' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.-The petitioner which is a duly registered trade union and the collective bargaining agent of workers employed in the Respondent No,3 Bank has called in question the Constitutional validity of section 27-B of the Banking Companies Ordinance 1962 inserted through the Banking Companies Amendment Act, 1997. The provisions of section 27-B may be reproduced as follows:-- "27-B. Disruptive union activities.
(1) No officer or member of a trade union a banking company shall use any bank facilities including a car or telephone to promote trade union activities, or carry weapons into bank premises unless so authorized by the management or carry on trade union activities during office hours, or subject bank officials to physical harassme nt or abuse and nor shall he be a person who is not an employee of the banking company in question.
(2) Any person violating any of the provisions of subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to three years, or with fine or with both."
2. Basically Mr. Sulleman Habibullah learned counsel for the petitioner complained that the impugned legislation purported to takeaway the following rights that could available to trade unions or its members under the Industrial Relations Ordinance or a valid and legally binding settlement effective thereunder:
(i) The right to use a car or telephone to promote trade union activities.
(ii) To carry on trade union activities during office hours.
(iii) To elect non-employees as officers of the trade union to the extent of 25%.
3. He proceeded to argue that such restrictions were violative offundamental right of freedom of association and the right to form unions guaranteed by Article 17 of the Constitution and denial of certain rights to bank employees, which could be available to other workers amounted to hostile discrimination forbidden by Article 25 of the Constitution.
4. Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa learned counsel for Respondent No,3 in the first instance objected to the maintainability of this petition on the part of the petitioner union contending that only an aggrieved workman and not a trade union could approach the Court to seek redress against violation of his fundamental rights. On merits he contended that the rights under Article 17 were available only to citizens and not to collective entities like the petitioner and in any event the legislation in question did not impair the right of freedom of association. With respect to Article 25 he contended that there was a reasonable basis forclassifying employees of a bank as a separate category and Article 25 had not been violated.
5. Mr. Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui learned D.A.G. Argued that the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 17 was subject to reasonable restrictions and the restriction envisaged under the impugned legislation was evidently reasonable.
6. Taking' up the question of maintainability first. Mr. Bajwareferred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Democratic Workers Union (C.B.A.) v. State Bank of Pakistan (S.B.L.R 2001 Karachi 439) wherein it was held that a collective bargaining agent could not claim locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution for alleged violation of the legal or fundamental rights of its members. It may be added that even otherwise the scheme of the repealed Industrial Relations Ordinance as well as the present one makes a clear distinction between the rights of a trade union as a collective body and those of its individual members as was' highlighted by a full Bench of this Court in Karachi Pipe Mills v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLC 1984 (Labour) 1359), which was upheld by the Honourable Supreme Court in Karachi Pipe Mills Employees Union v. Karachi Pipe Mills (1992 SCM R 36), where it was held that in application under section 34 of the 1969 I.R.O. Could only be made for enforcement of rights guaranteed to a C.B.A.
Only and for enforcement of rights of individual workers section 25-A had to be invoked.
7. Nevertheless, we find that the impugned legislation does notmerely affect the rights of individual workers. Interests of a C.B.A. As a collective body could also be impaired. For instance the restriction to carry on its activities on the work premises is something which directly impairs the interests of the collective body. Again if certain facilities were granted by the employer to office bearers of the C.B.A. For carrying on their trade union activities the C.B.A. Would be directly affected by withdrawal of such facilities. It is well settled by now, through a series of pronouncements of Honourable Supreme Court that a strict legal right need not be established but a sufficient legal interest is enough for showing locus standi to maintain a petition. We are therefore, unable to sustain the objection to the maintainability of this petition.
8. Coming to the merits of the case Mr. Sulleman Habibullah argued that Article 17 of the Constitution guaranteed to every citizen the right to form assessments or claims subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by-law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality. He contended that the right to form trade union was clearly covered by the aforesaid Article.
9. Mr. Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui learned D.A.G. Argued that the rights guaranteed under Article, 17 could always be subjected to reasonable restrictions. Nevertheless, he was unable to show how the restrictions contemplated in the impugned legislation had any nexus with national sovereignty, public order or morality and therefore we found no force in his contention.
10. Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa learned counsel for the Respondents argued that the right to form a trade union has been guaranteed only to citizens and not to collective entities like the petitioner.
Therefore, at least in this/petition such right cannot be ascertained. He pointed out that in all 'reported cases for enforcement of the right under Article 17 individuals and not collective entities have approached the Court. Prima-facie the argument appeared attractive. Nevertheless, it also needs to be kept in view that the provision of Article 17 cannot be confined to mere formation of trade union but would also include certain necessary concomitants flowing therefrom. After the pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416) where it was held that the right to form a political party guaranteed under Article 17 also contained a concomitant right to contest general elections on party basis, the Petitioner challenged section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, which provided for allocation of symbols to candidates, through drawing of lots before the Supreme Court through C.P. Nos.2-R and 7-R of 1988. The 12 member Bench of the Court in a decision reported as (PLD 1989 SC 66) declared the statutory provision to be unconstitutional and held political parties entitled to seek allotment of any prescribed symbols for all itscandidates. Indeedif a political party ,was a legal entity competent to sue in its own name possibly a petition could be maintained. By the same analogy it might be difficult to say that no trade union could under any circumstances moved a Court for enforcement of Article 17 rights.
11. Nevertheless, Mr. Bajwa referred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court, which was incidentally authored by one of us (Sabihuddin Ahmed J) in Bank of America Employees Union v.
Federation of Pakistan (PLC 2003 Labour 143). In the aforesaid case all the grounds taken up by Mr. Sulleman Habibullah were considered and the challenge to the impugned legislation founded upon Article 17 of the Constitution was repelled. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to show that the judgment was over ruled by the Honourable Supreme Court or point out any other case from anywhere, where a different view was taken. Hewas thus unable to persuade us to reconsider the same and respectfully following it we would,hold--that none of the rights claimed fall within the guarantees envisaged by Article 17 of the Constitution.
12. Corning to Article 25 Mr. Sulleman Habibullah contended that there could be no rational basis for treating bank employees as class by themselves and make a law distinguishing them from other categories of employees entitled to the benefit under the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
13. Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, however, argued that the reasonable basis did exist for doing so and referred to the following factors distinguishing a bank from other establishments to which the I.R.O.
Applied---
(i) Banks were dealing with large amount of money and maintenance of discipline in their premises was of utmost importance. Therefore, carrying out union activities within the working premises could very substantially affect their normal working and jeopardize the security of the amounts entrusted to them by depositors.
(ii) The branches of a bank were spread over through out the involved country and each one of them was involved in public dealing on an urgent basis. Any trade union activity during working hours could very seriously affect the interests of its customers who might have approached the Bank in several urgent situations. In the current state of economic activity their functioning was no less sensitive than those of hospitals.
14. Learned counsel further pointed out that since 1975 bank employees were being treated as a separate class and their wages and other terms and conditions of employment were regulated by awards of Wage Commission constituted under section 38-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. No industrial dispute could be raised in respect of matters regarding which decision of Wage Commission was operated or which was under consideration of the Commission. In any event it is well settled that there is always a presumption as to the validity of a statutory provision and there is a heavy burden of proof upon party who challenges its Constitutionality on the ground of the classification being arbitrary or unreasonable as inter alia held in I.A Sherawani v. Federation of Pakistan (1991 SCM R 1041). Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to show that the classification was, arbitrary or unreasonable. We therefore, found no force in this petition and dismissed it vide our short order dated 8-9-2004.