' MEPCO WAPDA through its Chief Executive, Multan and S.D.O. MEPCO, Khanqah Sub-Division, Bahawalpur, have filed this writ petition, challenging the validity of decision dated 2-6-2001 taken by the Advisory Board, Punjab, Lahore, on the appeal of Muhammad Ashiq, respondent No.4, filed against MEPCO, WAPDA and others, by which the Advisory Board had declared the detection bill amounting to Rs.8,52,968 for allegedly stealing of electricity in the season of 19951996 i.e., (from November, 1995 to April, 1996) by Cholistan Cotton Ginning Factory, Bahawalpur Road, Noorpur Nauranga, District Bahawalpur, illegal and ulawful.
2. Facts, in concise form, are that Muhammad Ashiq, owner of Cholistan Cotton Ginning Factory, Bahawalpur Road, Noorpur Nauranga, District Bahawalpur, was consumer of MEPCO, WAPDA. When the surveillance team of MEPCO raided outside premises of the factory on 28-12-1998, they had detected a hole in the upper side of the body of the electric meter. Not only F.I.R. Was lodged for the theft of energy under' section 39-A of the Electricity Act, 1910 yet also a detection bill, which was subsequently reduced to Rs.8,52,968, was issued to the aforesaid consumer. Muhammad Ashiq respondent No.4 challenged this detection bill before the Electric Inspector by raising the plea that there was no hole in the meter, no notice was served, petitioner was not associated with checking of the meter, which was installed outside the factory by the WAPDA itself and for which he was not liable. The Electric Inspector on 10-5-2000, directed the parties to approach the appropriate forum as after elapse of 90 days, his jurisdiction to decide had ceased under section 26(6) of the Electricity Act 1910. Aggrieved from this decision, Muhammad Ashiq filed an appeal before the Advisory Board, Punjab, Lahore. Ultimately, the aforesaid Advisory Board accepted the version of ,respondent No.4 Muhammad Ashiq and declared the imposition of detection bill to be illegal, as no theft was found by the aforesaid Advisory Board to have been committed by Muhammad Ashiq, respondent No.4. Hence this writ petition.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners has argued the case at great length.
According to him, the Advisory Board of the Punjab had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has also challenged the jurisdiction of the Electric Inspector.
4. Learned counsel for respondent has raised a preliminary objection by stating that the writ petitioner had never objected to the question of jurisdiction of the Advisory Board before said Board so was not entitled to argue it.
5. Although the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners has raised manifold objections with regard to the jurisdiction of the Advisory Board and to the validity of the decision, yet I have avoided to enter into that controversy and have accepted the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for respondent No.4. On behalf of respondent No.4, it has been forcefully asserted by his learned counsel, that the question of jurisdiction was never raised by MEPCO or its learned counsel appearing before the Advisory Board, therefore, this question cannot be canvassed in this writ. As this agitated point can be decided as a preliminary objection, taken by the other party, therefore, the other arguments/points/objections/grounds raised for challenging the validity of the decision of the Advisory Board have not been taken up by me because those matters fall into the domain of findings of facts.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the MEPCO has not been able to deny this fact that the objection with regard to jurisdiction of the Advisory Board to entertain the appeal of Muhammad Ashiq and to decide it was never raised by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of MEPCO and others before the above-mentioned Advisory Board. So relief in the writ petition cannot be granted to the petitioners as they had acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction of the Advisory Board, Punjab Lahore with regard to matter in dispute. Having submitted to the jurisdiction of that forum, without any objection to its jurisdiction, now the petitioners cannot put challenge to the jurisdiction of the Advisory Board, Punjab, Lahore, when the decision has gone against them.
Therefore, it does not like in their mouth now to take any contrary position or version. If a Court/Tribunal/Authority/ Forum has got no jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate a case, the objection must be raised at the earliest stage, otherwise, it would be presumed that the parties submitting to that Court/Authority/Forum/Tribunal have got no objection to it, or if it had any such objection to his score, had intentionally waived or abandoned it. There is no dearth of authorities on this point and proposition of law Ahmad Khan and another v. Zahur Ahmad Khan Tareen and 7 others PLD 1986 Lah. 184, Naik Muhammad and others v. A.D.C. (C) and others PLD 1988 Lah. 299 and Chief Engineer, Hydel (North) and Project Director, WAPDA, Warsak v. Zafarullah Shah and another 2003 SCMR 686 can be referred to in this respect.
7. According to subsection (6) of section 26 of the Electricity Act, 1910, when any difference or dispute arises between a licensee and a consumer as to whether any meter is correct or incorrect, the matter can be referred to, upon application of either party, to an Electric B Inspector, who has to decide it within a period of 90 days. If, according to the provision of that section, the Electric Inspector fails to decide it within the above noted period of 90 days, then the matter has to be referred to the Provincial Government, whose decision shall be final. As per learned counsel for respondent No.4, the Electric Inspector had not decided the case of the petitioner. So, the matter was brought before the Advisory Board in the shape of appeal but it was returned on 16-9-2000 with these remarks that it was not maintainable before this Board and the appellant could approach the Provincial Government for issuance of direction to Board to hear it. Upon it, Muhammad Ashiq applied to the Government of Punjab and obtained the requisite direction from the Government of Punjab on 23-12-2000 under section 38 subsection (3) of the Electricity Act, 1910.
So, the cognizance of the dispute was in fact taken up by the Advisory Board in compliance with the direction of the Government of Punjab. When confronted with this situation, the learned counsel has tried to wriggle out of it by stating that this order, dated 23-12-2000 was not valid because it was signed by Additional Secretary (Tech.) and could not be held to have been passed by the Government of the Punjab. This anew objection is liable to be rejected as nowhere in the writ such a plea was ever raised by the writ petitioner. Even otherwise, it may be pointed out that the order passed by the Government of the Punjab, is legally conveyed through Secretary, therefore, no exception can be taken to it. So it is held that the Advisory Board had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide upon, the direction/order passed by the Provincial Government.
8. Section 38 subsection (3) of the Electricity Act, 1910 has conferred power upon the Provincial Government/Federal Government to direct the Advisory Board through general or special order to decide an appeal, which jurisdiction lies with the above-noted Governments. To be more clear and precise, the Advisory Board can be delegated powers of Appellate Authority by the concerned Government to entertain, hear and adjudicate an appeal against the decision of Electric Inspector.
Therefore, even if the merits of the case are considered, the Advisory Board has not rendered decision without any jurisdiction.
' Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.