' Through this Constitutional petition, petitioner has challenged the order, dated 24-9-2004 passed by the learned Special Court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, whereby, he turned down request of the petitioner and ordered trial of the offence in question by the said learned Special Court in the case registered vide F.I.R. No,733 of 2004 dated 7-7-2004 under section 324/34, P.P.C. Read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Police Station Jaranwala, District Faisalabad.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of this petition, submits that from a bare perusal of the F.I.R. No case is made out to be tried by the learned Special Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; that there is a previous background of enmity between the complainant Rana Mehfooz Ahmad, Advocate and that in the afore-referred circumstances it is a case to be tried by the ordinary Court. Placed reliance on PLD 2004 Lah.
199.
3. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Advocate-General Punjab Mr. Tahir Mehmood Gondal assisted by complainant's learned counsel Hafiz Muhammad Yousaf, Advocate, submits that in the instant case, the complainant/Advocate was attacked by the accused persons armed with fire- arms when he was on his way from the Office of Tehsil Nazim to his Chamber; that there is no previous enmity between the parties; that one accused has not surrendered his person to the process of law and is still at large and that a bare perusal of the F.I.R. Shows that it is a case triable by the learned Special Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Reliance was placed on Ziaullah v.
Special Judge, Anti-Terrorist Court, Faisalabad and 7 others 2002 SCM R 1225.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, have gone through the contents of the F.I.R., the impugned order and the relevant provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
5. It is an occurrence in which an Advocate/complainant was attacked upon by the accused persons, while armed with fire-arms, at the time when he was going from the Office of Tehsil Nazim, Jaranwala to his Chamber across the road. Despite repeated queries made by this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to bring on record anything to substantiate his plea of previous enmity. Even if there was any enmity between the parties, then the complainant could have easily named the petitioner and other accused persons in the F.I.R. Which was not done by him. It shows bona tide of the complainant.
6. The occurrence in question had taken place around the District Courts and near the Chamber of the complainant who is a practising Advocate and he was attacked on the public road when he was coming from the Tehsil Nazim's office and was crossing the road for his Chamber. Admittedly, it is a "public place" where the litigant public, the Advocates and officials of the Courts have frequent movement.
7. The moot point urged in this petition is whether the act of the accused persons created panic and insecurity in the minds of the people and whether it comes within the ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. In a recently delivered judgment of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan reported in Muhammad Farooq v. Ibrar and 5 others PLD 2004 SC 917 the question of "previous enmity", "public place" and the very object to promulgate Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 came up for consideration and the case was directed to be tried by the learned Special Court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. At page 39 of the said judgment, the August Supreme Court observed as under:-- "(8) The very object to promulgate Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and other heinous offences as defined in section 6 of the Act and their speedy trials..."
' In para. 9 of the same page, it was held as under:-- "(9) In the case in hand, though the motive is shown to be previous enmity, yet paramount consideration to be taken note of is the culminative fall out the occurrence...."
' At the same page, while defining the words "public place" and while giving reference to the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 the apex Coutt of the country quoted as under:-- "Public place" means a street, road, thoroughfare, park, garden or other place to which the public have free access and includes a hotel, restaurant, motel, mess and club, but does not include the residential room of a hotel in the occupation of some person."
8. In the case in hand an Advocate was fired upon on the road, which is a "public place" according to the dictum laid down by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in above case. In the occurrence, the accused persons made direct firing on the complainant when he was around the District Courts. According to the contents of the F.I.R. And the medico-legal report, he received seven fire- arm injuries in the occurrence which shows the tenor and intention of the accused persons. It was luck of the complainant that he survived. The victim belongs to the legal profession. He was made victim of firing when he was busy in A his professional engagements. The firing at such a large scale must have created insecurity and panic in the minds of the people who were present at the place of occurrence which is admittedly a "public place". It must have created same feelings in the minds of the persons engaged with such a noble profession. Since the occurrence in question had taken, place around the District Courts and since victim was an Advocate it must have engaged the attention of the media in consequence whereof public-at-large must have felt the same feelings. The offence in question, in our considered view, has nexus with the object of the Act and is covered by sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 especially a bare reading of sub- clauses (b), (d), (h) and (i) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the Act would show that the offence which creates a sense of fear or insecurity in society, causes death or endangers a person's life, involves firing to spread panic falls within the ambit of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and is liable to be tried by the leaned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court. The learned trial Court has rightly dismissed application of the petitioner. We see no reason to interfere 'with the impugned order. This petition, having no merit, is dismissed.