or Provincial are subservient to it" and that "if any Statute violates or infringes upon any provision of existing Statute, then such provision of the newly enacted Statute would be void to the effect it offends or violates any provisions of any existing Statute". There can be no cavil with this legal proposition because the principle is too settled to admit of any ambiguity or even two opinions. The question here is whether Section 5-A, as introduced by the Punjab Finance Act (No, VII) of 1998, offends against any provision of the Constitution or the existing Federal Statute. As mentioned above, no frontal attack has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the power of the Provincial Legislature to have enacted Section 5-A. However, the contention of the learned counsel is that whereas in the existing Section 5 of the 1958-Act, a Federal Statute, it was provided that the "annual value of any land or building shall be ascertained by estimating the gross annual rent at which such land or, building together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use or enjoyment with such building might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year" less allowances etc., mentioned therein, but the provisions of Section 5-A making "valuation tables' as the basis for ascertaining "annual value" was a clear departure therefrom; hence not sustainable being violative of Section 5 of the Act. The precise submission of the petitioners is that the expression used in Section 5 of the Act, viz: "annual value of any land or building shall be ascertained by estimating the gross annual rent" means nothing more than the annual rent which an owner/landlord is actually receiving from the tenant and not that which a property is reasonably expected to fetch. The argument at the first blush looked to be attractive, but when examined in depth, it loses significance. Even When a vigorous break with the past and smooth reconciliation with a radical Constitutional value-set are the object, and the art of reading down and reading wide is used, being permissible by jurisprudence of statutory constriction as a part of interpretational engineering, I see no reason for implying a limitation in terms as is contended for, since that legislature itself has not through it fit to impose any. The following luminous guidelines in Weems v. United States (1909 54 L. Ed., 793 at p. 801] set one's sight high:- "Legislation, both statutory and Constitutional is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had therefore, taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immorality as nearly as human institutions can approach it". The future is their care and provision for events of goods and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a Constitution; therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what, may be. Under, any other rule a Constitution would indeed be as easy ,of application as it would be. Under any other rule a Constitution would indeed be 'as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formula. Rights declared in the words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction. The case of the petitioners themselves is that the Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1958, having been framed under Section 23 of the Act, the same have statutory force. A plain reading of clause (e) of Rule 6 of the Rules makes it indubitably clear that "gross annual rent" is not restricted only to' the "earned" rent, but it also includes which "could reasonably be earned" Clause (f) further clarifies that it is competent for the assessing authority to take into consideration "such other data as may be available" for the purposes of determining "the gross annual rent at which any property in the rating area may reasonably be expected to be let from year to year, if in its opinion the average gross annual rent of such property ascertained under clause (e) be not fair or reasonable when compared with such rent of any other property in that locality." (underlining is by me for adding emphasis). Ex facie, the object of this provision in the Rules could not be a verbal excursion, but a meaningful exercise so that clever owners of the properties, in active connivance with their tenants, should not successfully hoodwink the assessing authority by deliberately showing the rent ridiculously low, thereby frustrating the whole intent and purpose of the statute. In Rafia Ahmed v..
Excise and Taxation Officer (1992 SCMR 1941) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by highlighting the distinguishing features of the case reported as Lyallpur Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The Commissioner, Sargodha Division and another (1976 SCMR 615), inter alia held as follows:-- "Therefore, it may not be necessary for the Assessing Authority to entirely base its assessment on the actual rent at which the building or land has been let out. Although it may be a very firm basis for assessing the gross annual value, yet not the only basis. The authority has to base its finding on the rent which can reasonably be expected from a hypothetical tenant.. To arrive at this finding, it should consider the nature and age of the construction, the locality in which it is situated, the nature of user, fair rent if fixed by the Controller or which may be .fixed under the law relating to rent restriction, the actual rent earned or expected to be earned kir the building or similar building in the locality and other relevant considerations. Rule 6(e) empowers the Assessing Authority to make such inquiry. The principles for determining fair rent by the Controller under the Ordinance and the annual rental value by the Assessing Authority are similar. Therefore for a hypothetical tenant the reasonable rent would be the fair rent which has a sanction of law behind it. It may be clarified that Section 5 lays down in mandatory terms that the annual value of any building or land shall be the gross annual rent at which such building or land may be let out with fixtures and fittings. The Assessing Authority prepares the valuation list as provided by Rule 6. The gross annual rent can be determined after making enquiry about the gross annual rent earned or could reasonably be earned in respect of the property. If in such enquiry the gross annual rent earned is found to be reasonable and can be expected to be earned, it will be accepted for purposes of assessm ent. Proceedings under Rule 6 ends there. But if such determination is not fair or reasonable compared to the rent of similar property in the locality, then the Assessing.
Authority can under rule 6(f) determine the gross annual rental value on the basis of the rent at which property in the rating area could reasonably be let out. The law does not require the actual rent received by the owner to be accepted in all- circumstances as the gross annual rent of the property. It is one of the several grounds on which it is determined. Thus, if we examine the impugned Section 5-A in the light of the aforementioned principles, it cannot be struck down on the ground of impermissible delegation of legislative power. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the earlier round of litigation rendered in Civil Petition No, 1435 of 2001 decided on the 14th of June 2001, Section 5-A is to be read conjunctively with Sections 3 and 5 of the Act. Whereas no challenge was thrown to Section 5-A, this Court had earlier struck down the valuation . tables, since the same did not comply with the requirements of Section 5-A and other relevant provisions of the Act. While affirming the decision of this Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had unequivocally observed: "Even the mechanism provided for in Section 5-A has not been taken into consideration by the petitioners in preparing the valuation table." It was further helds as follows:-- "Section 3 of the Act postulates that there shall be charged, levied and paid a tax on the annual value of buildings and lands in a rating area at the rate of ten per centum of such annual value.
The annual value of the buildings and lands is not defined in the Act but the mode and manner for determining the annual value is provided in Sections 5 to 9 of the Act. It appears to mean loosely the annual rental value of a building or a land as accepted and determined by the assessing authority. It is not necessarily the annual rental value on which a building or a land is let or is purported to be let. Nonetheless this fact is to be considered by the assessing authority in the ascertainment of the annual value of the property. In point of fact, at intervals of five years, door- to-door survey is made to register such particulars of buildings and lands in each town as ownership, type building, area, accommodation and annual rent. In the case of rented buildings, actual rent is ascertained and recorded after necessary inquiries. Estimated or notional rent is assessed for owner-occupied properties. The officer incharge of assessment is required to lay down locality-wise guidelines for the staff as to rent per room or per bedroom in respect of owner- occupied properties. This serves the purpose of regulating the discretion of tax staff and avoiding arbitrariness. Section 5 of the Act describes the mode of ascertainment of annual value of any land or building by estimating the gross annual rent at which such land or building together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use or enjoyment which such building might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year less any allowance specified therein and revenue paid in respect of such building or land. Section 5-A provides that the only value of the land or building may be determined on the basis of such valuation tables and for such localities as may be notified by or under the authority of the Government."
I am of the view that Section 5-A does not offend against any other. provision of the Act, let alone Section 5 and, therefore, the same cannot be scrapped.
16. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the valuation tables notified by the Government in exercise of its power derived from Section 5-A of the Act can be, or are liable to be set at naught. Even when Section 5-A of the Act has been held to be a good law, that does not preclude any affected person from challenging the valuation tables on the grounds that the same are arbitrary, discriminatory and unrelated to the purposes and the guidelines available in the Act.
The law may be good, but if the act performed thereunder suffers from such a vice that it does not conform to the provision of law itself, the same cannot be saved. In other Fords, if the valuation tables intended ostensibly to combat an evil, are misused for a perverse, ulterior or extraneous object, Section 5-A, would not serve as a shield to the valuation tables. In such an event, even though section 5-A is upheld as a valid piece of legislation, the valuation tables cannot be saved, and will be sentenced to death.
