' This is an appeal from an order of Muhammad Azim Khan, Additional District Judge at Lahore, dated 12th January, 1978, affirming an order of Mr. Mansoor Akbar Kokab, Rent Controller, Lahore dated 23rd February, 1977, whereby he accepted an application for ejectment filed by the respondent, and ordered the ejectment of the appellant from the shop in dispute.
2. The record of the learned Additional District Judge shows that on 31st July, 1977, he had made the following order :{{URDU TEXT}} ' The appellant deposited the receipts in Court before the learned Additional District Judge decided the appeal on 12th January, 1978. It was discovered that the appellant had failed to comply with the, orders, as the rent for the month of July 1977 had been deposited on 28th August 1977, and that for September had been deposited on 14th November 1977, and that for November had been deposited on 10th January, 1978. On account of the late deposit of rent for the above-mentioned three months the appellate authority struck off the appellant's' defence.
The only point which has been raised in this appeal is that the learned Additional District Judge could not have passed the order of deposit of rent by exercising power under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. It is also submitted that having passed such an order, the Court could not have struck off the appellant's defence. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on Abdul Qayyum Ansari v. Salahuddin Qureshi for the proposition that under section 13(6) of the Ordinance, an appellate authority can also order the deposit of rent pending the appeal, and can strike off defence for non-compliance of its order. In Mehr Gul and others v. Nazar Abbas, etc. C. P. S. L. A. No, 272 of 1978 the Supreme Court has observed to the effect that the High Court could exercise powers under section 13(6) of the Ordinance for making a1 preliminary order of deposit of rent. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to oppose this point of view by relying on any case-law.
4. In view of the above facts I hold that the appellant's defence was rightly struck &I by the lower appellate Court. There is no merit in this second appeal which accordingly is dismissed. PLD 1974 Kar. 10