1. ' Mazdoor Union Neelam Glass Industries Hassan Abdal, theCollective Bargaining Agent filed this petition under section 49(4)(e) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 (hereinafter refered to as an Ordinance) taking exception to a sentence incorporated after clause No,30 of the Settlement alleged to have taken place on 11-1-2003, whereby the retiring age was reduced to 55 years instead of 60 years. It is the case of the petitioner that the Charter of Demand was submitted by the union on 3-9-2001 containing thirty (30) demands. On 12-9-2001 and 17-9-2001 the bilateral talks took place. Having failed to achieve any settlement during the course of bilateral talks, the petitioner union submitted a notice of strike under section 26 of the Ordinance to the Management as also to the Conciliator on 6-11-2001. Thereafter proceedings commenced before Mr. Liaquat Ali, Assistant Director Labour, the Conciliator. However, while negotiating before the Conciliator, the management as well as the petitioner union agreed to have bilateral talks again. The negotiations between the management and the union commenced and ultimately a Settlement was reached which was incorporated in black and white on 11-1-2003 and was signed some time after by' the Conciliator as well. However, while the copy of the Settlement was provided to the petitioner union on 13-1-2003 they were shocked to see that after clause 30, of the following words were incorporated:- {{URDU TEXT}} ' The learned Representative appearing for the petitioner argued that it was the petitioner union as CBA which submitted its Charter of Demands in accordance with law. There was however, no counter demands by the Management. It was further argued that earlier the age of retirement was 60 years. This has been reduced in an unfair manner by the respondents without taking the petitioner into confidence. This issue of reduction of retirement age, according to the learned Representative was never brought during the course of bilateral talks and has been inserted through interpolation in a mala fide manner prejudicing the right of workers who were to retire at the age of 60 years in terms of their appointment letters. He has also referred to the evidence to substantiate his stance that the age of retirement was not part of Charter of Demands and has been introduced through interpolation which act constitutes unfair labour practice as defined under section 63(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the Ordinance.
2. ' The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has taken exception to the very maintainability of this petition, as according to him the CBA cannot espouse the cause of individual workers under section 33 of the Ordinance as it can only move an application for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it by, or under any law or any award or Settlement while an individual worker may make an applicationunder section 46 of the Ordinance. He has pointed out that from the years, 1980 to 1993, the age of retirement in the Establishment was 55 years. However, the same was raised to 60 years in the year, 1993 by the Management which remained effective till signing of the Settlement subject-matter of the present petition. He has admitted that age of retirement is always given in the letter of appointment of workers by the Establishment. He has further stated that the President and General Secretary of the Union as well as the Conciliator signed the impugned Settlement in token of its correctness and section 59 of the Ordinance makes it binding on the parties who are signatory to the same. The petitioner Union, cannot go back from its undertaking. He has also pointed out that 28 (Twenty Eight) workers of the respondents'
3. Establishment have got their terminal benefits by accepting their retirement at the age of 55 years.
4. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon 1992 SCMR 36 Karachi Pipe Mills Employees Union versus Karachi Pipe Mills Limited, 1984 PLC 1359 Karachi Pipe Mills Limited versus Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and others and 1982 PLC 1 Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited and two others versus Labour Appellate Tribunal Lahore and two others.
5. ' When asked, how the retiring age of the workmen can be reduced to 55 years from 60 years when at the time of their very induction into the service a valuable right accrued to them as they were given assurance in black and white qua their retiring age at 60 years. Learned counsel has only stated that since the Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) had agreed and signed the Settlement in token of its correctness as such they cannot make any grouse of the same and cannot back out from the Settlement.
6. I have given my consideration to the entire facts of this case and have gone through the evidence brought on record by the parties. The Ordinance is a special law and is procedural in nature. It was promulgated with the principle object of formation of trade unions so as to cultivate better relations/interaction between the employer and employees. The foremost aim of this Ordinance is to speedily settle the dispute between the workers and employer so that industrial peace can flourish. Furthermore, Ordinance is a beneficial legislation and is to be interpreted as already stated to ameliorate the plight of teeming millions workers who because of their meagre means cannot effectively peruse their cause. In the course of determination of CBA, the workers entrust through their votes to the former the right to guard their terms and conditions of service.
7. ' It would be appropriate to reproduce the dictum of the Hon'able Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case reported in PLD 2000 SC 207 Lahore Development Authority v. Abdul Shafique and others wherein the Ordinance was termed as a beneficial legislation. The dictum is in the following term: "The I.R.O. Is basically beneficial legislation which provides for protection of the rights of labour classes. Its object amongst others is to ameliorate the conditions of workers. Such a legislation' has to be construed liberally and beneficially. A restricted constructure of the provisions of the I.R.O.
