SYED JAMSHED ALI, J.--- The suit filed by the appellant-Bank against the respondents was decreed on 8-12-1998 on the basis of the admission of the learned counsel for the defendants. Perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned Banking Judge observed that defendants/ respondents 7 and 8 had not inherited anything from the Managing Director namely Muhammad Saeed Akhtar decease , and as such they have no personal liability especially when the, are not guarantors nor have they signed any document. Confronted with the above situation, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-Bank stated that he claimed the decree against the said defendants/respondents as legal heirs of the deceased and the decree shall be executed out of the assets which respondents 7 and 8 have inherited from the deceased i.e., Muhammad Saeed Akhtar.
2. The grievance of the learned counsel for the appellant is against that part of the judgment and decree which restricts the liability of respondents 7 and 8 to the property inherited by them from Muhammad Saeed Akhtar. The learned counsel submits that the said respondents had furnished personal guarantees and they were, therefore, personally liable to satisfy the decree not only against the assets inherited by them but that their personal assets could also be proceeded against for satisfaction of the decree. He seeks modification of the decree.
3. Nobody is in attendance on behalf of the respondents. Except respondents 7 and 8, the others are pro forma respondents. Respondents 7 and 8 were directed to be served through a notice in the daily Jang. The notice was duly published which has appeared in the daily Jang of 7-7-2004 for today's date of hearing. They are not in attendance and, therefore, proceeded against ex parte.
4. The judgment and decree impugned in this appeal are based on the consent of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff-Bank. The concession purely relates to a question of fact.
Therefore, we are of the view that as far as liability of respondents 7 and 8 to satisfy the decree is concerned, it is a consent decree and, therefore, not appealable. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.