The brief facts out of which the present appeal arises are that respondent-Bank filed suit for recovery of Rs.24,254.09 by sale of hypothecated Truck No.LR-3801 against the following persons:--
(1) Messrs Rehman Brothers
(2) Feroze Din
(3) Ahmad Din
(4) Saif-ur-Rehman Mirza son of Ghulam Qadir.
During the pendency of the suit predecessor-in-interest of appellants died and the appellants were impleaded as defendants in the suit. The Banking Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 8-1-1994. The respondent-Bank filed execution petition before the Banking Court. The appellants filed application under section 47, C.P.C. on the plea that in view of the provisions of section 50, C.P.C. the. appellants or their property cannot be held liable for the payment of decretal amount as the predecessor-in-interest has not left any property which would be inherited by the appellants. The application was dismissed by the Banking Court vide order dated 13-2-1995. The appellants filed an application on 8-3-1995 to secure certified copy of the impugned order before the copying agency of the Banking .Court which was received by the appellants on 12-3-1995. The appellants filed present appeal before this Court on 16-4-1995 along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.
2. Learned counsel of the respondent raised a preliminary objection that section -5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as the appeal has been filed by the appellant under the special, law wherein specific period has been prescribed to file appeal before, this Court. In support of his contention, he relied .upon Messrs A.D.B. P. v. Messrs Bio-Tech 2002 CLD 1772. Learned counsel of the appellant submits that basic order of the Banking Court is without lawful authority. Therefore, limitation prescribed under the special law is not a bar to file this appeal before this Court after the prescribed period. He further submits that this Court has ample jurisdiction to condone the delay as the order of the Banking Court is without lawful authority and in violation of the mandatory provisions of law.
3. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record.
4. It is admitted fact that the appellant has filed present appeal under the provisions of special law wherein specific period has been prescribed as one month under section 12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. Therefore, section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in view of section 29 of the Limitation Act as the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah 2001 CMR 286.
In view of what has been discussed above this appeal is time barred and section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. Therefore, the same is dismissed as time barred.