A case was registered against the petitioner on 9-8-1978 vide F.I.R. No. 189 at Police Station, Jhelum, under section 3/6 of Hoarding and Black Market Act, 1948 and M. L. O. No. 5. The allegation as levelled in the F.I.R. As well as in the prosecution evidence against the petitioner is that he charged Rs. 160 for one tin of ghee instead of Rs. 151.90, control rate. The Summary Military Court which tried the petitioner found him guilty and sentenced him 'to undergo 3 months' R. I. And pay a fine of Rs.
2,000 and in default thereof to further undergo three months' R. I.
It has been argued that even if the allegation levelled in the F. I. R. As well as in the prosecution evidence is taken to be correct the case should have been tried by the ordinary Court as there was no legal necessity for its trial by the Military Court. It is submitted that no extraordinary circumstance has been brought on record for the trial of the case by the Military Court. The learned Assistant Advocate-General submits that since in the month of August, 1978, the period preceding Eid-ul-Fitr, an artificial shortage of essential articles was created by the vested interests, therefore, trial of the case by the Military Court was necessitated.
3. It is not denied that many cases covered by section 3/6 of Hoarding a Black Marketing Act, during the period August-September, 1978, were sent to the ordinary Courts, for trial and not to the Military Courts. In the presence of that, some extraordinary circumstances should have been brought on record for the trial of the case by the Military Court. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish that such trial was necessitated on account of extraordinary circumstances.
There is no doubt that any action to be taken against a person indulging in black-marketing will be in the public interest, but keeping in view the circumstances of the present case the gravity of the crime stands minimized and for that reason the case should have been tried by the ordinary Court.
If such cases are also sent to the Military Court for trial then work of the ordinary Courts will come to stand still. Further, I don't see any reason as to why an ordinary Court cannot deal with a person properly who is accused of indulging in black-marketing on an ordinary level, as in the present case.
4. For the aforesaid reasons; the conviction and the sentence of the petitioner is hereby set aside.
The writ petition is accepted without an order as to costs.
The petitioner is on bail by the order of this Court. His bail bon stands discharged.