17. The validity of the valuation tables has been challenged mainly on the ground that the whole gamut of procedure laid down in Section 7 of the Act read with Rule 5 of the Rules; Section 8 read with Rules 6,7, 8 and 10 of the Rules; Section 9 read with Rules 9 and 11 of the Rules, has not been observed before finalising the valuation tables. On the other hands, submission of the learned counsel for the Department is that, in the preparation of valuation tables, observance of procedure as laid down in the various provisions of the Act and the Rules, just mentioned, was not necessary, particularly when valuation tables are pales apart from valuation lists, and that based on valuation tables, while preparing valuation lists, the entire procedure has been adhered to by the concerned assessing authorities. A perusal of the valuation tables shows that both residential and commercial properties have been divided into seven classes, i,e, 'A' to 'G'. Then, each category of properties has been further sub-divided into two categories, those which are located on main roads, and those which are off the roads. Of each property, covered area and land area have been separately assessed. Not only that, small chunks of land and building have been treated separately than those covering larger areas. Self-occupied buildings and lands have been treated differently than the rented buildings and lands. Above all, according to the status of the buildings and lands, rates of tax have been determined. A perusal of the valuation tables would reveal that whereas tax of 'A' class self-occupied buildings located on main roads has been determined at the rate of forty paisas per sq. foot for the first 3000 sq. ft. covered area, and at the rate of thirty paisas per sq. foot for the covered area exceeding 3000 sq. ft., the rate of tax of a building located off main roads has been determined at paisas thirty and twenty-five, respectively. The rate of tax gradually decreases with the decrease in the status of the building and the rate of tax of a building of `G' class located off the main roads has been fixed at seven paisas and four paisas, respectively. Those who are owners of buildings beyond their own personal requirements and are enjoying rent thereof had to be treated differently, and are required to pay more tax. Detailed exercise had been undertaken with regard to each category of properties in order to determine monthly rental according to the size of landed property and buildings, their assumed rentability, as per slabs, and the tax which may reasonably be levied taking into consideration all the necessary factors. Be that as it ma these are only standard valuation tables. The respondent-Department has brought on record evidence to show that subsequent to the notification of these standard valuation tables, the assessing authorities had undertaker the exercise and, after observing the entire procedure laid down in differed provisions of the Act and the Rules as discussed above, each property locate in the Province has been so categorized as 'to be covered by either of the fourteen categories (each of seven categories 'A' to 'G' having been further divided into two categories, i,e, located on main roads and off the roads), am valuation lists have been prepared by not only taking into consideration entire pros and cons meticulously, but by giving due publicity of the draft valuation lists and after hearing objections. According to the details provided by the Department, there are 24, 45, 665 property units in the urban areas of the Province of Punjab, out of which only 11,69,207 property units are taxable, whereas 12,76,458 are non-taxable. Again, out of taxable property units, 7,10,524 are residential and 4,67,683 commercial. Besides, out of residential property units, 4,91,067 are self-occupied and 2,10,457 are rented whereas out of commercial property units, 2,80,610 are self-occupied and 1,87,073 are let out. Cumbersome exercise was taken by the assessing authorities to collect relevant data for determination of class and category of each individual property. Information has also been provided with regard to the objections filed. For instance, 3785 owners of properties falling in Lahore Region 'A' whereas 480 owners of properties located within Lahore Region `B' had filed objections to the draft valuation lists notified by the concerned assessing authorities which were reportedly duly considered and disposed of. Relevant extracts from Register of objections (Form P.T. 7) have also been brought on record. Similar information about some of the other rating areas has also been brought on record to demonstrate that draft valuation lists were duly published, objections, invited, received, heard and disposed of before finalising the valuation lists, whereafter process of appeals had started. According to the record made available by the Department, 12,974 appeals had been filed upto October 2002 against the final valuation lists. According to the departmental representative, as on 31st of December 2001, valuation lists of seventy three (73) out of total of one-hundred and seventeen (117) rating areas had been finalised, valuation lists of thirty (30) rating areas had been finalised by 30th of June 2003; valuation lists of thirteen (13) rating areas would be finalised on 30th of June 2004 and of the remaining one (1) rating area would be finalised on the 30th of June 2005. Whereas demand pertaining to 117 rating areas has already been created for the period commencing 1st of January 2002 and w:e.f 1st of July 2003, about the remaining 14 would be created upon finalisation of valuation lists as mentioned above.
18. Furthermore, besides providing guidelines to the assessing authorities with regard to determination and levy. of tax on different classes, and categories of properties, detailed guidelines have been given for determination of rentability of properties which, for any reason peculiar to a particular building or land, may be found not covered by any of the fourteen general categories of buildings and lands. For instance, about plazas and rented multi-storeyed buildings, the assessing authorities have been advised that while determining rentability of such' buildings, 10% reduction for each floor above and below ground floor/inter-floor, subject to a maximum 50% of the rate specified in the valuation table has to be given. Rentability of 20 years old properties is to be determined by giving allowance of 10% less because of their old age. Rentability of seasonal used properties, cotton ginning factories, rice husking mills, oil mills, Ice factories etc., is to be reduced by 50%. On the other hand,' addition of 50% in the residential rates (self or rented, as the case may be) as specified in the valuable tables has to be made if the buildings and lands are used as offices or educational institutions. Guidelines for determining rentability of Hotels, Hospitals, Marriage Halls, Cinemas, Petrol-Pump, Industrial Units and agricultural land located within urban areas have been provided for assistance of the assessing authorities. Not only that, during the pendency of some of these writ petitions, the Department issued instructions on the 19th of March 2003 that even in cases of localities which have been assigned a particular class/category, the "pocket areas' which due to their peculiar conditions may have lesser rentability than the one determined on the basis of the category of that locality, the assessing author4/appellate authority may assign a different category to such pocket areas depending on their rentability. By yet another Notification of the same date, reproduced in the beginning of this judgment, the Government has constituted a Committee comprising (1) Additional Director-General, Excise and Taxation, (2) Deputy Secretary (Technical) Excise and Taxation Department and (3) concerned District Officer, Excise and Taxation to function as "Appellate Authority" in respect of exceptional cases where the annual value of a particular property determined on the basis of the category of the locality in which it falls as per valuation tables, appears to be excessive in view of any peculiar disability affecting the rentability of that property". By the same Notification, the Government has appointed "Director-General Excise and Taxation, Punjab" to exercise the powers of "Revisional Authority" in respect of the decisions of the "Appellate Authority" mentioned immediately hereinabove. The appointment of the said appellate and revisional authorities is in addition to the appellate and revisional authorities, i,e, Collectors and Commissioners concerned, as envisaged by-Section 10 of the Act, Thus, an attempt has been made to provide a foolproof. system even for individual grievances. I would, therefore, hold that the procedure laid down for observance 'by the assessing 'authorities while preparing valuation lists, Was not sine qua non for preparation of valuation tables, and that since the procedure had been complied with in letter and spirit by the assessing authorities before finalising the valuation lists, neither there has been violation of any provision of law nor the assesses (petitioners herein in particular) have suffered any prejudice. Be that as it may, I am clearly of the view that upon proper construction of Section 5 of the Act read with Rule 6 of the Rules, the "annual value' of any land or building is not necessarily the actual rent received by the owner of the land or building, and if rent is fixed bona fide by the owner and represents actual rentability of the land or building that would be an important factor for the assessing authority to consider, but the rent received by the owner cannot, in all circumstances, be a conclusive proof of previous annual value as contemplated by the Act read with the Rules. In the view of the matter I take, the contention of to learned counsel for the petitioners is riot sustainable and neither Section .5-A nor the impugned valuation tables, prepared thereunder can be struck down on this ground.
19. Learned Advocate General contended that even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that Section 5-A was a departure from Section 5 then too the same cannot be annulled, because of the fact that Section 5-A opens with a non obstante clause. He referred to Articles 48(2), 58(2) and 91(2A) of the Constitution, where similar "non obstante clauses have been used. The decisions reported as Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saifullah Khan (PLD 1989 Supreme Court 166 at page 188) and Mst. Rafia Ahmed v. Excise and Taxation Officer and others (1992 SCMR 1941) at page 1959) and fully support the submission of the learned Advocate General. Reference may, with advantage, be made to a Division Bench decision of the High Court of Sind at Karachi reported as Golden Industries Ltd. u. Province of Sind (PLD 1983 Karachi 76) wherein vires of Section 8-A, added to the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, by the Sind Finance. Act (No, VII) of 1977, opening with a similar non obstante clause, viz: " Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ace came under challenge. Besides holding that the provision was intra vires the Commission and the legislative power of the Provincial. Assembly of Sind, it was found that it did not offend against Article 25 of the. Constitution which guarantees equality of citizen before law, although Section 8-A provided a basis for assessm ent of the property tax only in respect of industrial properties located within Karachi Rating Areas and its validity was attacked on the ground that it was discriminatory. I am, therefore, of the view that Section 5-A is a valid piece of legislation, and so are the valuation tables prepared pursuant thereto.
20. Learned counsel for the petitioners attempted to make mountain out of a mole. Reliance was placed on the following averments in the Parawise Comments , submitted by Respondent No, 4 (The District Excise and Taxation Assessing Authority, Zone-11, 2-Faridkot Lahore).
