MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---The respondent-Bank filed a suit for the recovery against the appellant under the provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. The suit was decreed on 1-12-1994 and the Bank thereafter, brought the execution application on 17-5-2000. This was opposed by the appellant on the ground of being barred by limitation. The application has been rejected through the impugn( d order, hence this appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant, by relying upon the judgments reported as Khalid Qureshi and 5 others v. United Bank Limited 2001 SCM R 103 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Fakir Spinning Mills 1998 CLC 812, has argued that the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997, have no retrospective effect and, therefore, under section 22 of the Act, no fresh period of limitation shall be available to the decree-holder for filing an execution petition, which earlier had not been filed within three years and this already was barred by time.
3. Heard. We are not impressed with the above plea for the reason, that under section 12 of the Ordinance No.LVIII of 1984, the application of the Limitation Act was excluded qua any suit, application or other proceedings filed by the Banking Companies under the Ordinance, with the result that there shall be no limitation for seeking the execution of a decree under the above Ordinance. Therefore, if the 1997 Act had not come in force, the respondent decree-holder could avail unlimited period to initiate the execution process. And it is well-settled, that once a vested right has been created upon a litigant at the time of the commencement of the lis, such right cannot be taken away except by the express provisions of the law. Now if the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (No XV of 1997) is inapplicable, the legal consequences would be that the execution application shall never be barred by time.
4. Be that as it may, in our view, the correct legal position is, that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (XIX of 1979) and the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984), have been repealed by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act. 1997 (No.XV of 1997), and all the cases pending before the defunct forums stand transferred to the "Banking Court" constituted under the Act. By virtue of section 22 (1) of the Act 1997, the Limitation Act remains excluded for any suit, application or the proceedings, which are so transferred to the latter forum. But under subsection (2), the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to all the cases which are instituted or filed in the "Banking Court" Cu, after the coming into force of the Act, however with the exception regarding those cases, which are covered by the proviso to subsection (2), i.e. in relation to the past transactions, for which, a fresh cause of action is deemed by law to have accrued in favour of the concerned party to initiate their cause/case within the period prescribed by the Act of 1908. The true import of section 22(2) when read along with its proviso, therefore, is that for all the cases, instituted before a Banking Court after the commencement of the Act 1997, which undoubtedly includes an execution application, the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply. However, with a view to protect and safeguard the rights and the interest of those, who under the Ordinance LVIII of 1984, had unlimited period to initiate and pursue their cases, but may get affected because of subsection (2) of section 22, if the proviso was not there, that the same was added. With such legal consequences, the cases falling within the purview of the Ordinance, 1984, were termed as the "past transaction" and by fiction of law a fresh cause of action is deemed to have accrued in their favour for the purpose of the Limitation Act, 1908.
5. In our considered view the case of the respondent-Bank is squarely covered by proviso to subsection (2) of section 22 and a fresh period of limitation i.e. three years under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, shall be available to the respondent-Bank to file the execution application.
Admittedly, the Act 1997 came into force on 31-5-1997 and the application was filed on 17-5-2000, which is within time. Resultantly, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.