This single order shall decide the present Constitutional petition (W.P. No, 17956 of 2004) and the connected petitions (W.P. Nos 18234, 18235, 18236 & 18237 of 2004), as common questions of law and facts .are involved in all the petitions and they have arisen out of consolidated order.
2. Petitioners through the filing of all these petitions, have called in question order/letter dated 2.10.2004, whereby the learned Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue Punjab of his own motion, recalled and reviewed all the orders passed for the grant of proprietary rights under Lamberdari grants etc.
3. Petitioners, in all the aforesaid Constitutional petitions, are Lumberdars and they were granted proprietary rights, qua the land in their possession, under Board of Revenue, Notification dated 13.7.96, according to the price assessed by the District Authorities, vide consolidated order dated 30.4.2004, passed by the learned Member (Colonies). According to the petitioners, pursuant to the said decision . dated 30.4.2004, they are still enjoying the benefits of .the saidproperty with full rights. Subsequently, the learned Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue, without issuance of any notice to the petitioners and in purported exercise of review jurisdiction, under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1979, while himself condoning the delay occurred in reviewing the orders, recalled and reviewed all the orders passed for the grant of proprietary rights under Lamberdari grants etc after 8.3.99, vide impugned order/letter dated 2.10.2004, addressed by the said learned Member to all the Executive District Officers and District Officers (Revenue) in the Punjab, which order/letter has prompted the petitioners to file the present Constitutional petitions.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957 does not empower the Board to exercise suo moto review jurisdiction and that before passing the said order, no notice was served upon the petitioners, thus the impugned letter/order is not Sustainable under the law. He has further submitted that the judgment (Maqbool Ahmed Qureshi vs. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 484), relied upon by the learned Member Board of Revenue, in reviewing the orders, has no concern with the case in hand and the said judgment is not application under the facts of the present case. Confronted with the above recorded contentions, the learned Law Officer, after going through the provisions of Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, and after examination the impugned letter, could not say much on the proposition
5. In view of the arguments of the learned counsel, I have examined the impugned order/letter and find that the learned Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, in purported exercise of powers under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue. Act, 1957, has in general recalled and reviewed all the orders, passed after 8.3.99, for the grant of proprietary rights under Lamberdari grants etc. It would be appropriate to reproduce the concluding portion of the impugned order/letter, which reads as follow: In view of above, exercising powers under Section 8 of Board of Revenue, Punjab Act, I hereby recall and review all orders passed for grant of proprietary rights under Lambardari Grants, Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme etc, decided in my capacity as Member (Judicial-III) and Member (Colonies) after 8.3.1999 which is the date of judgment of Supreme Court of Pakistan. Delay which has occurred in reviewing orders passed is hereby condoned under relevant provisions of the Limitation Act."
It flows from the above that the learned Member, Board of Revenue, while reviewing and recalling all the orders, passed for the grant of proprietary rights under Lamberdari grants etc. has exercised powers under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, and has himself condoned the delay, which has occurred in reviewing the orders. Now the question arises as to whether the learned Member, Board of Revenue, under the said provision of law, relied upon by him, could exercise powers of suo moto review jurisdiction. Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, appears appropriate to be reproduced: "Any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree passed or order made by the Board and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record (or for any other sufficient reason) disires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply to the Board for a review of judgment made the Board may, after giving notice to the parties affected thereby and after hearing them, pass such decree or order as the circumstances of the case require.
(2) Every application for a review of a decree or order under sub-section (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date of that decree or order."
Bare perusal of the said provision of law manifests that the Board can only exercise review jurisdiction and review the order, on the application of any person, who feels aggrieved by decree or order passed by the Board and who from the discovery of new and important matters, which were not within his knowledge or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record desires to obtain a review, may apply to the Board for review and that after the receipt of the said application, the Board, after giving notice to the parties affected and after hearing them, can pass an order. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 further envisages that every application for review of order/decree shall be made within 90 days from the date of that order. Undeniably, in the present case, none filed any application for review of order that the impugned order was passed after the expiry of period of ninety days from the date of passing of latest order in line, i,e, 30.4.2004.
In view of the above, to my mind, the Board has no powers to suo moto exercise powers to review earlier order passed. It has been held in Umar Din and others vs., Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue and others (1984, CLC 17) that powers of review under Section 8, supra, can be exercised by the Board of Revenue only upon an application filed by aggrieved person and the Board has no powers of suo moto review.
6. Learned Member Board of Revenue, through passing the impugned order/letter dated 2.10.2004, has generally recalled and reviewed all the orders passed after 8.3.99 for the grant of proprietary rights under Lamberdari grants etc. Petitioners claim that they were granted proprietary rights by virtue of order dated 30.4.2004, passed by the learned Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue, which appears to be the latest order on the subject. As noted above, Section 8(2) provides that every application for review of order under Section 8(1) shall be made within 90 days from the date of that decree/order. In view whereof, all the orders passed after 8.3.99 could not have been reviewed in view of the bar of limitation contained in Section 8(2), supra. Similary, even if it be taken that the learned Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, has reviewed order dated 30.4.2004, even then the impugned order recalling the said order was passed after the lapse of more than five months and, thus, on this count too the learned Member (Colonies) could not have passed the impugned order after the lapse of 90 days from the date of the said order.
7. There is another aspect of the case. Admittedly, before passing the order dated 2.10:2004, no notice was issued to any of the persons, who were really affected by the impugned order.
Undeniably the learned Member (Colonies) did not provide opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, while purportedly exercising suo moto review jurisdiction. The petitioners, who were granted proprietary rights, vide order dated 30.4.2004, have, thus, been condemned unheard and, therefore, the impugned order is violative of the principle of natural justice embodied in the maxim "Audi alteram partem". In view whereof, the impugned order was passed not only in violation of Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, but it also offends the principle of natural justice.
8. I have also had the advantage of perusing the judgment reported as Maqbool Ahmad Qureshi vs. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 484), and find that principles laid therein have no nexus with the controversies dilated upon by the Member, while passing the impugned order. In the said judgment the hereditary claim of the office of the Lamberdar and the rule of primogeniture in this regard were declared as un-Islamic and the question of Lamberdari grants was neither adverted to nor decided in the said case. Reliance of the Member, Board of Revenue, on the said judgment, while illegally reviewing all the orders, is misconceived, as the principles of law laid down in the case of Maqbool Ahmad Qureshi, ibid, were not attracted in the present case.
9. In the above perspective, seeing from any angle the impugned order cannot be maintained, as the same was passed in violation of the provisions of Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957 and in derogation of the principle of natural justice. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, inasmuch through the passing of the said order the petitioners have been condemned unheard.
10. For the foregoing reasons and conclusions, all the writ petitions are allowed and order/letter dated 2.10.2004, passed by the learned Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, thereby reviewing all the orders passed for the grant of proprietary rights under Lamberdari grants etc, in purported exercise of powers under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957, qua the petitioners, is declared to be illegal, without jurisdiction and without lawful authority and, thus, have no legal effect. No order as to costs.