"It is not Respondent No, 4 who is authorized to prepare the valuation tables of fair market rents of immovable properties in a Renting Area. Respondent No, 4 as a subordinate authority is supposed to abide by the dictates and decisions of Respondent No, 1." (Emphasis added). It was contended that by preparing and notifying the valuation tables, the Government has virtually robbed the assessing authorities of their statutory powers and functions under the Act and the Rules, as was apparent from the miserable tale divulged by Respondent No,
4. The contention proceeds on total legal and factual misconception. In the first instance, it may be mentioned that the Parawise Comments of Respondent No, 4 have to be read as a whole. Only one sentence thereof, detached from other parts, cannot be read. The same respondent, and in the same reply, had pleaded inter alia as follows:-- "The valuation tables of fair market rents have been prepared keeping in view the situation and status of the immovable properties in a locality which has been categorized in accordance with the civic amenities and prevailing reasonable rentability of both commercial and residential units in the area."
The valuation tables have been prepared in line with para 7 of the judgment dated 26.4.2001 passed by this honourable Court in Writ Petition No, 4799/2001. Draft valuation lists and final valuation lists have been prepared by Respondent No, 4 after observing all codal formalities including public notice, survey, publication of proposed assessment, calling for and disposal of . objection petitions under Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act 1958 and Rules made thereunder."
To say that he being a subordinate authority was supposed to abide by the dictates and decisions of the Government, Respondent No, 4 was referring to the direction of the Government contained in the Notification, dated the 13th of October 2001 wherein it was mentioned that the D.Os/D.D. Os. will not be authorised to change the figures recorded in the valuation tables, since it will remain the same. throughout Punjab". It was further mentioned in the said Notification that the format for the re-assessm ent' of urban immovable properties throughout the. Punjab" was a "uniformed formula.'
Whereas the assessing authorities had the power of determine on the basis of ground realities, after proper survey, as to which class or category of the valuation tables, each property within their rating area fell, no further discretion was left with the assessing authorities in the matter of determination of tax, which had to be calculated according to the formula laid down in the valuation tables. The valuation tables contain a menu of yardsticks 'depicting the range of reasonable rentals in the Province. The assessing authorities have been authorized to select the appropriate yardstick out of this menu and apply it to a particular locality. The assessing authorities rely upon multiple sources of information for determining reasonable rentability of localities, i,e, selection of yardstick; (i) old valuation list as benchmark date; (ii) current survey after public notice; (iii) current' sample data, and (iv) market intelligence and empirical observations.
Thus it is wrong to say that by the introduction of valuation tables, the a assessing authorities had been relegated to a position of a show-piece. Because of the absolute discretion earlier enjoyed by the assessing authorities, they had imperialist overtones which had caused severe dents on the credibility of the Excise and Taxation Department as a whole, and it was in a bad light, a argued by the learned Advocate-General and by Mr. Sahgal who represent the Department. According to them, corruption had gained ground so mud that it ceased to be a news in the Department, and barring rare exceptions everybody there had his fingers in the till. It used to be said that corruption was one of those things which the said Department could live with, but knew no way to live without.
21. The matter can be looked at from another angle. Section 3- added by the Punjab Finance Act (No, XL) of 1975 reads as follows:- "3-A. Share of local bodies in the tax.--Out of tax collected under this Act from within the limits of a Metropolitan Corporation a Municipal Corporation, a Municipal Committee, a Town Committee a Cantonment Board or any other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund, the Government shall, after retaining five per cent thereof as collection charges, pay eighty-five per cent of the balance to such Metropolitan Cooperation, Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee, Town Committee, Cantonment Board or any other authority, as the case may be."
Thus, out of the property tax collected from the tax-payers, only a negligible percentage is retained by the Government which can hardly be sufficient to meet the expenditure spent by the Government itself in connection with the collection thereof. The major chunk of the tax collected is diverted to the local bodies for utilisation on development programmes undertaken by such local bodies for the well-being of the common man. It is thus a beneficial legislation. While construing such a legislation, the Court has to show a complete consciousness and deep awareness of the growing requirements of the society, the increasing needs of the nation, the burning problems of the any, and the complex issues facing the people which the legislature, in. its wisdom, through beneficial legislation, seeks to solve. The judicial approach as to be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic, and not pedantic, and elastic at her than rigid. The Court should take into consideration the changing rends of economic thought, the temper of the times, the living aspirations and feelings of the people. While acting as a sentinel on the qui vine to protect fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution to the citizens of e country, the Court has to strike a just balance between the fundamental ghats and the large and broader interests of society, so that when such a ghat clashes with the larger interest of the society; it must yield to the latter. Moreover, when the legislature, in its wisdom, considers necessary to solve man problems, even the text of reasonableness has to be viewed in the next of the issues faced by the legislature. Every attempt has to be made further the social interest which the legislature proposes to promote. In eh circumstances, the Court does not function in .vacuo, but as a part of e society trying to achieve a social concord, and to further material ogress of the community as a whole. None but those who live in Ivory wears can refuse to look at the realities of life as well as the ground realities riling with such a case, regressive in nature. The law may be blind, but the judges are not. Of Judges, no one should expect that they shall sit as mute stators. Let a message go to all those who have inculcated a fixed habit of scion of taxes, that in their wealth, weak and poor have a share. They just contribute ungrudgingly towards the welfare, of down-trodden classes edgy, poor, deserving and common man in the society. Of late an drivable trend has been seen that rich have gone the richer, and the or driven to below poverty level. It is a misnomer that only Courts mister social justice, whereas every citizen, if he is in affluent substances, must ensure that within his own sphere he must divert his resources towards channalising social justice. Even if false notions of bigwigs may not permit their conscience to see the common man on an even keel at least, respectable place in the society can be ensured for them. Let us not make them a symbol of contempt in the society. It is no denying the fact that the legislature is in the best position to understand and appreciate the needs of the people to bring about social reforms for the up liftmen of the backward and the weaker sections of the society and for the improvement of the lot of poor people. The Court may interfere with the process only when the enactment is found to be beyond the legislative competence, because there is always a presumption in favour of Constitutionality of a statute and the burden is on him who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation of the Constitutional principles. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statute, Twelfth Edition, it is stated as follows:-- "If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result." (page 45)
"Nevertheless, even where the usual meaning of the words falls short of the object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to them, if they are fairly susceptible of it Previous editions of this work have referred to this relaxation of strictly literal principles of interpretation as beneficial construction; and the modern cases provide many instances of the judges' reluctance to stand upon the letter of a statute. They will not, of course, supply omissions, but where they are faced with a choice between a wide meaning which caries out what appears to have been the object of the legislature more fully, and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, they will often choose the former. Beneficial construction is a tendency, rather than a rule." It is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the Mischief and advance the remedy. To this end, a certain extension of the letter is not unknown, even in criminal statutes."
For what has gone above, I am of the considered view that if we read Sections 3-A and 5-A together, the main, rather the only object sought to be achieved is the well-being of the common man for whose larger benefit, valuation tables have been prepared, without unreasonable classification; persons in similar circumstances and properties situated alike having been taxed alike.
22. There is another equally important aspect of the matter which may be referred to at this stage.
According to the information supplied by the Department, there are 11,69,207 taxable property units in the Province of the Punjab, which consists of thirty-four (34) Districts. The following table would reveal the number of Writ Petitions filed from each District:- S. No, District No, of W.P.
