The facts of this case are that Shop No. BI-6-S-44, situate in the Main Bazar, Kamoke, which belongs to the respondent is in possession of the present appellant. A part of the building was also occupied by three others, namely, Abdul Ghani, Muhammad Saddiq, and Muhammad Hanif. The demised premises, presently in possession of the respondent and those which were in occupation of Abdul Ghani comprise of shops, whereas, Muhammad Siddiq and Muhammad Hanif occupied only Thara. The respondent moved an ejectment application against all the four tenants on the ground that property was needed by him reasonably in good faith for re-constructions.
2. It appears that during the pendency of this ejectment petition, Abdul Ghani committed default in payment of rent and on the basis of fresh cause of action, the respondent instituted another ejectment petition against him and succeeded in procuring his ejectment. Similarly, Muhammad Siddiq and Muhammad Hanif are said to have compromised with the respondent-landlord, and handed over to him the possession of the site in their possession. Thus, the present appellant having been left alone in the field resisted the ejectment petition and succeeded before the learned Rent Controller as the petition was dismissed on 31-5-1975.
3. The respondent-landlord filed an appeal, which was disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, vide his order dated 26-10-1976, and the learned Rent Controller's order set aside with the result that the present appellant was ordered to be ejected. This order has been challenged through the S. A. O. '
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, who has argued, that the chobara existing over the shops belongs to another person, and that it is not physically possible for the respondent to embark upon the demolition and reconstruction of the property. It is submitted that clause (vi) of subsection (2) (b) of section 13 is to be read along with section 13(5) of the Ordinance, and that the word "demolished" as used in subsection (5) means complete demolition. According to the learned counsel, mere alteration, or constructual changes in the building will not satisfy the requirements of clause (vi) aforesaid, and the re-construction a envisaged by this provisions means 'construction of the whole building'. The argument is, as the chobara over the shop belongs to some one else, complete demolition of the shop by the respondent is impracticable. The ground regarding the vacation of the demised premises for reconstruction purposes, thus cannot be available to the respondent.
5. In order to succeed on the ground of reconstruction of the property, a landlord mots prove, that he requires the building reasonably and in good faith for reconstruction. It has been pleaded, that reasonableness is essentially linked up with subsection (5-B) which confers a right on the tenant to apply to the Rent Controller before the completion of the new building for an order directing the landlord to put him in possession of such area in the new build--ing as does not exceed the area of the old building, of which he was in posses--sion. That the reconstruction on which the tenant intends to embark will render it impossible for the appellant to ask for approximately the same area, which is presently in his possession. In the submission of the learned counsel, the intended reconstruction militates against "reasonableness". His other argument was, that on ejectment of Abdul Ghani, the respondent occupied the shop, but instead of demolishing it, he converted these premises into five small shops, and that this factor also belied his stand, as to the re-construction of the property. In this respect, the learned counsel heavily relied on the Local Commissioner's report called for by the learned District Judge during the pendency of the appeal, and emphatically argued, that the respondent never intended to reconstruct the property and therefore, could not be said to have required the shop reasonably and in good faith for reconstruction purpose. 1n support of his submission, the learned counsel relied on Abdullah Baloch v. Adam Ali ((1) PLD 1961 SC 28
6. On the other hand, it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that in order to attract clause (vi), substantial demolition of a building is sufficient and that Complete demolition is not necessary. He referred to the amendment made in clause (vi) of section 13(2)(b), whereby the word "demolish" as originally incorporated in this clause was deleted. As regards the appellant's reliance on subsection (5-B) for determination of the scope of reasonableness, he submitted that subsection (5-B) deals with post-construction phase, and does not come into play before the stage of reconstruction is reached. The requirement of making improvement in and development of his property by a landlord will entitle him to get the building vacated on the ground of reconstruction and he referred to Mauls Dad v. Sardar Khan (PLD 1972 Quetta 39), Muh7mmad Haroon v. Ghulam Mustafa (1978 SCMR , 151) and Zakarla Bros. v. Heshwanl Sales & Services Ltd. (PLD 1978 Kar. 581). The observations made in these precedents to some extent support the stand taken by the learned counsel. It has also been contended, that the Local Commissioner's report is factually wrong, because, at the spot, the ,hop got vacated by the respondent from Abdul Ghani, was never divided into five compartments as stated in the report. My attention was drawn to a plan on the file to show, that a part of the premises previously in possession of Abdul Ghani has been left out, to be amalgamated with the shop occupied by the appellant, on its vacation by him.
