This is a revision petition against the order dated 24-11-1977 of Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan, acting as an Appellate Court under the Payment of Wages Act.
2. Mohammad Ilyas Khan, petitioner filed an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for recovery of overtime wages amounting to Rs. 50,252.25 before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, which vide order dated 19-8-1976 allowed that claim. Against that order, Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Multan on 21-10-1976 filed an appeal before Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan, which is the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.
Alongwith the memorandum of appeal a certificate dated 20-10-1976 of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was filed. The said certificate is to the effect that a cross cheque dated 19- 10-1976 for Rs. 50,252.50 had been received. On the said certificate the appeal was admitted for hearing. While the appeal was still pending, another certificate dated 17-2-1977 was issued by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to the effect that the aforementioned amount had been credited to its account. The petitioner raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not competent in view of the proviso to section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act.
3. The learned Labour Court overruled the preliminary objection by holding that there was sufficient compliance of law since the said amount had eventually been deposited to the account of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.
4. Against the aforementioned order, Mohammad Ilyas Khan, petitioner has preferred this revision petition.
5. The first point for determination is as to whether this petition is competent.
6. According to section 36 (3-a) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance, in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.
7. From the above it is clear that an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is revisable by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. In the instant case the impugned order was passed by the Labour court, acting as an Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, which is not an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but nevertheless it will be deemed to be an order passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 in view of section 35 (5) (d) of the said Ordinance, which reads as under :---- A Labour Court shall exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance, or any other law.
From the above it is clear that a Labour Court can pass an order not only under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, but also under any other law, which is covered by the expression `or any other law'. In view of the above, the revision petition is competent and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain it.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was not competent, because the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a certificate of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act to the effect that the Appellant had deposited with the Authority the amount payable under the direction appealed against.
9. According to the proviso to section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, no appeal is competent unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate of the Authority to the effect that the appellant had deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against.
According to section 17(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, save as provided in subsection (1), any direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 shall be final. In other words, if the memorandum of appeal is not accompanied by the requisite certificate, the direction given by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act becomes final.
10. From the perusal of the record I find that the appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act on 21-10-1976. Alongwith the memorandum of appeal a certificate dated 20-10-1976 of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was filed to the effect that a cheque for Rs. 50.252.25 had been received through Divisional Superintendent, Multan. The said certificate did not say that the amount had been deposited as required under the law. It was subsequently on 17-2-1977 a certificate of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was filed before the Labour Court to the effect that the aforementioned amount had been credited to its account. In other words, the amount was deposited with the Authority several months after the filing of the appeal. This shows a clear violation of the statute. It is well established that if law prescribes a particular mode of doing an act, it must be done in that mode to gain validity. In the case, Col. Bashir Hussain and 10 others v. Land Acquisition Collector, Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1970 Lah. 321) it was held;----- "It is an accepted principle of law that if a statute requires something to be done and also prescribes the mode for doing it the require--ments of law can be fulfilled by the act, in the manner pres--cribed."
In the case, Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (AIR 1936 P C 253) it was observed;---- "The rule which applies is a different and not less well-recognised rule, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all-other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden."
In the case, Ghulam Abbas v. State (PLD 1968 Lah. 101) it was held; "It is well settled that where a power is given to a particular person to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all; other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden."
In the case, Mohammad Sharif v. Sh. Mohammad Rafiq, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1968 Lah. 263) it was held:---- "That when a particular act is directed by the Legislature to be done in a particular manner it should be done by that and that manner alone."
In the case, Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property, West Pakistan, Lahore v. Mohammad Din and another (PLD 1971 Lah. 217) it was held:------ "Whenever a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular manner it necessarily includes in itself a negative, viz. That the thing shall not be done otherwise."
In the case, Mst. Sardar Begum v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore (PLD 1972 Lah. 458) it was held that when law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular way, the provisions of such law must be complied with. Failure to do so renders proceedings invalid.
In the case, Mian Abdul Majid and 7 others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore (PLD 1972 Lah. 66) it was held that when Legislature intends a thing to be done in a particular manner, the thing must be done in that and in no other manner.
11. In view of the above rulings it is established that law requires that when an appeal against the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is filed before the Appellate Authority under the same Act, the memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a certificate that the amount had been deposited with the Authority payable under the direction appealed against. The amount does not mean a cheque.
12. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that mere technicalities,' unless offering insurmountable hurdles, should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. In support of his contention he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case, Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan and others v. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678). He also relied in the case, `Praphull Dev v. Sham Lai and others (AIR 1932 Lah. 328), wherein it was observed:----- "It is true that under O. 33, R. 5, the Court is bound to reject an application which is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rr. 2 and 3, but from this it does not follow that R. 2 is to be meticulously interpreted against the petitioner. After all, the Code is not designed as a trap which a litigant must try to avoid by all means in his power but is designed to enable the Court to ascertain the real points in issue between the parties and come to a speedy and clear determination of those points."
13. The rulings cited by the learned counsel for the respondent have no application in this case, because it is not a question that mere technicalities have not been followed. According to proviso to section 17, as already mentioned above, the memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a certificate that the amount has been deposited. According to section 17 (2), it is expressly provided that if this requirement is not complied with, any direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 shall be final. In other words, this goes to the root of the matter and without such a certificate the appeal becomes incompetent, and the direction given by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act becomes final.
14. In the instant case when the appeal was filed the requisite certificate that the amount had been deposited did not accompany the memorandum of appeal and, therefore, there was a clear violation of law and as such the spies was incompetent. The fact that the amount was deposited subsequently would not validate the proceedings.
15. I, accordingly, accept the revision petition, set aside the order of the Labour Court (Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act) and dismiss the appeal filed before it by the respondent.