8. Would deflect the manifest objective of the legislation".
9. The law for this purpose has assigned a pivotal/prime role to the CBA to look after the, terms and conditions of employees/workers under the Ordinance. A CBA after its certification according to section 20(13) of the Ordinance is entitled to perform the following function:
(a) Undertake collective bargaining with the employer oremployers on matters connected with employment, non-employment, the terms of employment or the conditions of work, other than matter which relate to the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or any award or settlement;
(b) represent all or any of the workmen in any proceedings;
(c) give notice of, and declare a strike in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance; and
(d) nominate workmen on the Boards of Provident Funds and Workers' Participation Fund of their respective establishment or industry.
10. To run the office of CBA and to perform its function in a suitable manner the Ordinance has also provided him the funds which are generated out of deductions made by the employer from the wages of the workers under section 21 of the Ordinance in accordance with a formula agreed upon between the CBA and the workers. The arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents that the CBA has got no locus standi to file this petition under section 33 of the Ordinance as it can only move such an application for the enforcement of any right,. Guaranteed or secured to it by or under any law or any award or settlement while an individual worker may make such an application under section 46 of the Ordinance is devoid of any force. The cases relied upon by the respondents are distinguishable not only on the facts involved therein but the same were also decided under section 34 of the repealed Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which provision was different from the present dispensation under section 33 of the Ordinance. The presentdispensation under section 33 of the Ordinance is in the following terms: "Any collective bargaining agent or any employer may apply to the Labour Court for the redressal of any grievance or enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement."
11. ' Section 34 of the repealed Ordinance of 1969 in its original form was in the following terms:- "Any party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right guaranteed or secure to an employer or workman by or under any law for the time being in force or an award or settlement may apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute."
12. ' However, it was subsequently substituted by Ordinance XIX of 1970 and was couched in these terms: "Any collective bargaining agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement".
13. ' Further through an amendment promulgated by Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act XXIX of 1973 the words "Or workman" were deleted.
14. ' However, as stated above in section 33 of the present Ordinance the words "for the redressal of any grievance" have been incorporated.This demonstrates that the CBA who is entitled under section 20(13) to represent all or any workman in any proceedings have also been authorized under section 33 to approach the Commission for the redressal of any grievance. The word 'any' cannotes wide generality and excludes limitation or qualification. In PLD 1971 Lahore 537 at 548 Mr. Manzur Qadir v. Mst. Amtul Hussain and two others, the word 'any' has been defined as under:-- "The interpretation of the word "any" as meaning "specific" or "Particular" is neither supported by judicial Dictionaries nor by dictionaries of the English Language. According to Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Edition) "any" means some, one out of many, an indefinite number. According to Stround's Judicial or qualification and is a word which excludes limitation or qualification and is "as wide as possible". According to the law. "Law Lexicon of British India" compiled by Aiyar (1940 Edn.) the word "any" may have one of the several meanings, ' according to the circumstances, it may mean "all" "each" "every" "some" or "one or more out of several". In Webster's New International Dictionary, of the English language "any" has inter alia been explained as indicating a,person, thing, event etc. Given category but whichever the chance may select". Thus the word "any" cannot necessarily be liquated with "Specific". Or "Particular".
15. The word 'grievance' has been defined in Webster's Dictionary as a real or imagined cause for complainant. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, it has been defined as under:-- "The infliction of wrong or hardship on a person; injury oppression; a cause or source of injury.The state or fact of being oppressed, injured or distressed, distress; suffering pain. A circumstance or state of things felt to be oppressive in mod. Use, something (real or supposed) which is considered a legitimate ground of complaint".
16. ' In Blacks Law Dictionary the Word 'Grievance' is defined as under:-- "In labour law, a complaint filed by an employee regarding working conditions and for resolution of which there is procedural machinery provided in the union contract. Any injury, injustice or wrong which gives ground for complaint because it is unjust, discriminatory and oppressive".
17. ' It is also to be appreciated that in section 33 the word 'or' has been used disjunctively after the word grievance which demonstrates that the CBA apart from applying for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it by or under any law or any award or settlement, can independently approach for the redressal of collective grievance of the workers. Furthermore the settlement, subject-matter of the present case has emanated according to the respondents out of the bilateral talks between the CBA and the employer. It does not now lie in the mouth of the respondents to say at this juncture, that the CBA cannot file the present application respecting the aforementioned settlement when as already stated, this very settlement relied upon the parties was stated to be entered between them.
