Ijaz-ul-Hassan Khan, J.--Mian Muhammad Ghafoor, Petitioner, has filed instant writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, with prayer that by accepting the petition in hand, order dated 30.11.2004 recorded learned Special Judge Anti Terrorist Court, Malakand, be declared illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect by setting it aside with order of transfer of case to the Court of normal criminal jurisdiction at Saidu Sharif, Swat.
2. The prosecution story in brief is, that on the night of occurrence i,e, 20.3.2004 at about 9.45 p.m. the petitioner shot to death his wife and four children in his house. situate in `Ghari Killi Madyan in the precincts of Police Station, Madyan. The matter was reported to the police the same night at 10.45 p.m. by Mian Said Ghafoor, brother of the petitioner. One Salim was stated to have informed the respondent about the crime in question. A case was registered against the petitioner under Sections 302/34 PPC vide FIR No, 80 dated 20.3.2004. Subsequently Section 7(a) of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 was added. The petitioner was arrested and during course of investigation, he produced 30 bore pistol with 10 live cartridges of the same bore with its license copy to ASI Zarbakht PW. The petitioner was produced before Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate, Swat at Bahrain on 22.3.2004. The petitioner in his statement recorded under Sections 164/364 Cr.P.C. confessed .the guilt and admitted having committed murders of his wife and four children. The petitioner moved an application before the trial Court challenging its jurisdiction to try the case in question on the ground that the said case did not fall within the ambit of Anti Terrorism Act of 1997 and consequently prayed that the trial in question be sent to the ordinary Court of plenary jurisdiction.
This application having been resisted was dismissed per the impugned order, which necessitated the filing of instant Constitutional petition.
3. Mr. Muhammad Jamil Khan Advocate, for the petitioner, mainly contended that the alleged offence, criminal act, does not fall under the definition of 'terrorism' or 'terrorist act' as defined in Anti Terorism Act, 1997 and the learned trial judge had no legal justification to decline to transfer case to the Court of ordinary criminal jurisdiction. In this regard he placed reliance on Naeem Akhtar and others. Vs. The State and others (PLD 2003 SC 396), Mehram Ali and others vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445), Besharat Ali vs. Special Judge Anti Terrorism Court Gujranwala (PLD 2004 Lahore 199) and Sardar Moazzam Khan vs. The State and another (PLD 2004 Peshawar 175).
4. Mr. Hamid Farooq Durrani learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Abdul Latif Afridi Advocate, for Respondent No, 4, supported the impugned order and contended that in order to attract the provisions of Section 6 of the Act (ibid), it is not necessary that the offence, as alleged, had in fact caused terror or insecurity in the society but it would be adequately satisfied if the case was to strike terror or sense of fear and insecurity in the society. To augment the contentions, reliance was placed on Mumtaz Ali Khan Rajban and another vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2001 SC 169), Mst. Raheela Nasreen vs. The State and another (2002 SCMR 908), Muhammad Farooq vs. Ibrar and 5 others (PLD 2004 SC 917), Mst. Najmunnisa vs. Judge Special Court constituted under Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 (2003 SCMR 1323).
5. Contrarily Mr. Muhammad Shakeel Advocate, for Respondent No, 3, supported the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and maintained that the alleged offence does not fall within the ambit of Sec. 6 of the Act (ibid) and the same was triable by ordinary Court of criminal jurisdiction and the learned trial judge has advanced no good reason to decline to accept the application of the petitioner. To support the contention, he placed reliance on Ch. Bashir Ahmad vs. Naveed Iqbal and 7 others (PLD 2001 SC 521).
6. We have given due consideration to the arguments of learned counsel for the parties with reference to the material on record and the case law cited at the bar.
7. The question falling for determination would be, as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner could be tried by ordinary Court of criminal jurisdiction or by the Special Court constituted under the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997?
8. In order to appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and resolve the controversy effectively and properly, we consider it appropriate to reproduce below Section 6 of the Act, which reads:-- "6. Terrorist Act.--A person is said to commit a terrorist act if he--
(a) in order to, or if the effect of his actions will be to, strike terror or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substances, or such fire arms or other lethal weapons as may be notified, or poisons or noxious gases or chemicals, in such a manner as to cause, or be likely to cause, the death of, or injury or, any person of persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property on a large scale, or a wide spread disruption of supplies services essential to the life of the community, or threatens with the use of force public servants in order to prevent them from discharging their lawful duties;
(b) commits a scheduled offence, the effect of which will be, or be likely to be, to strike terror, or create a sence of fear and insecurity in the people or to adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people;
(c) commits an act of gang rape, child molestation, or robbery coupled with rape as specified in the Schedule to this act;
(d) commits an act of which snatching or lifting damage to, or destruction of State or private property, random firing to create panic charging bhatha or criminal trespass."
9. From a bare reading of Section 6(b) of the Act, it is manifest that it is not necessary that the offence alleged had in fact, caused terror as the requirement of the said provision of law could be adequately satisfied if the same was likely to strike terror or sense of fear and insecurity in the people.
10. Needless to emphasize that the very object to promulgate Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and other heinous offences as defined in Section 6 of the Act and their speedy trials. To bring an offence within the ambit of the Act, it is essential examine that the said offence should have nexus with the object of the Act and the offences covered by its Sections 6, 7 and 8.
11.In a case captioned Mst. Nujmunnisa vs. Judge Special Court constituted under Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, reported in,2003 SCMR 1323, it was observed:-- "The venue of the commission of a crime; the time of occurrence, the motive which had led to the commission of a crime and the fact whether the said crime had or had not been witnesses by the public at large are not the only factors determining the issue whether a case did or did not fall within the parameters of the ATA of 1997. The crucial question is whether the said crime had not the effect of striking terror or creating a sense of fear and insecurity in the people or any section of the people. Needless to mention here that a crime of the kind in hand committed even in a remote corner does not remain unnoticed in the area in which it is committed or even in the -country on account of the print and electronic media. Seven persons being butchered in a house at night is not the kind of occurrence which would not create terror and horror in the people or any section of- the people,"
12.Having considered the matter from all angles, we are of the firm opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity justifying interference of this Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. The petitioner has killed his wife and four children in a brutal manner. The crime in question had the effect of striking terror or creating a sense of fear and insecurity in the people. It is not denied that in such like case paramount consideration to be taken note of is the culminative fall out of the occurrence. The present incident having taken place in the house of the petitioner is sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. The time, place and manner of the act is of eminence importance. The writ petition is devoid of force. The same is hereby dismissed.