1. G. SAFDAR SHAH, J. This leave petition is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 3-10-1978, by which he dismissed the petitioner's rent appeal against the appellate order, dated 20-9-1978 of the Additional District Judge, Faisalabad.
2. The background of the case is that respondent Chaudhry Khurshid Alam filed against the petitioner an application under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, in the Court of Administrative Civil Judge, Faisalabad, for his eviction from the suit property bearing No. P-24 which according to him consisted of a shop and a residential apartment above it. The application was contested by the petitioner but the same Was allowed by the learned Civil Judge, exercising the powers of Rent Controller (hereinafter called the Rent Controller), vide his order dated 18-11- 1975, directing the ejectment of the petitioner from the "disputed shop". The petitioner challenged the said order in appeal before the Additional District Judge,. Faisalabad, but the same was dismissed. There-- after he went to the High Court in second Appeal but the same also was dismissed. Finally, he filed in this Court petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, but the same was dismissed in limine by an order, dated 28-3-1978. In consequence of the termination of the proceedings thus, the respondent started execution proceedings against the petitioner in the Court of Rent Controller, but he discovered that in the order passed by the latter, the said property had been misdescribed in that instead of describing it as property bearing No. P- 24, the same was mentioned as the "disputed shots". Faced with this situation, he filed an application before the learned Rent Controller praying therein that the description of the property may be corrected. The petitioner seems to have contested the said application on the ground that the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to review his order, but even so the same was allowed, and consequently the due correction was made in the original order. Being aggrieved of the said order, the petitioner started on a second round of litigation by filing against it an appeal before the Additional District Judge which was dismissed, and thereafter he filed Second Appeal in the High Court, which was also dismissed by the impugned order.
3. Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised before us only one ground against the order of the High Court. He argued that by amending his original order, dated 18-11-1975, the learned Rent Controller had, in fact, reviewed his said order respecting which, however, he had no jurisdiction whatever. He, therefore, contended that by endorsing the said order, the learned Judge in the High Court equally fell in error, and consequently the impugned order passed by him is liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied on two judgments, one of this court in the case of F. A. Khan v. The Government of Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 520) and another from the Karachi Bench of the then High Court of West Pakistan Khair Muhammad Nizamani v. Abdul Quddus (PLD 1965 Kar. 367). Quite apart from the fact that these two judgments have no relevancy whatever to the facts of this case, we are satisfied that the contention raised by the learned counsel is wholly misconceived. The learned counsel conceded before us that in the eviction application filed by him, the respondent had mentioned the suit property to be bearing No. P-24, consisting of a shop and a residential apartment above it to which no objection had been taken by the petitioner in his written statement.
4. It is, therefore, obvious that the petitioner had correctly understood the nature of the property from which his eviction was sought. But the learned Rent Controller had, in his order, dated 18-11-1975 evidently misdescribed the property as a shop, and consequently the respondent had every right to ask him to correct its description so as to read a property bearing No. P-24, consisting of a shop and a residential apartment above it. To this end, therefore, the learned Rent Controller had the jurisdiction to correct the said error which was patent on the face of the record, and to say that he had actually reviewed his earlier order, would be incorrect.
5. The learned counsel, ho\4ever, argued that after the order of the learned Rent Controller was upheld by the learned Additional District Judge, the former order would cease to exist, as it must be held to have merged in the order passed by the latter. He, therefore, contended that the learned Rent Controller's jurisdiction to carry out the required correction in his said order. We are afraid, there is no force in this contention especially under the learned counsel conceded that the learned Additional District Judge could have competently carried out the said correction himself, and so the argument raised by him would seem to be only technical.
6. The learned counsel next argued that the order of the learned Rent Controller would be a decree within the meaning of section 2, C. P. C. And consequently the same could not have been reviewed by him sub--sequently. We are afraid, there is no force in this contention. According to section 17 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, the order of the learned Rent Controller, or for that matter the order of the appellate authority, affirming the said order, is required to be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. It is, therefore, obvious that the order of the learned Rent Controller is not a decree within the meaning of section 2, C. P. C., but the same is required to be executed by a civil Court as if it were a decree.
7. Quite apart from what the learned counsel has contended before us, we are satisfied that substantial justice has been done between the parties in the two rounds of litigation in which the matter had also come up before this Court. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has any case in law or for that matter even in Equity. In this view to extend him the indulgence of this Court, which is necessarily discretionary in nature, would be tantamount to perpetuating injustice, as by the concurrent finding of all the Courts against him, he was found to have defaulted in paying rent. For all these reasons, therefore, we find no force in this petition and the same is dismissed. However, the petitioner is permitted to keep occupying the said property until December 31, 1978, on which date he must vacate and hand over the possession thereof to the respondent.