1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The dispute in this petition for leave relates to a small plot of land in Nawabshah and the case turns on the proper construction of subsection (4) of section 42 of the Sind People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972 (hereinafter called the said Ordinance).
2. On the plea that he was a poor man, the petitioner had applied to the Chief Minister of Sind for the allotment of the said plot of land and by his order dated 25-9-1975, the Chief Minister directed that the petitioner's application should be allowed if the plot of land was "lying vacant". In pursuance of this order, the plot of land was allotted to the petitioner, and as he paid the transfer price, the mutation of the plot was made in his favour. However, according to learned counsel, although the transfer of the plot in the petitioner's favour had thus become final, some representa--tions were made against this transfer on the ground that it was illegal and that the plot of land should have been kept for a public purpose. Learned counsel addressed us at length on the representations thus made, but nothing turns on them, and it is sufficient to state here that on the orders of the Commissioner of Sukkur Division, the Administrator of the Municipality of Nawabshah was directed not to implement the order transferring the plot in dispute to the petitioner. Finally, by his order dated 16-4-1976, the Deputy Commissioner of Nawabshah informed the Administrator of the Municipality of Nawabshah that the Chief Minister had "desired that the plot in question may be utilized for school/Maternity home or public park". The Administrator was, therefore, informed that the transfer in favour of the petitioner had been cancelled, and that the revised order of the Chief Minister should be implemented forthwith, On being informed of this order, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Sind High Court to challenge .It on the ground that the transfer of the plot in his favour had become complete and that the order cancelling the transfer in his favour was illegal 'on the further ground that it had been passed without hearing him. The writ petition was contested by the respondents, who stressed the fact that the land in dispute had been granted to the petitioner by an authority not competent to grant it, namely, the Chief Minister, therefore, the further contention was that the petitioner had no cause of action whatsoever against the respondents.
3. The writ petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the Sind High Court in August 1977, and it would appear to have been the petitioner's case that the order of 25-9-1975 amounted to a grant of land, and as he relied on the amendment of subsection (4) of section 42 of the said Ordinance, we would observe that this subsection, as originally enacted, read: "All contracts for transfer by grant, sale, mortgage, lease or otherwise of immovable property or any interest and right thereto or disposal or sale of movable property shall, subject to rules be entered into after inviting offers in an open auction: Provided that if the highest bid is not accepted by the Council. Approval in writing of the Controlling Authority shall be obtained. The Controlling Authority shall in his order give reasons for not accepting the higher bid. . ."
4. Then, according to learned counsel, the subsection was amended on the 15th of July 1975 and the following words were added toi t:- "Provided further that a Council may with the approval of Government enter into contract without inviting offers auction."
5. According to learned counsel, the effect of this amendment of the section was that People's Councils lost their competence to transfer land and this power vested in the Provincial Government. And as the plot in dispute had initially been transferred to the petitioner on the orders of the Chief Minister and as the plot had been mutated in the petitioner's favour after he had complied with all the conditions of the transfer, the submission was that the transfer in his favour had become final and could not be challenged.
6. The learned Judges of the Sind High Court, however, held that section 42 had to be read as a whole, and therefore, the power of transferring land was vested in the People's Councils and the transfer of the plot in dispute to the petitioner by the Chief Minister was void ab initio and, as no rights could be based on a void order, the learned Judges dismissed the writ petition of the petitioner by their judgment dated 12-9-1977. Hence this petition for leave.
7. Although the position taken by the petitioner in the High Court was that he had obtained the land in dispute by a grant, he vehemently submitted before us that the land was not a grant but a sale. It is, however, not necessary for us to enter into the controversy whether the Chief Minister's order on which the petitioner based his case amounted to a grant or a transfer. Even on the footing that the order amounted to a transfer, the only point in the petition is whether the Chief Minister was competent to transfer Municipal land to the petitioner. This question cannot be determined by reference to subsection (4) alone on which Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan laid so much stress. As rightly held by the learned Judges of the Sind High Court (we say so with respect) the question whether the Chief Minister had any power to dispose of Municipal land has to be determined by reference to section 42 read as a whole and A reading it as a whole, the only possible view is the view taken by the High Court which was that the Chief Minister was not competent to dispose of land vested in Municipalities and People's Councils. This has been made very clear by subsection (7) of the section which reads "No contract executed otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this section shall be binding on the Council."
8. The difficulty in the way of the petitioner is, therefore, obvious, but as we observed, learned counsel thought that the petitioner's case was supported by the proviso which had been inserted in subsection (4) of section 42 by the amendment of 15th of July 1975.
9. We have examined this proviso and its effect has to be examined by reference to the entire section.
10. The opening words of the section make it clear beyond all doubt that it is only the People's Councils which have the power to transfer Municipal land, and the method of effecting that transfer has been specified in subsection (4). The method thus prescribed is that the alienation shall be made "after inviting offers in an open auction". But this clear direction was subject to the proviso that the People's Councils could reject the highest bid obtained at auction with the approval of their controlling authorities. Then came the proviso on which Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan relied and this read:- "Provided further that a Council may with the approval of Government enter into contract without inviting offers auction."
11. We have reproduced these words from a copy of the amendment furnished by learned counsel and there seem to be obvious errors in learned counsel's copy. It is unfortunate that learned counsel did not produce the notifica--petition by which the amendment of subsection had been effected. Be that as it may, the only effect of the amendment is that if a People's Council wishes to alienate its properties without holding a public auction, it can do so only if the Government agrees to dispense with the requirements of public auction. But the limited power thus conferred on the Government does not mean that the Government can itself dispose of the property of Municipalities. Learned counsel relied on Article 129 of the Constitution, but this Article does not help the petitioner's case, because it was obviously not intended to alter by a side wind the settled law about Municipal Local Self-Government. Accordingly, we agree with the view of the learned Judges that the Chief Minister's order of 25-9-1975 on which the petitioner bases his case was a nullity. And as a nullity cannot create any rights whatsoever it follows that there is no infirmity in the order cancelling the purported transfer of the plot in dispute to the petitioner. It is, therefore, not necessary to examine the other submissions of learned counsel and the petition is dismissed.