' This Regular Second Appeal impugns the concurrent findings of the learned trial Court dated 28- 2-1995 and of the learned lower Appellate Court dated 19-10-1996.
2. The facts of this case have elaborately been set out in the impugned judgments and need not, therefore, be reproduced in extenso.
3. The main contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that only one of the marginal witnesses had appeared to prove the agreement dated 2-7-1987 (Exh.P.1). It was, therefore, argued that the provisions of Article .17 of the Qanun-eShahadat Order had not been complied with and as such the aforesaid agreement (Exh.P.1) was not proved to have been executed by the appellant- defendant. Learned counsel for Rahat Iqbal respondent-plaintiff has, however, pointed out that Jamal Din one of the marginal witnesses to the aforesaid agreement had appeared and had proved execution of the same by the appellant-defendant. Karamat Ali who is brother of the appellant-defendant was the other marginal witness to the agreement. He appeared as D.W.1 and denied that the appellant-defendant had executed the agreement (Exh.P.1). However, Ghulam Hussain the scribe of Exh.P.1 appeared as P.W.5 and testified that the said agreement had in fact been executed by the appellant-defendant. The said Ghulam Hussain has also signed the agreement. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff contended that in these circumstances, the scribe was also a competent witness. In support of this contention, he referred to the cases titled Mst. Fatima Bibi v. Mst. Nasim Akhtar and others (2000 YLR 2953) and Zafar Ullah Khan v. Mst.
Hakim Bibi and another (2000 YLR 2789). The cited cases do in fact support the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff.
4. In addition to the above, it is significant that the agreement (Exh.P.1) was in respect of a house, one-half portion of which was owned by the appellant-defendant while the other one-half was owned by his mother namely, Mst. Aimna. Both the appellant and his mother Mst. Aimna had agreed to sell their respective portions to the respondent-plaintiff as has been asserted in the plaint and in the testimony of the witnesses of the respondent-plaintiff. It is noteworthy that Mst.
Aimna in fact executed a sale-deed pursuant to the agreement (Exh.P.1) in favour of the respondent-plaintiff in respect of her one-half portion of the disputed house. This circumstance corroborates the claim of the respondent-plaintiff and leaves me in no doubt that the appellant- defendant had in fact executed the agreement (Exh. P. 1).
5. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no justification for interfering in the impugned judgments and decrees of the two Courts below. In the event, the other argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant as to the identity of the respective portions owned by the appellant and his mother Mst. Aimna, has become irrelevant.
6. Before parting with this judgment, I need to note that Khalida Parveen widow of the appellant has filed C.M. No.1104-C/03 under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C. Praying that she be impleaded as a respondent in this appeal. The case set up by her is that the disputed house was given to her by her late husband (the appellant-defendant) by way of dower and that this fact had been mentioned in Column 13 of the Nikahnama evidencing her marriage with the appellant-defendant. This assertion quite clearly is an afterthought. I have no doubt that the application has been moved at this belated stage with the object of delaying the decision in this appeal. The agreement to sell is dated 2-7-1987 while the respondent-plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance as far back as 17-11- 1987. The suit resisted by the appellant-defendant before the two Courts below and also in the High Court. In the circumstances, the plea of the applicant Khalida Parveen that she was ignorant of the pending litigation and the concurrent decrees passed against her husband by the two Courts below cannot be accepted. Furthermore, the alleged grant of the house to the applicant by way of dower has not been recorded in any registered deed of conveyance. As such even if the appellant- defendant had agreed to give the disputed house to the applicant as dower, such agreement alone does not constitute a conveyance in favour of the applicant. The application filed by Khalida Parveen under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C. Is, therefore, dismissed.
7. The appeal also is dismissed for the reasons recorded above.