The brief facts out of which present revision petition arises are that the respondents filed suit for partitions of suit against the petitioner in the Court of Civil Judge, Lahore. The petitioner filed written statement controverting the allegations leveled in the plaint. The learned trial Court framed the issues on 23.9.2003. Thereafter; the responder filed an application under Order 18 Rule 1 read with Order 14, Rule 5 of CPC, which was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 13.10.2003.
The learned trial Court has given last opportunity with costs of Rs, 100/- to the petitioner/defendant and thereafter the learned trial Court closed the evidence on 25.9.2004 due to non-production of evidence by petitioner as she was given so many opportunities. The petitioner being aggrieved went to Revisional Court and last more opportunity was given to the petitioner by the Revisional Court. The petitioner was given short dates as is evident from orders sheets i,e, 10.2.2005, 5.3.2005, 14.3.2005, 21.3.2005, 26.3.2005, 30,3.2005 and 4.4.2005 and no other case was adjourned to any date till May, 2005. The petitioner being aggrieved filed transfer application before the District Judge, Lahore, who dismissed the same vide order dated 7.4.2005. Hence, the present revision petition.
2. The learned counsel of the petitioner submits the learned District Judge passed the impugned order without perusing the record of the learned trial Court, therefore, the impugned order of the learned District Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law. He further submits that case was fixed on 14.3.2005, when mother of petitioner's witness aged 99 years was in the Hospital and the petitioner's witness requested the learned trial Court for recording of evidence or to adjourn the cases, but the learned trial Court did not accept the request of the petitioner's witness, therefore, the observations of the learned District Judges are not borne out from the record. He further submits that the case of the petitioner was adjourned for short dates whereas in other case, the learned trial Court has fixed the dates in the month of May, 2005, therefore, it is discrimination with the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner is prejudiced by the act of the Court, but this fact was not considered by the learned District Judge in the impugned order.
3. I have given my anxious consideration to the contention of learned counsel of the petitioner and perused the record.
4. The sole grievance of the petitioner that the petitioner appeared before the learned trial Court and the learned trial Court fixed the dates by granting short dates in this case. There is no other allegation of malice in the contents of application filed by the petitioner before the learned District Judge as well as before this Court against the learned trial Court. It is settled principle of law that general allegation of malice is not sustainable in the eye of law, as per principle laid down by the Superior Courts in the following judgments "Federation of Pakistan vs. Saeed Ahmad Khan, etc." (PLD 1974 S.C. 151); "Aman-ullah Khan & others vs. Federation of Pakistan etc." (PLD 1990 S.C. 1092); "Shah Jehan vs. Special Judge Anti-corruption and others" (N.L.R. 1993 Criminal 391); "Muhammad Malik vs. Muhammad Farooq and 2 others" (1993 P.Cr.L.J. 1362); 'Mushtaq Ahmad versus Mst. Rajan and others" (NLR 1994 Cr.L.J. 652); "Abdul Sattar and others vs. The State" (NLR 1994 Cr.L.J. 653); "Imam Bux versus Shadi Khan and 4 others" (1996 P.Cr.L.J. 933); Mere adjourning the case within short dates, is not reflected that the learned trial Court is against the petitioner. The impugned order of the learned District Judge is consonance with law laid down by the Superior Courts in the following judgments:-- "Hakim Ali and others vs. Muhammad Ashraf' (1994 C.L.C. 1655); "Hakim Ali and others vs. Muhammad Ashraf' (NLR 1994 C.L.J. 263); "Zafar Iqbal versus Manzoor Hussain" (NLR 1994 C.L.J. 343); The learned District Judge has given findings against the petitioner to the extent that the petitioner wants to delay the proceedings, which is in accordance with law laid down in "Ch. Nusrat-ullah vs. Athar Jamil" (1982 SCM R 300).
5. It is settled principle of law that this Court has very limited jurisdiction to set-aside the findings of the learned District Judge while exercising powers under Section 115 of CPC as per law laid down by the Privy Council in "N.S. Vankatagiri Ayyangar and another vs. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board Madrass" (PLD 1959 P.C. 26). The relevant observation is as follows: This is section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with maternal irregularity, that is by committing some error or procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters`, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusion of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law.
The judgment of the Privy Council was considered and relied upon this Court in "Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Lahore us. Syed Khalid Mehmood" (NLR 1985 Civil 114).
6. It is pertinent to mention here that the judgment of this Court is upheld by the Honourable Supreme Court in C.P. No, 1146-1984 vide judgment dated 31.3.1985 which was re-affirmed and approved by the Honourable Supreme Court in "Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore" vs. Ghulam Qadir" (PLD 1988 S.C. 625). The learned counsel of the petitioner failed to bring the case within the principle prescribed by Privy Council in the aforesaid judgment.
In view of what has been discussed above, this revision petition has not merit and the same is dismissed. However, in the interest of justice and fair play, let copy of this petition be sent to the learned trial Court, who is directed to submit his comments alongwith orders sheets in the administrative side, within one month.