18. There is one more important factor which cannot lightly ignored. That the rules and regulations are only meant to streamline the procedure and administer the course of justice but not to thwart the same. It has been time and again stated that Courts have always preferred a decision of the case on merits particularly so when valuable rights of the parties are involved and technical knock out has always been discouraged. Reliance in this respect is placed upon 2001 SCMR 159 Chaudhry Ghulam Ghaus through Legal Heirs versus Saifullah and another, PLD 2002 SC 491 Muhammad Anwar Khan and five others versus Chaudhry Riaz Ahmed and five other respondents PLD 1963 SCMR 382 Imtaiz Ali versus Ghulam Ali, PLD 1975 SC 678 Manager Jammu and Kashmir State, Property in Pakistan versus Khuda Yar and another. It would be as appropriate to re-produce the determination of Full Bench of Lahore High Court in the last mentioned case which is in the following terms:-- "The proposition could hardly be disputed that the principal objection behind all legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest of justice. In fact while considering the importance of legal technicalities and rules of procedure in the administration of justice, it is inevitable to recall the various evolutionary stages in the transition from justice without law of primitive society to justice in accordance with law of Modern Society and the conflict between equity and law in judicial history.
19. It cannot be denied that legal precepts were devised with a view to impart certainty, consistency and uniformity to administration of justice and to secure it against arbitrariness, errors of individual judgment and mala fide."
20. ' This being the position the CBA who has got sound financial position because of section 21 of the Ordinance, can move the Commission respecting the very settlement subject-matter of this petition more effectively which act would go a long way in dispensing substantial justice to the workers. This would also avoid multiplicity of litigation as in the disputed settlement all the workers of respondents' establishment are involved.
21. ' As far as the merits of the case is concerned, admittedly, the demands were submitted by the petitioner. No counter demand was made by the employer. It is admitted by Malik Muhammad Ashraf, Factory Manger in his testimony that no charter of demand was given by the Establishment.
22. He has further stated that issues were discussed on the Charter of Demand submitted by the petitioner's union. He also admitted that the settlement was reached on 11-1-2003 but the same was transmitted to the petitioner on 13-1-2003. According to him the next day was Sunday.
23. Similarly, Mr. Liaquat Ali, Assistant Director Labour has stated in his testimony that he has seen the charter of demands and did not find anything about the deduction of age limit from 60 to 55 years.
24. He has further stated that there was no demand regarding the demand of age limit from 60 to 55 years in the charter of demand annexed with strike notice.
25. Apart from this, admittedly, a valuable right accrued to the employees qua their retirement at the age of 60 years at the time of their induction into service as according to the respondents the appointment letter contained such a clause. Such a right cannot be taken back in the manners stated by the respondents without providing an opportunity of hearing when as already stated this aspect was not mentioned in the Charter of Demands. I failed to understand how this contentious issue of reduction of retiring age was discussed in the bilateral talks when admittedly nothing has been brought on record worth-consideration that same was put forward through any demand.
26. Reliance in this respect is placed upon PLD 1969 SC page 407 Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance versus Muhammad Himayatullah Frukhi and 1991 SCMR 2293 Government of Sindh through Secretary, Board of Revenue, Hyderabad and another versus Niaz Ahmad and others.
27. ' The other argument of the respondent that 28 workers have voluntarily accepted their retirement at the age of 55 years and have received terminal benefits as such the CBA cannot espouse the cause of other workers of the respondent Establishment who are insured under the Employees Old Age Benefit Act, 1976. They are entitled to get full pensionary benefits after rendering 15 years of service. On this basis it is argued that under the circumstances their retirement at the age of 55 years would not have any adverse effect on their service as they would receive full pension.
28. ' Both the aforementioned arguments are devoid of any force. How could a worker refuse his retirement at the 55 years of age when the matter remained sub judice before this Commission for more than one and a half years and the impugned clause was not suspended. The workers could not have dared to go against the said clause. The second argument that the workers have not suffered materially is also of no force. Learned Counsel has not taken into consideration the fact that by this reduction of retirement age, the workers have lost 5 years of his service benefits. It is pertinent to mention here that under section 22 of the aforementioned Act, the superannuation age is 60 years and this could not have been curtailed in a manner brought on record during the course of present proceedings.
29. Resultantly keeping into consideration all the aforestated features of the case, I accept this petition and declare this clause of reduction of age from 60 to 55 years as having been inserted without lawful authority and of legal effect as the case admittedly falls within section 63 of the Ordinance.