1. Attock. --
2. BahawalPur --
3. Bahawalnagar. --
4. Bhakkar. --
5. Chakwal. --
6. D.G. Khan. --
7. Faisalabad. 65
8. Gujranwala. 60
9. Gujrat. 2
10. Hafizabad. --
11. Jhang 1
12. Jhelum --
13. Kasur 2
14. Khushab 1
15. Khanewal 3
16. Lahore 338
17. Layyah --
18. Lodhran --
19. Mandi Bahauddin 2
20. Multan --
21. Muzaffargarh. --
22. Mianwali --
23. Narowal --
24. Okara 3
25. Pakpattan --
26. Rajanpur --
27. Rahim Yar Khan --
28. Rawalpindi 1
29. Sialkot 1
30. Sheikhupura 2
31. Sargodha 6
32. Sahiwal 44
33. Toba Tek Singh 4
34. Vehari -- From above information, it is clear that no writ petition has been filed from eighteen (18) Districts out of total of thirty-four (34) Districts of the Province. Only negligence number of writ petitions have been filed from Kasur, Sargodha, Jhang, Rawalpindi: Sheikhupura, Okara, Toba Tek Singh, Khushab, Mandi Bahauddin, Gujrat and Sialkot. Excluding Lahore, Faisalabad .and Gujranwala, only 33 writ petitions have been filed from the remaining Districts of the Punjab. So far as writ petitions filed from Gujranwala and Faisalabad are concerned, they pertain mainly to commercial properties, barring a few exceptions pertaining to house properties. A little more than 300 writ petitions filed from Lahore District, pertain mainly to City areas. -1ardly there is a petitioner who belongs to a common class. Most of them are owners of Cinemas, Factories, Multistoreyed buildings, Composite buildings and Houses in posh localities etc. About eighty (80) writ petitions pertain only a Fruit and Vegetable Markets, located at Link Badami Bagh Road, Lahore. The petitioners of such petitions are owners of composite buildings, consisting of godowns, shops, offices, residential portions, and of cold shores etc. For instance, the petitioner of the case. (Writ Petition No, 5700/2002) in which this judgment is being delivered, feels aggrieved of the demand of property tax amounting to Rs, 16,939,00 for the period 1st of July to 31st December 2002 as against the previous demand of Rs, 1,553.00 for the period 1st of July to 31st of July 2001. In Paragraph 2 of the petition, it is stated that the petitioner "is owner of Building No, 2, Fruit Market, Link Badami Bagh Road, Lahore which comprises of godown in the basement, office at the ground-floor and accommodation for the growers etc. at the first and second floors. This is a composite building owned by the present petitioner." The petitioner has not mentioned the area upon which the building has been constructed. Surely, it is not a bed by night and a chest of drawers by day. Those who have had the occasion to visit the Vegetable and Fruit Markets known that almost all buildings have basements used as godowns; at least about a dozen of shops on the ground-floor; rooms, with necessary amenities on the first floor (if it is only a double-stroyed building) for residential purposes, whereas the last story is used partly for offices and partly for entertaining visitors. The entire locality is commercial. Daily business carried at site runs into lacs of rupees. The petitioner is a "whole sale" dealer. It is not a mini-shop of a little man. It is not a place where little men ply little crafts, where poor tradesmen like candle-stick makers and tanduri-bakers trade and live in. The amount of property-tax now claimed from the owners of this locality looks to them to be exorbitant because they have developed the habit of paying only a negligible amount. The life-style of the people shapes the profile of the law and not vice versa. Law, not being an abstraction but a pragmatic exercise, the legal inference is to be drawn from prevailing circumstances. Our counter, as a sovereign borrower, had been penalised by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other International Lending Institutions primarily for the reason that instead of depending on self- generated resources we have been meeting our needs on borrowings and a stage came when our country was at the brink of being declared a "defaulter". We never though that every rupee spent on external debt servicing left the country. If that rupee was spent at home, common man would have benefited. Since we had never thought of minimizing contract between tax-payers and text- collection, improvement in the quality of tax administration and relief against excesses of tax- collectors, could not be achieved. If we want to help the poor and the middle class segments of the population more tax-payers will have to be brought under the net, and wide-spread evasion of, tax will have to be reduced. In the past poor had suffered the most, arid elites had driven most of the benefits through connections and influence peddling. Reorientation of our institutions, therefore, calls for tough actions. We should no more be contingent on the financial assistance of the International Lending Institutions. Let us traverse the road ahead without their assistance, rather there should be an exit to their programme.
23.Learned counsel for the respondent-Department further submitted that a similar provision i,e, Section 5-A had also been inserted in the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, by the Sind Finance Ordinance 2000 which is to the following effect:-- "5-A. Valuation Tables to ascertain annual value:- Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5 the annual value may be determined on the basis of the valuation tables as may be notified by or under the authority-Government of various locations."
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-Department is that the property tax is being claimed in the Province of Sind on the basis of valuation tables prepared and notified by the Sind Government, and that no exception has been taken to the same. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, entered caveat to this submission; and contended that petitions challenging the levy of tax have been filed in the High Court of Sind at Karachi, and the same are pending. The contentions raised by the parties, being divergent, and there being no material available on record of these writ petitions in proof or disproof of their pleas, I would make no comment.
24.The decision of Mr. Justice Iftikhar Hussain Chaudhry (as his lordship then was, now the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court) rendered in Writ Petition No 1225/94 and other similar Writ Petitions on 19th of June, 1995, which pertained to the levy of property tax by the Capital Development Authority has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the Department. In the case, SRO No, 806(1)/91, dated the 20th of August 1991 was issued by the Federal Government in exercise of powers conferred on it by Rule 6(1) of the Capital Development Authority (Imposition of Taxes)
Rules, 1981, sanctioned levy of property tax in Islamabad at the rates and on the conditions mentioned in the said SRO. The wires of the SRO were challenged in this Court through .Constitutional petitions wherein it was held that "property tax was levied and collected by the CDA under proper authority of law, and valid, Notification in this regard was issued". Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed. The aggrieved persons approached the Apex Court. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is reported as Mrs. Bilqees Anwar Khan u. Pakistan (2001 SCMR 809). The appeals were dismissed by observing inter alia as follows:-- 13."The property tax imposed hereinabove is very nominal in comparison to the rates of property charged by the authorities under the provisions of Urban Immovable Property Tax Act in all over the country. Moreover Part B of the SRO provides exemption, which appears to be reasonable, rational and wise. The tax levied by the respondent is within the legal parameters of Section15-A read with Sections 33, 34 alongwith Schedule III referred to above. The tax in question has been imposed after observing all proper and legal formalities required under the law and with the sanction of the Government. The CDA is also providing necessary civic amenities to the people which are normally provided by the local councils, with the result that Islamabad is very neat and clean area of the country. So far as the contention of Mr. Ahmed Raza Khan Kasuri, Advocate, that under Article_ 77 of the Constitution tax is not to be paid for the purpose of Federation, is concerned, in any case, the tax has not been charged for the Federation and further, as mentioned-above, the amendment made in the CDA Ordinance, by insertion of Section 15-A is quite legal and within the established principle of law.
14.We have also gone through the impugned judgment, whereby each and every objection and contentions raised by the appellants- have duly be considered, analyzed and examined by the learned Judge of the High Court in Chambers with sound, cogent and plausible reasons. In view of what has been stated above, we are of the considered opinion, that these appeals are without merit and substance which must- fail and the same are hereby dismissed alongwith the listed applications."
From above, it will be seen that the uniformed formula prescribed by the Federal Government as well as levy and demand of property tax in terms thereof, after observing necessary procedural formalities, were upheld.
25. In some of the writ petitions, individual grievances have been voiced by saying that exorbitant property tax has been demanded from them. For instance, in Writ Petition No, 9145/2003, Sahibzada Anwar Hameed, Advocate has contended that whereas tax claimed for the year 2001-2002 was. only Rs, 4,185/-, 'the demand for the year 2002-2003 has tailed to Rs,. 70,710/-. Perusal 'of the record however, does not reveal such an alarming position. The Notice issued by the Excise and Taxation Department shows an amount of Rs, 23,472/- towards arrears and Rs,6,000/- reflect the amount of penalty claimed, whereas the actual demand raised for the year 2002-2003 is Rs, 40,968/-: A copy of Form-A for the year 2001-2002 brought on record shows that the petitioner is owner of a composite building, located on an area of more than 1 Kanal, its constructed area being more than 16 Marlas, The building consists of 12 rooms, a garage arid two bath-rooms. It is located on the main Hospital Road, Gujranwala. It consists of a residential portion and an office. The record further shows that office of District Food Controlled` is housed in a portion of the building which is yielding Rs,.3100/- rent per month. The total gross annual rent has been assessed at Rs, 2,02;320/-.The case of the petitioner is that although the total amount of annual rent received by him is Rs, 37,200/-; tax being demanded from him is Rs, 70,710/-. The contention is that in order to liquidate the tax liability,' he has to look towards other sources which he does not have. He maintains that rent being the only means of his sustenance of which he has been robbed, his fundamental right enshrined in Articles 4(2) (a) of the Constitution has been violated. In one sentence, his case is: You take away my life, if you take away the means by which I live." I have given above the break-up of the amount of Rs, 70,710/- to show that prima facie the petitioner's grievance is more imaginary than real. The rent of Rs, 3,100/-per rnensem is only of a part of the building in which office of District Food Controller is located. Otherwise, as per Form 'A' brought on record by the petitioner himself, the building consists of twelve rooms and is located at Main Hospital Road, Gujranwala. Its gross annual rent has been determined at Rs, 2,02,320/-. Its 'annual value has been proposed at Rs, 1,82,088/-. Therefore, to say that the only means by which the petitioner lives has been taken away is factually incorrect. Be that as it may, as noted above Section 10 of the. Act providing for an appeal and a revision took care of an individual grievance. Moreover, in view of the Notification, dated the 19th of March, 2003, the Assessing Authority/Appellate Authority have been conferred power to take care of pocket areas which due to their peculiar conditions may have lesser rentability than the one determined on the basis of the category of that locality. Besides, by another Notification of the same date, Appellate and Revisional authorities have been constituted to deal with exceptional cases where the annual value of a particular property determined on the basis of the category of the locality in which it falls as per valuation tables, appears to be excessive in view of any peculiar disability affecting rentability of that property. My above views are not based on any evidence. Only a scissor-and-paste operation of Form-A brought on record by the petitioner himself has been undertaken by me. Therefore, whatever has been said above is of a tentative nature and shall not be deemed to be conclusive so as to shutout the petitioner once for good. He will have the right to resort to the remedies available to him under the law.
