1. G. SAFDAR SHAH, J.-The dispute in this case relates to a garrage/ workshop situated at G. T. Road, Peshawar. Respondents 3 and 4, who are the owners of the said garrage filed an application against the petitioner for his eviction on the ground that they required the same reasonably and in good faith for reconstruction. The -said application was allowed by the learned Rent Controller, and the petitioner failed to get the said order reversed even in this Court which dismissed his petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, vide order dated 26-11-1977.
2. Upon the conclusion of the said proceedings, the respondents instituted execution proceedings against the petitioner, but during the pendency of the said proceedings the petitioner filed objections in the Executing Court contending inter alia that the parties had compromised the proceedings out of Court to the effect that the petitioner would continue to remain as tenant of the said garrage and from 1-12-1977 pay to the respondents Rs. 100 per month as rent; that he would further pay to the respondents Rs. 3,000 as costs of the previous litigation; and that in consequence of the said agreement he had paid to the respondents Rs. 4,200, which amount included the rent for one year, w. e. f. 1-12-1977 to 1-12-1978. In support of his said objections, the petitioner appeared in the Executing Court on 18-2-1978 but the case was adjourned to 22-3-1978 and thereafter to five more dates when it was finally taken for recording the evidence of the petitioner on 12-7-1978. On that date, the petitioner got himself examined, but his prayer to examine certain other witnesses who were present in the Executing Court was turned down by the Presiding Officer on the ground that he had failed to file the list of witnesses as required by Order XVI, rule 1, C. P. C. Against the said order, the petitioner went in revision to the Court of the Additional District Judge. Peshawar, but the same was dismissed vide order dated 19-10-1978. Being still dissatisfied, the petitioner filed writ petition in the High Court but the same was also dismissed by a Division Bench vide judgment dated 19-11-1978. It is in this background that the petitioner has come up to this Court praying for leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of the High Court.
3. We have heard Mr. Karimullah Khan Durrani, the learned counsel for the petitioner. He argued that the order, dated 12-7-1978 passed by the Executing Court, disallowing the petitioner to get examined his witnesses who were present in Court was illegal. He, therefore, contended that the High Court was in error to dismiss his writ petition on the ground that the Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be extended to cases of civil nature; that the trial Court was the best Judge of its own procedure; and that in view of the peculiar facts of the case the exercise of writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner was unwarranted. We are afraid there is no force in this contention. It is conceded by the learned counsel that the parties herein have been litigating with each other for a number of years, and the respondents finally succeeded in this Court when the leave petition filed by the petitioner against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed on 26-11-1977. He further conceded that the alleged compromise reached between the parties out of Court was entirely oral as also that the petitioner claimed to have paid to the respondents the sum of Rs. 4,200, without having obtained from them any receipt or any other document. The learned Judges in the High Court have taken notice of this fact and rightly held that "it does not stand to reason that though there was long drawn out litigation upto the Supreme Court and the adjustment was made but the petitioner was not even careful enough to get the document executed from the respon--dents. It would follow that it is just a cock and bull story to stall the ejectment".
4. The High Court also seems to have correctly taken the view that the order dated 12-7-1978 passed by the Executing Court could not be made the subject-matter of challenge in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is evident In that the Executing Court had the jurisdiction to dispose of the objection filed before it by the petitioner and consequently it could pass a legal as well as illegal order which could not be questioned in the exercise of Constitutional Jurisdiction of the High Court.
5. Furthermore, the finding was recorded by the High Court to the effect that the objections filed by the petitioner in the Executing Court on the ground that the alleged compromise reached between) him and the respondents was just another devise to frustrate the efforts of the respondents to evict him from the premises. For many long years, the parties have been litigating with each other right up to this Court and consequently, it would be absurd to believe that the petitioner would advance to t oil respondents the sum of Rs. 4,200, without obtaining any receipt from them of getting them execute some document in his favour .
6. We are, therefore, satisfied that substantial justice has been done in this case by the High Court and consequently the order of the High Court calls for no interference whatever. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.