' This civil revision is directed against the appellate judgment and decree dated 14-5-2003 whereby appeal filed by the respondents was accepted.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this petition are that the petitioner-market committee filed a suit for declaration to the effect that it was a local authority hence not subject to levy of immoveable property tax and demand raised in this behalf by respondent No.3 for the year 1995- 1996 was illegal. A permanent injunction restraining the respondents from recovering the said demand was also prayed for. The suit was contested by the respondents and on the divergent pleadings of the parties issues were framed and evidence produced by both the parties.
Subsequently, the trial Court vide the judgment and decree dated 27-2-2002 decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner. Aggrieved the respondents filed an appeal, which was accepted by the First Appellate Court vide the impugned judgment and decree.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Additional Advocate-General has been heard and the record appended with the petition has also been perused.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in view of section 4(b)(ii) of the Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act 1958, the property owned /administered by the petitioner-market committee was exempt from levy of the property tax for the period in dispute.
5. That after the amendment effected by the Punjab Finance Act, 1973 in the Punjab Immoveable Property Tax Act, 1958 the property owned or administered by a local authority was exempt from the levy of property tax in view of the section 4(b)(ii) ibid. Local Authority was defined under section 3 clause 28 of the General Clauses Act as follows:-- "Local authority" shall mean a municipal committee, District board, body or port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund;...."
6. The said provision came up for interpretation before this Court and it was held that a market committee was a local authority by the judgment reported as 1991 CLC 118 (Market Committee, Chichawatni District Sahiwal v. Federation of Pakistan).
7. In view of the above it clearly follows that the property owned or administered by the petitioner- market committee would be exempted from levy of immovable property tax. Further legislative changes took place vide the Punjab Finance Act, 2002, whereby, section 4(b)(ii) of the Punjab Immovable Property Tax Act was amended to read as follows:-- "Building and lands other than those leased in perpetuity, owned and administered by the Government of the Punjab or a Local Government as defined in section 2 clause (XVI) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2002 (XIII of 2002)."
8. The aforesaid amendment/substitution read in conjunction with the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2002 makes it clear and obvious that the petitioner-market committee is not a Local Government as defined thereunder hence properties owned or administered by it ceased to be exempt and became subject to the levy of property tax as a consequence of the amendment from the date of its taking effect.
9. The Punjab Finance Act, 2002 came into force with effect from 1st of July 2002 as is stated therein.
There is nothing in the said legislative instrument, which can be interpreted to mean that the amendment effect in the Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Act 1958, more particularly section 4(b)(ii) thereof would have retrospective application. Thus, it is clear and obvious that the property owned/administered by the petitioner-market committee would not be subject to the levy of property tax from 1973 to 1st of July, 2002 and any demand for property tax in respect of the said period would clearly be ultra vires of the Act ibid and without jurisdiction and lawful authority.
10. In view of the above, it is clear and obvious that the impugned judgment and decree dated 14- 5-2003 cannot be sustained. The appellate impugned judgment and decree dated 14-5-2003 is set aside and the judgment and decree dated 12-10-1996 passed by the trial Court is upheld.