These appeals arise out of awards given on various dates in 1968, by the Industrial Court (Northern Zone), Lahore. The appellant in three of the appeals is the. General Secretary, of the Labour Union of WAPDA Electrical and Mechanical Workshop, Lahore, and in, the fourth appeal, the workmen of WAPDA Electrical and Mechanical Workshop ate the appellants, it is not necessary for the disposal of these appeals to give the facts giving rise to the industrial disputes. The learned Chairman of the Industrial Court dismissed the applications, of the appellants on the ground that; the demands giving rise to the industrial disputes were hit by the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 (herein after called the Act). The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that its jurisdiction was excluded by sastionr7-A of the Act. Section 7-A, provides that "The provisions of this Act shall ha" effect to the contrary contained in the Trade Unions Act, 1926 or the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, or any other law.".
2. I propose to dispose of these appeals by this order as common question of law requires consideration in all the appeals.
3. In three of the appeals preferred by the General Secretary of the Union, the employees of the WAPDA Electrical and Mechanical Workshop, Lahore, had formed a Union. The Labour Union had raised certain demands, which were not accepted by the respondents, WAPDA Electrical and Mechanical Workshop, Lahore (hereinafter called the Management). A strike notice was given, which resulted in a Failure Certificate. In Appeals Nos. LHR-157 of 1969 and LHR-156 of 1969, the dispute arose in 1963, and in Appeal No. LBR-161 of 1959, the dispute arose in 1954, while in Appeal No. LHR-167 of 1969, the dispute arose in 1965.
4. During the pendency of the disputes before the Industrial Court, giving rise to these appeals, a Notification was issued by the Central Government on 7th December 1966, declaring all employment in or in connection with the Organizations dealing with the generation, transmission, distribution or supply of electricity, essential to the life of community under section 3(1) of the Act, to which the said Act applied. Under section 3(3) of the Act declaration under subsection (1) of section 3, could remain in force for a period of six months only. The Central Government, however, could extend the same for periods not exceeding six months. The Central Government has extended the Notification from time to time, with the result that the provisions of the Act are still applicable to all employment in or in connection with the organizations dealing with the generation, transmission, etc. The Management, in view of the said Notification, challenged the maintainability of the applications filed by the appellants.
5. Under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, the Central Government has been empowered, under section 3, to declare an employment or class of employment to be "Essential Services" to which the Act could apply. Under section 6 of the Act the Central Government has been further empowered to make Rules regulating or empowering the specified authority to regulate the wages and other conditions of service of persons or any class of persons engaged to any employment or class of employment declared to be an "Essential Service". There is no dispute that Rules had been framed on 2ndJuly 1962 (The Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Rules, 1962), and the Director of Labour, West Pakistani had been appointed as the Authority to regulate the wages and conditions of service.
6. On 15th February 1965, the Act was amended by the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance)
Amendment Ordinance, 1965, whereby section 7-A, was introduced.
7. The Industrial Court relying on section 7-A of the Act came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Court was --excluded in respect of demands, which could be regulated under the Rules framed under section 6 of the Act.
8. A number of points have been urged by Mr. Naz, the learned Representative for the appellants.
These points have been dealt with by me in Appeals Nos. HYD-12 of 1969, KAR-6 of 1968 and KAR-124 of 1968 decided on 30th January 1969 (M. P. O., WA PDA Workers' Union, Hyderabad and 2 others v.
The West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore and others), except the contention that the provisions of the Act cannot be given retrospective effect, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. The contention was that it was only on 7th December 1966, that the Act was made applicable to all employment in or in connection with the Organizations dealing with the generation, transmission, distribution or supply of electricity. The industrial disputes giving rise to these appeals had, admittedly, arisen much before 7th December 1966. On this basis, it was urged that the Notification of 17th December 191,6, could not be given retrospective effect, so as to apply to provisions of the Act to the industrial disputes, which were pending before the Industrial Court prior to 7th December 1966. The learned Chairman of the Industrial Court disposed of the contention in the following words :- "It was further urged that the present dispute was pending before the Notifications were issued and, therefore, this petition was not hit. I am unable to accept this contention for the simple reason that there has been change in the procedure and, therefore, it must be affected retrospectively."