26.Before parting with this judgment, I would like to observe that individual grievances of some of the writ-petitioners including that of petitioner in Writ Petition No, 9145 of 2003, may not be altogether unfounded. However, if they now approach the appellate and revisional authorities, with appeals/revisions under Section 10 of the Act, they may be non-suited on the technical ground of limitation. But, so far as the powers of the appellate and revisional authorities constituted under Notification, dated the 19th of March 2003 are concerned, the same are neither trammelled nor hedged by the law of limitation. Therefore, if any person approaches them, his grievance shall be attended to by the appellate and revisional authorities so constituted, and decision shall be taken by passing speaking order, containing reasons.
27.In the result, I hold that Section 5-A of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act (No, V) of 1958, is intra vires the legislative power of the Provincial Legislature, and neither it offends against any existing provision of the Act nor is violative of any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners as guaranteed by the Constitution. Similarly, no valid exception can be taken to the valuation tables prepared and notified by the Government of the Punjab in the valid exercise of its power derived from Section 5-A ibid. Consequently, the writ petitions are dismissed, subject to the observations in the preceding paragraph. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
Sr.No, W.P.No, YearParty Names District 1 4046 20022002 Malik Muhammad Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.T.T.Singh 2 4954 20022002 Jamshed Waheed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore.
3 5537 20022002 Muhammad lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Okara 4 5538 2002Irfan Ijaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Okara 5 5674 2002Sami ud Din Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
6 5675 2002Ch. Tahir Islam Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
7 5676 2002Muhammad Shehbaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
8 5700 2002Muhammad Fiaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
9 5701 2002Hafiz Abdul Razaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
10 5702 2002Ch. Muhammad Yousaf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore.
11 5703 2002Ghias ud Din Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
12 5704 2002Sh. lftikhar Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
13 5705 2002Muhammad Islam Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
14 5706 2002Muhammad Bilal Awais Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
15 5707 2002Sh. Muhammad lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
16 5708 2002Muhammad Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
17 5709 2002Muhammad IshaqV s. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
18 5710 2002Ch. Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore.
19 5711 2002Muhammad Shehbaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
20 5712 2002Muhammad Ihsan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
21 5713 2002Muhammad Aslam Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
22 5714 2002Abdul Rashid Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
23 5715 2002Ghias ud Din Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
24 5716 2002Sajjad Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
25 5717 2002Muhammad Shafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
26 5718 2002Syed Anwar Shah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
27 5765 20022002 Muhammad Massood Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore.
28 5768 2002Muhammad Nawaz. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
29 5769 2002Semi ud Din Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
30 5770 2002Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
31 5771 2002Muhammad Munir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
32 5773 2002Khurshid Anwar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
33 5776 2002Ch. Abdul Hameed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
34 5777 2002Ch. Muhammad Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore.
35 5778 2002Muhammad Hafeez vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
36 5794 2002Ahmed Butt Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
37 5795 2002Mst Urooj Butt Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
38 5888 2002Muhammad Ajmal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
39 5889 2002Muhammad lshtiaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
40 5890 2002Muhammad llyas Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
41 5891 2002Muhammad Mohyuddin Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore.
42 5892 2002Muhammad Idrees Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
43 5893 2002Haji Rob Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
44 5894 2002Muhammad Ishtiaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
45 5895 2002Muhammad Ilyes Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
46 6012 2002Mehmood Ahmed Bux Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore.
47 6029 2002Asim ul Haq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
48 6215 2002Ch. Athar Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
49 6216 2002Muhammad ljaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
50 6217 2002Fazal Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
51 6218 2002Muhammad Ashiq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
52 6219 2002Muhammad Ibrahim Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
53 6220 2002Sarni ud Din Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
54 6221 2002Muhammad Zulfigar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
55 6222 2002Amir Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
56 6223 2002Haji Muhammad Zareef Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
57 6585 2002Pir Qamar Din Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
58 7025 2002M. Aziz Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
59 7416 2002Naghma Cinema Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
60 7625 2002Ghulam Sarwar Bokhari Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
61 7753 2002Shabistan Cinema Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
62 7754 2002Prince Cinema Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore.
63 7770 2002M. Ashraf Chughtai Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.(Multan) Sahiwal 64 7827 2002Muhammad Rarnzan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 65 7830 2002Zafar lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 66 7863 2002Dildar Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 67 8030 2002Syed Irfan Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 68 8137 2002Ws. Morning Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Govt. of the Punjab etc. Lahore 69 8796 2002Noor Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 70 8930 2002Ijaz Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.(Multan) Sahiwal 71 9360 2002Sabir Enterprises Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 72 9417 2002Muhammad lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Sheikhupura 73 9525 2002Zafar lqbal Ahmad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 74 12031 2002Haji Mohd Afzal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 75 12232 2002Abdur Rehman Shaukat Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 76 13267 2002M/s Haji, (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 77 13268 2002Haji Muhammad Sarwar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 78 13269 2002Sohail Sarwar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 79 13675 2002Lahore Race Club Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 80 13973 2002Altaf Ahmad Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. T.T.Singh 81 14134 2002Munir Ahmed Bhatti Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 82 14904 2002Amjad Wazeer Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 83 14914 2002Haji M. Ashraf Naseem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 84 14915 2002Haji M. Ashraf Naseem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 85 14921 2002Sh. Muhammad Amir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 86 15135 2002Haji Muhammad Riaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 87 15202 2002Mst. Nazli Sohail Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 88 15298 2002Kh. Amjad Hassan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 89 15308 2002Muhammad Hafeez Bhatti Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 90 15758 2002Muhammad Ismail Qureshi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 91 15771 2002Akhtar Ali Dogar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 92 15803 2002Muhammad Zaheer Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 93 15804 2002Dr. Mukhar Ahmad Dhodhi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 94 15805 2002Mrs. Khalida Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 95 15806 2002Mrs. Khalida Akhtar Vs. Government of the. Punjab etc. Lahore 96 15867 2002Mian Abdul Ml4eed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 97 15873 2002Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Okara 98 15990 2002Mian Muzaffar Ahmad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 99 16198 2002Mian Ilyas Miraj Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 100 16308 2002Dr. Shahid Latif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 101 16544 2002Mrs. Momina KhanVs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 102 16545 2002Dr. Farrukh A. Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 103 16547 2002Mst Naeema Khanum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 104 16548 2002Brig (R) Farooq A. Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 105 16549 2002Brig (R) Farooq A. Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 106 16745 2002Begum Naseem Sharif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 107 16901 2002Haji Muhammad Ihsan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 108 17083 2002Muhammad Khalid Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 109 17134 2002Mst Fauzia Sharif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 110 17135 2002Sh. Sharif Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 111 17333 2002Qazi Javed lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 112 17437 2002Wasim Bari Saleemi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 113 17438 2002Naeem Bari Saleemi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 114 17497 2002Shaukat Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 115 17498 2002Shaukat Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 116 17608 2002Ch. Azhar Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 117 17609 2002Malik Muhammad Afzal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 118 17610 2002Muhammad Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 119 17611 2002Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 120 17612 2002Muhammad Shehbaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 121 17616 2002Syed Yasir Ali Ijaz Vs Government of the Punjab etc. Rawalpindi 122 17642 2002Mian Arif Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 123 17643 2002Mst Farkhanda Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 124 17701 2002ATH Tajran Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 125 17742 2002Sh. Muhammad Umar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 126 17743 2002Muhammad Saif Ullah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 127 17745 2002Mrs. Naz Per4itf_ Sultana Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 128 17784 2002Muhammad lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 129 17785 2002Abdul Hafeez Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 130 17786 2002Muhammad Rafiq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 131 17787 2002Usman Farooq Ch. