1. In this petition only point involved is whether a grievance notice under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 given by the petitioner to his employer respondent No. 2 through an Advocate of the petitioner is valid in law. The Junior Labour Court had treated said notice as a valid notice and had ordered the re-instatement of the petitioner after consider--ing the merits of the case. The Labour Court however on appeal took a different view and allowed the appeal of respondent No. 2 on 23-8-1975 on the preliminary point that grievance notice through an Advocate is not a grievance notice under section 25-A (1) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. The matter has been argued by the learned counsel Mr. Shahenshah Hussain for the petitioner and Mr. Abdul Samad for the respondent No. 2. The relevant provision of law to be interpreted is section 25-A (1) which is reproduced hereunder ;- "25-A. Redress of individual grievances.-(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his shop steward or the Collective Bargaining Agent, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises."
3. Mr. Shahenshah Hussain relied upon PLD 1975 Kar. 312 where Mr. Justice Abdul Hayee Kureshi after considering the provision of section 25-A (1) has come to the conclusion that the notice through an Advocate is valid in law. He also relied upon Halsbury's Laws of England, Second Edition, Vol, I, p. 141, where general proposition of law has been stated to be that whatever a person has power to do himself he may do so by means of an agent. He has also relied upon Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edn., p. 558 where the Maxim stated is "He who does an act through another is deemed in law to do it himself".
4. On the other hand Mr. Abdul Samad the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on 1975 PLC 546 where Mr. Justice K. B. Marri had taken a different view from Mr. Justice Abdul Hayee Qureshi and has come to the conclusion that the use of the word "himself" requires that the notice should be given by the workmen himself and not through his Advocate. Mr. Abdul Samad has also relied upon AIR 1956 SC 604 (para. 4), where the Indian Supreme Court while interpreting use of word "personally" in rule 6 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 held that it requires the application to be signed by the partner in person and not by another partner. But the words "personally" are much more indicative of the person concerned than the word "himself". Mr. Samad has also relied upon the meaning of the word himself given in Shorter Oxford Dictionary p. 902 which says that the word 'himself' shows 'emphatic use' and means `very Him', 'very He', and that 'very Man', etc. After having gone through these judgments and various dictionaries, I agree with the view of Mr. Justice Abdul Hayee Kureshi in PLD 1975 Kar. 312. My reasoning is however a bit different and I think that the words in section 25-A (I) should be construed as they are found in this subsection without recourse to the impediments found against representation of workman by lawyers. The important words in this subsection are "the worker may bring his grievance .. . ....To the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his shop steward or Collective Bargainin Agent". I feel that the words "either himself' has not been used in this subsection to suggest in any emphatic manner the very personality of the worker himself, but they have been used for the purpose of comparison with the other words `or through his shop s-reward' "or Collective Bargaining Agent". The legislature in its wisdom allowed the workmen to be represented by a shop steward or an Collective Bargaining Agent although they may not have been specially appointed as attorney by the workmen. But the Legislature did not want that workman should lose the right of sending a petition himself, therefore this word 'himself' had been used in order to emphasise the position that the worker can also move the petition himself. To me it does not seem that the common right of acting through a agent is being denied to a workman by the use of the word himself. On the other hand I feel that since outsiders like Collective Bargaining Agent and shop steward, are being allowed to represent a workman, the Legislator did not intend to deprive a workman of moving a grievance petition through an attorney of his own choice. Therefore the word 'himself, should be construed liberally and in a beneficial manner to allow the representation through an attorney. We should not allow our minds to be prejudiced by the exclusion of lawyers provided in section 49 in respect of conciliation proceeding as they are completely different proceedings and even in concili--ation proceedings a workman can be represented by any attorney if he is not a legal practitioner because the bar provided is only against representation of a workman by a legal practitioner only.
5. Moreover if representation by a lawyer in sending a grievance notice was to be forbidden then the B Legislature would have provided that bar specifically and not by implication-1 Since I have come to the conclusion that the notice by the attorney it not excluded by the use of word 'himself' then the logical conclusion would be that if the worker can act in respect of sending a grievance notice through an ordinary attorney, it does not stand to reason that he should be deprived C from acting through a legal attorney. In this view of the matter I am of the view that the word `himself' in section 25-A (1) of Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 does not prohibit the sending of grievance notice by a workman through a lawyer.
6. The result is that the appeal has not been correctly decided by the Labour Court. The order of the Labour Court dated 23-8-1975 is therefore .Set aside and the case is remanded back to the Labour Court, for decision of the appeal on merits.
7. Since there was a conflict of decisions of this Court, there will be therefore no order as to costs.