9. The first question that requires consideration is as to whether the Act and particularly section 7-A of the Act introduces merely a procedural change in the Industrial Dispute Ordinance or has the effect of taking away vested rights. I am clearly of the view that the Act takes away the vested right of the' Union and the individual workman. The Act merely provided that the Authority appointed by the Central Government under the Rules framed under section 6 of the Act may regulate the wages and other conditions of service of persons declared under section 3 of the Act to whom the Act applies. - The Act does not give any right of appeal to the workmen. On the other hand, under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the repealed Ordinance), an elaborate procedure is provided for adjudication of industrial disputes. When a dispute arises, the Conciliation Officer, in the first place, would make an effort to bring about conciliation between the workmen and the employer. If he fails to bring about conciliation, he will issue a Failure Certificate, which would entitle the parties concerned to apply to the Industrial Court for adjudication of the dispute. Thereafter, a right is given to go in appeal against the order passed by the Industrial Court.
In this connection, reference may be made to Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (1965 A C 369). In that case Lord Macnaghten observed as under " . . . . . . . it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only the petition is well founded. On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is (sic!) date of the passing of the Act, or was it mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships' that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In --either case, there is an interference with existing rights, contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively, unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested."
10. The repealed Ordinance dealt with procedure as well as of rights. There is nothing in the Notification of 7th December 1966, which can be either construed expressly or by necessary '' intendment to give it retrospective effect. In other words, it cannot be held that the intention of the Central Government by the Notification dated 7th December 1966, was to apply the provisions of the Act to the Organizations referred to in the Notification, even prior to that date.
11. Mr. Mahmud Zaman, the learned Advocate for the Management in all the appeals, very strenuously contended that the intention of the Legislature was to give retrospective effect to the provisions of the Act. In this connection, he submitted that if the provisions of the Act were not given retrospective effect, the very object for which certain organizations were declared under section 3 of the Act, to which the Act applied, will be frustrated. There is not much force in this contention. When the provision of law or rule is clear, it has to be interpreted grammatically.
Section 7-A of the Act has not been given retrospective effect either expressly or by necessary intendment. At any rate, in the present case, I am concerned with the Notification of 7th December 1966, which I would assume for the purposes of these appeals that it had been extended from time to time. It is not relevant for these appeals if the Notification had lapsed at any time. In this connection, it is important to note rule 1 of the Rules. It runs as under :- "(i).-(1) These rules may be called the Pakistan Essential ` Services (Maintenance) Rules, 1962.
(2) They shall apply to every employment and every class of employment which the Central Government may, in pursuance of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Act, declare to be an employment or class of employment to which the Act applies."
11. It would clearly appear from sub-rule (2) of rule 1, reproduced above, that the Rules apply to every employment or every class of employment declared under section 3 of the Act to which the Act applies. It was only on 7th December 1966, t1fat the Organization, to which the appellants belong, was declared to which the Act applied. There is nothing in the Rule. to make it applicable to the appellants prior to 7th December 1966.
12. In general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new E statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Editien;
221. Reference may l be made to the same at page 227. It runs as under :- "But a new procedure would be presumably inapplicable, where its application would prejudice rights established under the old, or would involve a breach or faith between the parties."
13. I would hold that the Notification dated 7th December 1966, cannot be given retrospective effect, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court in respect of in Industrial disputes, which were pending prior to 7th December 1966. Section 3 of the Act does not confer any power on the Central Government to declare any employment or class of employment, so as to apply the Act retrospectively. In the absence of any such power, the Notification cannot be given retrospective effect. The appeals are allowed. They must be dealt with by the Industrial Court in accordance with the law. These are very old disputes. They must be disposed of expeditiously.