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 132 17788 2002Ijaz Mushtaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 133 17789 2002Sharjeel !shag Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 134 17790 2002Mazhar Hameed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 135 17791 2002Maqbool Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 136 17792 2002Munawar Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 137 17793 2002Muhammad Asif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 138 17794 2002Muhammad Ajmal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 139 17795 2002Ijaz Mushtaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 140 17738 2002Ch. Maswar Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 141 17839 2002Ch. Zaheer Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 142 17840 2002Ch. Muhammad Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 143 17841 2002Umar Shaukat Ch. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 144 17842 2002Muhammad Ramzan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 114 17497 2002Shaukat Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 115 17498 2002Shaukat Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 116 17608 2002Ch. Azhar Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 117 17609 2002Malik Muhammad Afzal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 118 17610 2002Muhammad Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 119 17611 2002Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 120 17612 2002Muhammad Shehbaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 121 17616 2002Syed Yasir Ali Ijaz Vs Government of the Punjab etc. Rawalpindi 122 17642 2002Mian Arif Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 123 17643 2002Mst Farkhanda Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 124 17701 2002ATH Tajran Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 125 17742 2002Sh. Muhammad Umar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 126 17743 2002Muhammad Saif Ullah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 127 17745 2002Mrs. Naz Per4itf_ Sultana Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 128 17784 2002Muhammad lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 129 17785 2002Abdul Hafeez Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 130 17786 2002Muhammad Rafiq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 131 17787 2002Usman Farooq Ch. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 132 17788 2002Ijaz Mushtaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 133 17789 2002Sharjeel !shag Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 134 17790 2002Mazhar Hameed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 135 17791 2002Maqbool Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 136 17792 2002Munawar Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 137 17793 2002Muhammad Asif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 138 17794 2002Muhammad Ajmal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 139 17795 2002Ijaz Mushtaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 140 17738 2002Ch. Maswar Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 141 17839 2002Ch. Zaheer Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 142 17840 2002Ch. Muhammad Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 143 17841 2002Umar Shaukat Ch. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 144 17842 2002Muhammad Ramzan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 145 17843 2002Usman Farooq ch. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 146 17844 2002Maqbool Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 147 17856 2002Ch. Inayat Ullah Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 148 17868 2002LHCB Cooperative/Society Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 149 17890 2002Abdul Rasheed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 150 17929 2002K.B.Mohd Naqi Waqaf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 151 18018 2002Amjad Hussain Qureshi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 152 18574 2002Ch. M. lqbal Shahid Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 153 18757 2002Abid Pervaiz Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 154 19033 2002Tahir Younis Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 155 19036 2002Mian M. Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 156 19038 2002Muhammad Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 157 19079 2002Ch. M. Azmat Tarar etc. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 158 19306 2002Muhammad Abu Bakar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc, Lahore 159 19351 2002Nawabzada Zulfiqar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 160 19510 2002Mst Hanifan Bibi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 161 19631 2002Ishrat Ali Vs. Government" of the Punjab etc. Lahore 162 19627 2002Muhammad Ramazan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 163 19722 2002Malik M. Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 164 19816 2002Muhammad Khalid Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 165 19876 2002Ch. M. Sharif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. T.T.Singh 166 19902 2002M/s. G.R.W.A. Trust Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 167 20053 2002Arif Javed etc.Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 168 20385 2002Hamid Amin Soofi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 169 20440 2002Sarfraz Karim Qureshi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 170 20843 2002Fayyaz Hussain Kirmani Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 171 20907 2002Najam ud Din Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 172 20917 2002Muhammad Naveed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 173 20918 2002Muhammad Yaqoob Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 174 20919 2002Muhammad Naveed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 175 20920 2002Muhammad Naveed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 176 20921 2002Muhammad Ayub Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 177 21094 2002Sh. Aman Ullah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 178 21591 2002M.S.Hameeda Ismail Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 179 21642 2002Mst Mariam Ghulam Rasool Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Jhang 180 21750 2002Zahid Javed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 181 188 2003Raja Javed Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 182 320 2003Mst. Zarina Jabeen Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 183 465 2003Mobeen ul Hassan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 184 466 2003Mian Wali Muhammad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 185 467 2003Nadeem ul Hassan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 186 706 2003Syed Muhammad Shafiq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 187 722 2003Mst Akbari Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 188 732 2003Muhammad Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 189 749 2003Kh. Zahid Sultan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Sargodha 190 866 2003Shaukat Hameed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 191 1181 2003Muhammad Asad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 192 1182 2003Muhammad Akram Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 193 1407 2003Aftab Mohuddin Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 194 1437 2003Begum Rahat Riaz etc. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 195 1438 2003Begum Rahat Riaz etc. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 196 1440 2003Tariq Rahim Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 197 1504 2003Republic Motors Ltd. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 198 1564 2003Muhammad Latif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 199 1774 2003Muhammad Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 200 1827 2003Syed Ameer Haider Vs. Government of the Punjab Lahore 201 2015 2003Mian Ijaz Bari Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 202 2396 2003M. SiddiqueVs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 203 2435 2003Ch. Muhammad Sarwar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Gujranwala 204 2562 2003Ghulam Rasool Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. (Multan)Sahiwal 205 2678 2003Ghulam Tasawar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. (Multan)Khanewal 206 2722 2003Mst Shakila Khaliq Vs. Govt. of the Punjab etc.-(Multan) Khanewal 207 2690 2003M. Farhan Sher Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. (Multan)Sahiwal 208 3189 2003Ghulam Murtaza Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. (Multan)Khanewal 209 2609 2003Dr. MasoorruSaeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 210 3091 2003Mian Muhammad Khalid Pervaiz Vs. Govt. of the Punjab etc.Lahore 211 3136 2003Muhammad Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 212 3137 2003Mst Asifa Nasreen Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 213 3138 2003Shakeel Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 214 3215 2003Mst Nusrat BegumVs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 215 3254 2003Mukhtar Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. T.T.Singhk 216 3307 2003Rukhsana Parveen Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 217 3314 2003Shabbir Hussain Shah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 218 3550 2003Ch. Ashiq Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 219 3587 2003Rattan Cinema Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 220 3624 2003Raees Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 221 3753 2003Khurram Malik Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 222 3838 2003Malik Niaz Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 223 3851 2003Haji Mian Ghulam Qadir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Sargodha 224 3880 2003Mst Nasim Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 225 3991 2003Mst Kishwar SultartWs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 226 3992 2003Ajaz Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 227 4034 2003Qadeer Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 228 4036 2003Muhammad Imran Rasheed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Faisalabad 229 4064 2003Haji M. Aslam Shamas Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 230 4184 2003 Mst Masooda Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 231 4239 2003 Muhammad Irshad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 232 4242 2003 Muhammad Shafi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 233 4246 2003 Muhammad Sadique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 234 4334 2003 Adnan Sadiq etc. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 235 4367 2003 Arif Hussain Minhas Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 236 4368 2003 Nargis Bibi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 237 4369 2003 WaKeei Hassan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Kasur 238 4655 2003 Kaneez Fatima Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 239 4812 2003 Muhammad Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 240 4959 2003 Arif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 241 4971 2003 Farooq Azam Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 242 5008 2003 Mst Rehana Hashmi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 243 5009 2003 Muhammad Asif Yaqoob Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Sargodha 244 5087 2003 Agha Shehzad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 245 5131 2003 Pb. Prov. Coop. Bank Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 246 5174 2003 Muhammad Farooq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 247 5175 2003 Dr. Akhtar Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 248 5177 2003 Khadim Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 249 5225 2003 Asif Mehmood Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Sialkot 250 5241 2003 Abid Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 251 5372 2003 Mujahid ul Hassan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 252 5388 2003 Mst Asmat Anees Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 253 5389 2003 Mst Walayat Noor Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 254 5405 2003 Attiq ur Rehman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 255 5406 2003 Allah Ditta Tanveer Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 256 5407 2003 Selma Tariq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 257 5421 2003 Sufi Mirza M. Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 258 5442 2003 Mst Zarina Naseem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 259 5448 2003 Mst. Naik Parveen Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 260 5457 2003 Muhammad Qayyum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 261 5464 2003 Ch. Muhammad Abbas Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Gujrat 262 5483 2003 Ahmed Rahim Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 263 5484 2003 Mian Mansoor Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 264 5523 2003 Sadiq Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 265 5552 2003 Dr. Ahmed Hameed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 266 5570 2003 Dr. Muhammad Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 267 5648 2003 Malik M. Farooq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 268 5659 2003 Muhammad Siddique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 269 5659 2003 Faisal ljaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 270 5667 2003 Mehmood Raheel Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 271 5668 2003 Aurangzeb Kashmiri Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 272 5669 2003 Mian Nayyer Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 273 5670 2003 Ch. Allah Ditta Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 274 5671 2003 Ghulam Yazdani Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 275 5672 2003 Abdul Waheed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 276 5673 2003 Najma Parveen Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 277 5674 2003 Malik Muhammad Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Faisalabad 278 5675 2003 Kh. Muhammad lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 279 5676 2003 Khawar Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 280 5677 2003 Kh. Muhammad lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 281 5709 2003 Dr. Ashghar Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 282 5758 2003 Rana Abdul Qadir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 283 5779 2003 Col (R) S. Amjad Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 284 5791 2003 M.Amir Nawaz Bhatti Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Sheikhupura 285 5822 2003 M/s Amar Pak Dry Cleaners Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 286 5839 2003 Zia ullah Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 287 5840 2003 Kh. M. Azeem Akbar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 288 5938 2003 Ghazala KhanVs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 289 6023 2003 Mariam Bibi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 290 6079 2003 Yousaf Rasheed Ch.Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 291 6098 2003 Malik Javed Khalid Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 292 6099 2003 Abdul Hameed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 293 6106 2003 Begum Azra Rafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 294 6180 2003 Muhammad Tufail Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 295 6264 2003 Dr. Aziz Ahmed Aziz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 296 6265 2003 Dr. Aziz Ahmed Aziz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 297 6373 2003 Khadim Mehmood Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 298 6402 2003 Khalida Adeeb Khanum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 299 6403 2003 Khalida Adeeb Khanum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 300 6404 2003 Khalida Adeeb Khanum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 301 6409 2003 Mushtaq Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 302 6437 2003 Asad Niaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 303 6661 2003 A.W.T.H Shahrian etc. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 304 6733 2003 Fida Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. M.B.Din 305 6738 2003 Metropole Cinema Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 306 67682003 2003 Dr. Shah Muhammad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 307 6796 2003 Azhar Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 308 6818 2003 Mst Munawar Naseer Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 309 6845 2003 Muhammad Siddique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 310 6934 2003 M/s Sea Hawk Intl. Ltd. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 311 6935 2003 M/s Sea Hawk Intl. Ltd. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 312 6943 2003 lqbal Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 313 6944 2003 Umat ul Hafeez Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 314 7024 2003 Muhammad Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 315 7149 2003 Muhammad Jameel Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 316 7166 2003 Dr. Mukhar Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Sargodha 317 7167 2003 Muhammad Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Sargodha 318 7178 2003 Shahid Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 319 7204 2003 Asifa Zafar Islam Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 320 7213 2003 Zafar Hussain Bhatti Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 321 7224 2003 Muhammad Idrees Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 322 7229 2003 Faqir Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 323 7241 2003 Nusrat Bokhari Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 324 7297 2003 Malik Muhammad Younis Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 325 7337 2003 Abdul Jabbar etc.Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 326 7345 2003 Mian Fiaz Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 327 7395 2003 Muhammad Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 328 7449 2003 Mst Zara Riaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 329 7458 2003 Malik A Sattar ZulqarnainVs. Government of the Punjab etc.Gujranwala 330 7460 2003 Syed Alamdar Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 331 7463 2003 Syed Zafar Abbas Shah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 332 7477 2003 Shaukat Ali Vs. Government of Punjab etc. Faisalabad 333 7478 2003 Muhammad Iftikhar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 334 7497 2003 Arshad Mehmood Tamimi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Faisalabad 335 7548 2003 Muhammad Hanif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 336 7577 2003 Zameer Ahmed Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 337 7597 2003 LHR Stock Exchange Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 338 7629 2003 Mian Abdul Naveed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 339 7632 2003 Haji Reham Elahi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 340 7636 2003 Ch. Muhammad Hafeez Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 341 7637 2003 Mst Ghazala Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 342 7687 2003 Sultan Alam Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 343 7729 2003 Mst Sarwar Nazir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 344 7741 2003 Muhammad Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 345 7762 2003 Syed Abid Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 346 7769 2003 Muhammad Pervaiz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 347 7792 2003 Mian Waseem ur Rehman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 348 7919 2003 State Life Insurance Corp.Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 349 7965 2003 Muhammad Akram Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 350 8000 2003 Mst Safia Azmat Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Khushab 351 8110 2003 Ch. A. Hameed Kahloon Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 352 8114 2003 Abdul Basit Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 353 8159 2003 Masood Ashraf Siddiqui Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 354 8179 2003 Abdul Aziz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 355 8228 2003 Naveed Anwar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 356 8229 2003 Anwar Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 357 8261 2003 Syed Sagheer Ahmed etc Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 358 8288 2003 Ch. Zafarullah Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 359 8296 2003 Mst Azmat Tahira Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 360 8418 2003 Ch. Zafarullah Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 361 8526 2003 Zohra Nazir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 362 8528 2003 Mohsin Rasheed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 363 8533 2003 Surriya Jamil Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 364 8536 2003 Musarat Nazli Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 365 8629 2003 Ch. Muhammad Aslam Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 366 8631 2003 Abdur Rehman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 367 8751 2003 Muhammad Yousaf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 368 8789 2003 Masooda Birjees Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 369 8805 2003 Haji Muhammad IbrahimVs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 370 8813 2003 Muhammad Inayat Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 371 8837 2003 Muhammad SulemanVs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 372 8867 2003 Qudsia Naheed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 373 8918 2003 Mehmooda Rafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 374 8919 2003 Tariq Rafiq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 375 8920 2003 Tahir Rafiq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 376 8935 2003 Mohd Waheed Qureshi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 377 8937 2003 M. Yaseen Qureshi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 378 9005 2003 Abdur Rashid Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 379 9006 2003 Amjad Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 380 9007 2003 Muhammad Ashraf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 381 9008 2003 Rehana Saeed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 382 9034 2003 Nazar Shabab Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 383 9113 2003 Mst Shehnaz Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 384 9145 2003 Dr. Farah Khilji Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 385 9240 2003 Nazir Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 386 9241 2003 Muhammad Zaman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 387 9282 2003 Ch. Usman Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 388 9329 2003 Shafqat Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 389 9330 2003 ljaz Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 390 9332 2003 Mehmood Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 391 9353 2003 Sardar M.A. Dogar, Adv.Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Kasur 392 9430 2003 Abdur Rauf Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 393 9433 2003 Kh. Bilal Asghar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 394 9434 2003 Waseem lqbal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 395 9440 2003 Muhammad Rafiq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 396 9525 2003 Muhammad Amin Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 397 9581 2003 Pb. Prov. Coop Bank. Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 398 9772 2003 Babu lhsan ullah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 399 10110 2003 Masood Ahmed Butt Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 400 10117 2003 Amjad Mehmood Chughtai Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Gujranwala 401 10596 2003 Safia Bibi Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 402 10758 2003 Mst Shehzad Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 403 10845 2003 Mian Abdul Hameed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 404 11816 2003 Haji Muhammad Amin Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 405 11839 2003 Muhammad Umar Farooq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Faisalabad 406 11930 2003 Ch. Muhammad Afzal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 407 12125 2003 Abdul Jabbar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 408 12760 2003 Mst Sarfraz Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 409 12979 2003 Rehmat Ullah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 410 13146 2003 Sajid Siddique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 411 13747 2003 Mst. Ghazala Shaheen Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 412 13827 2003 Capital Cinema Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 413 14070 2003 M/s. Sarena Industries Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 414 14495 2003Mst. Shamim Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 415 14498 2003 Ch. Muhammad Younis Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 416 14501 2003 Muhammad Rafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 417 14502 2003 Ch. Zaheer Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 418 14503 2003 Muhammad Yousaf Butt Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Gujranwala 419 14511 2003 Syed Itrat Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 420 14844 2003 Kh. Muhammad Shehzad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Lahore 421 14845 2003 Rahat Shehzad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 422 14942 2003 Muhammad Umar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 423 14950 2003 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Faisalabad 424 15066 2003 Shahida Asghar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 425 15066 2003 lsrar ul Haq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 426 15166 2003 Nadeem T. Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 427 15366 2003 Muhammad Saeed Mirza Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Gujranwala 428 15476 2003 Manzoor ul Haq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 429 15487 2003 Muhammad Hafeez Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 430 15488 2003 Jamil Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 431 15493 2003 Lala Farooq Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 432 15500 2003 Noor Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 433 15506 2003 Tallat Mehmood Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 434 15507 2003 Muhammad Anees Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 435 15565 2003 Humayum Jamal Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 436 15608 2003 Muhammad Arif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 437 15622 2003 Malik Ajmal Hassan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 438 15624 2003 Mehboob AU Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 439 15735 2003 Shujat Amin Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 440 15886 2003 Muhammad Rafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 441 15887 2003 Muhammad Shafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc., Gujranwala 442 15888 2003 Muhammad Rafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 443 16029 2003 Muhammad Ishaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 444 16036 2003 Syed Fida Hussain Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 445 16038 2003 Ch. Shaukat Ali Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 446 16112 2003 Mst. Aziz Zulfiqar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 447 16169 2003 Shehzad Akbar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 448 16464 2003 Khalid Rafique Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 449 16566 2003 Syed M.R. Shah Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 450 16572 2003 Mst Aisha Moin Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 451 16581 2003 Mst Razia Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 452 16865 2003 Mst Firdous Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 453 16866 2003 Mst Firdous Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 454 17033 2003 Muhammad Anwar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 455 17126 2003 M. Shuja ur Rehman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 456 17198 2003 Seth Muhammad Nazir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 457 17200 2003 Mst. Jamila Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 458 17283 2003 Seth Muhammad Nazir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 459 17317 2003 Seth Muhammad Nazir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 460 17404 2003 Yar Muhammad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 461 17585 2003 2003 Ghulam Mustafa Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 462 17604 2003 Samina Malik Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 463 17607 2003 Mehmood Ahsan Malik Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 464 17674 2003 M. Afzal Tariq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 465 17769 2003 Muhammad Mushtaq Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 466 17954 2003 Muhammad Sharif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 467 17955 2003 Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 468 17956 2003 Muhammad Khalid Nawaz-Vs. Government-of the Punjab etc.Faisalabad 469 85 2004 Muhammad Saleem Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 470 427 2004 Abdul Hafeez Butt Vs. Govement of the Punjab etc. Lahore 471 513 2004 Tanveer Ahmed Khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Sargodha 472 800 2004 M. Aslam Tahir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 473 859 2004 Mst Noor Bakht Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 474 888 2004 Farkhanda Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 475 1017 2004 Aziz Suleman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 476 1020 2004 Hafiz Mehmboob AlamVs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 477 1055 2004 Rana Niaz Ahmed Government of Punjab etc. Lahore 478 1284 2004 Ali Haroon Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 479 1412 2004 Noor M. Khan Chandia Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 480 1439 2004 Abdur Rehman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 481 1612 2004 Muhammad Nazir Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 482 1921 2004 Mst. Naseem Akhtar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 483 1954 2004 Mst Irshad Begum Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 484 2036 2004 Nighat Zohra Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 485 2184 2004 Rana M.Altaf khan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 486 2211 2004 Shahid Latif Anwar Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 487 2264 2004 Zia ur Rehman Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 488 2420 2004 Pb. Prov. Coop. Bank Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujrat 489 2454 2004 Sh. Naseem Ahmed Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 490 2512 2004 Muhammad Ibrahim Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. M.B.Din 491 2530 2004 Muhammad Shah Nawaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc.Faisalabad 492 2692 2004 Agha Shehbaz Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Lahore 493 2744 2004 Shahid Anwar Latif Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad 494 2771 2004 Noor Muhammad Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Gujranwala 495 2961 2004 Abdul Ghaffar Hassan Vs. Government of the Punjab etc. Faisalabad Valuation Table Commercial CategorySelf ' Rented Land Area 02 Sq YardCovered Area @ Sq.Ft. Land Area @ Sq YardCovered Area Sq.Ft.
Clas sProperty Situated Main/Off Roads1 500Exd.
5001st 15001500 to 3000Exd.
30001 500 Exd. 500 1st 1500 1500 to 3000Exd. 3000 A Main Rs, 0.64 Rs, 0.40Rs, 0.40 Rs, 0.25Roads Rs, 0.64 Rs, 0.40Rs, 0.40 Rs, 0.25Rs, 0.30 Rs, 0.20Rs, 3.20.
Rs, 2.00iRs, 2.00 Rs, 1.25Rs, 3.20 Rs, 2.00Rs, 2.00 Rs, 1.25Rs, 1.50 Rs, 1.00 Off Road B Main RoadsRs, 0.50Rs, 0.32Rs, 0.50Rs, 0.32Rs, 0.25Rs, 2.50Rs, 1.60 Rs, 2.50 Rs, 1.60 Rs, 1.25 Off RoadRs, 0.32Rs, 0.20Rs, 0.32Rs, 0.20Rs, 0.16 Rs, 1.60 !Rs, 1.00 Rs, 1.60 Rs, 1 00 Rs, 0.80 Category Self Rented Land Area @ Sq YardCovered Area @ Sq.Ft.Land Area @ Sq Yard Covered Area @ Sq.Ft. i i Category Self Rented Land Area @ Sq YardCovered Area it @ Sq.Ft. Land Area @ Sq Yard Covered Area @ Sq.Ft.
ClassProperty Situated Main/Off Roads1st 500 Exd.
5001st 3000Exd.
30001st. 500 Exd. 500 1st 3000 Exd.
3000 A Main RoadsRs, 0.40 Rs, 0.30 Rs, 0.40 Rs, 0.30Rs, 4.00 Rs, 3.00 Rs, 4.00 Rs 3.00 Off Road Rs, 0.30 Rs, 0.25 Rs, 0.30 Rs, 0.25Rs, 3.00 Rs, 2.50 Rs, 3.00Rs, 2.50 B Main RoadsRs, 0.30 Rs, 0.25 Rs, 0.30 Rs, 0.25Rs, 3.00 Rs, 2.50 Rs, 3.00 Rs, 2.50 Off Road Rs, 0.25 Rs, 0.20Rs, 0.25 Rs, 0.20Rs, 2.50 Rs, 2.00 Rs, 2.50Rs, 2.00 C Main RoadsRs, 0.25 Rs, 0.20 Rs, 0.25 Rs, 0.20Rs, 2.50 Rs, 2.00 Rs,2.50 Rs, 2.00 Off RoadRs, 0.20 Rs, 0.15 Rs, 0.20 Rs, 0.15Rs, 2.00 Rs, 1.50 Rs,2.00 Rs, 1.50ClassProperty Situated Main/Off Roads1st 5001st1500 Exd 5001500 to 3000Excl.
30001st 500 Exd. 500 1st 15001500 to 3000Exd. 3000 AMain RoadsRs, 2.40Rs, 1.40Rs, 2.40Rs, 2.00Rs, 1.40Rs, 12.00 Rs, 7.00Rs, 12.00 Rs, 10.00 Rs, 7.00 Off RoadRs, 2.00Rs, 1.20Rs, 2.00Rs, 1.60 Rs, 1.20Rs, 8.00 Rs, 6.00Rs, 10.00 Rs, 8.00 Rs, 6.00 BMain RoadsRs, 1.60Rs, 1.20Rs, 1.60Rs, 1.40 Rs, 1.20Rs, 8.00 Rs, 6.00 Rs, 8.00 Rs, 7.00 Rs, 6.00 Off RoadRs, 1.40Rs, 1.00Rs,1.40Rs, 1.20 Rs, 1.00 Rs, 7.00 Rs, 5:00 Rs, 7.00 Rs, 6.00 Rs, 5.00 CMain Roads Rs, 1.40Rs, 1.00Rs,1.40Rs, 1.20Rs, 1.00Rs, 7.00 Rs, 5.00 Rs, 7.00 Rs, 6.00 Rs, 5.00 Off RoadRs, 1.00Rs, 1.00 Rs, 1.00 Rs, 0.80Rs, 0.60Rs, 5.00IRs, 3.00Rs, 5.00 Rs, 4.00 Rs 3.00 DMain Roads. Rs, 1.00Rs, 0.6 0Rs,1.00Rs, 0.80Rs, 0.60Rs, 5.00 Rs, 3.00Rs, 5.00 Rs, 4.00 Rs,3.00 Off RoadRs, 1.00Rs, 0.6 Rs, 0.80Rs, 0.60Rs, 0.50Rs, 4.00 Rs, 2.50Rs, 4.00. Rs, 3.00 Rs, 2.50 E Main RoadsRs, 0.80Rs, 0.50Rs, 0.80Rs, 0.60Rs, 0.50Rs, 4.00 - Rs, 2.50Rs, 4.00 Rs, 3.00 Rs, 2.50 Off RoadRs, 0.50Rs, 0.30Rs, 0.50 Rs, 0.40Rs, 0.30Rs, 2.50 Rs, 1.50 Rs, 2.50 Rs, 2.00 Rs, 1.50 .. i D Main RoadsRs, 0.20 Rs, 0.15 Rs, 0.20 Rs, 0.15 Rs, 2.00 Rs, 1.50Rs,2.00Rs, 1.50 Off Road Rs, 0.15 Rs, 0.10 Rs, 0.15Rs, 0.10 Rs, 1.50 Rs, 1.00 Rs,1.50Rs, 1.00 E Main RoadsRs, 0.15 Rs, 0.10 Rs, 0.15 Rs, 0.10 Rs, 1.00 Rs, 1.00 Rs,1.50 Rs, 1.00 Off Road Rs, 0.10 Rs, 0.05 Rs, 0.10 Rs, 0.05Rs,1.50 Rs, 1.50 Rs,1.00 Rs, 1.50