7. After bearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the record, I am of the view, that the amendment made in clause (vl) of subsection (2) of section 13 by Ordinance XXI of 1965 is not without significance. By this amendment, the language of this clause has been substantially modified, and the word "demolish" which originally existe therein was deleted. This amendment is indicative of the Legislature' intention, that the complete demolition of the building is not sine qua's non to establish the reasonableness, and good faith of the landlord for requiring the building for reconstruction or erection of the building. The amendment appears to have been incorporated to bring this legislative provision in conformity with the changing facts of life. It must have been known to the Legislature that under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act in many cases even different tenements of a building have been transferred as independent units. If a building could be got vacated by a landlord only on the condition of total demolition thereof, the transferee of a tenement unable to dismantle the entire building, because of settlement of its various portion on some other persons, would never succeed to get his tenant evicted and develop his property. According to the definition of the expression `building' as given in section 2(a) of the Ordinance, even a part of the building is to be treated as a building. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, as to whether or not the constructional changes sought to be introduced, justify eviction of a tenant on the ground of re- construction. If the construction put on clause (vi) by the learned counsel is accepted, the development of a part of the building would become impossible.
8. While interpreting clause (vi) the learned counsel's reliance on subsection (5-B) is wholly misplaced. As observed above, the Legislature expressly omitted the word "demolish" from clause
(vi) and this amendment cannot be nullified by reading the same word in clause (vi) on the basis of its user in subsection (5). The two provisions are to be read together and in case of conflict, the will of the Legislature as conveyed through the amending Ordinance should prevail.
9. The criteria for adjudging the reasonableness and good faith, resting on subsection 5-B, as pleaded by the learned counsel for the appellant is also without merit. The development which a landlord may intend to make in his property cannot be arrested and made subservient to the requirements of the tenant. In Abdul Manan v. Karam Elahl (PLD 1971 Quetta 1 ), it was held that- " once it is held that the landlord is entitled to re-build his property, the tenant cannot question the nature of the re-construction "of the old building" on the ground that it would not suit his require-- ments. That is why the question of the reinstatement of the tenant in the new building has been left to the discretion of the Rent Controller."
1, respectfully agree with these observations. The report in Abdullah v. Adam Ali (PLD 1961 SC 28), relates to a case under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, in which it was held that :- " . . . . Requirement for construction for the sake of reconstruction is not a valid requirement to enable a landlord to obtain ejectment of a tenant under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953. It must be a reasonable and bona fide requirement, and the landlord being conscious of the requisites of law in this respect had specified the reasons which led him to plan and carrying out reconstruction of the building. These reasons were found to be inadequated and insubstantial from the point of view of the Act . . . . . ."
This precedent is of no help to the appellant; for the reasonableness and good faith of a landlord with reference to reconstruction or erection of the building by him shall have to be ascertained in the light of the facts of each case and no generalised standard can be formulated to serve as a yardstick for adjudging the reasonableness and good faith of the landlord in every case. The construction, merely for the sake of construction, is no ground for eviction of a tenant, and the requirement of the landlord in this context has got to be examined objectively. It is in evidence, that the respondent previously worked as goldsmith. While appearing as his own witness, he deposed that as the goldsmith business was closed and he also lost eye sight, he intends to construct five shops in place of the existing two to serve as a source of income for him. The impugned order shows that the appellant has already raised construction in accordance with the sanctioned plan over the portion of the premises which happened to be in his possession and the site vacated by his other tenants. The shop in possession of the appellant is required by the appellant for amalgamation with his other property. Such a need for , reconstruction is neither repugnant to good faith, nor does it militate against reasonableness. In Mauladad v. Sardar Khan PLD 1972 Quetta 39 discarding the view taken by the Rent Controller, that the property which was not yet dilapidated could not be got vacated by the landlord for reconstruction of the building, it was observed : " . In this view of the matter, it seems to me that any reconstruction which would enable the landlord substantially to develop or improve his property would be reasonable within the meaning of clause (vi) . . . .
In the case of Muhammad Haroon v. Ghulam Mustafa an ejectment petition was filed by the respondent landlord to get his shop vacated from his tenant on the ground, that he had to construct it after amalgamating the same with the adjoining shop of his uncle. The requirement of the respondent for reconstruction was held reasonable and bona fide and the Supreme Court declined to hold that the respondent merely adopted a device to pressurise the tenant to pay higher rent.
10. The learned Rent Controller was clearly in error to hold, that the appellant wanted to enhance the rent and that his intention to reconstruct the property was neither reasonable, nor in good faith.
I have gone through the evidence on the record and I am inclined to agree with the learned Additional District Judge, that the shop in possession of the appellant is required by the respondent reasonably and in good faith for reconstruction.
11. As regards the Local Commissioner's report referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Additional District Judge was rightly of the view, that it does not inspire confidence. This report, therefore, cannot advance the respondent's cause.
As a result of the above discussion, I uphold the findings of the learned Additional District Judge, and dismiss the appeal with no orders as to costs. The appellant shall hand over the possession of the shop to the respondent by the 1st March 1979.