1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The respondent filed a bill of costs which was rejected by the office as time- barred, therefore, the case has been placed before me and I have heard both Mr. Abbas on behalf of the respondent/petitioner and Mr. A.I Akbar on behalf of the appellant.
2. The appellant's appeal was dismissed with costs by this Court on 18-9-1974, the respondent- petitioner immediately applied for copies of the judgment and decree which he received on 12-9- 1975. He filed his bill of costs ten days later, but as the judgment awarding costs had been pronounced a year earlier, Mr. A.I Akhtar vehemently opposed the application for costs on the ground that this application was time-barred. That also appears to be the view of the office, and the burden of explaining the delay is on Mr. Abbas.
3. Mr. Abbas's explanation is that he could not file bill of costs until the decree had been prepared.
4. This is correct, but as the decree was prepared on 6-12-1974 Mr. Abbas had to explain the delay of more than a year and he said that he had immediately applied for certified copies of the judgment and decree, but that the office had delayed supplying copies till 12-9-1975, therefore, he had shown sufficient cause under section S of the Limitation Act for the period between the date of the judgment and the date on which he was supplied copies of the judgment and decree.
5. Mr. A.I Akbar submitted that Mr. Abbas had been negligent in not collecting certified copies of the judgment and decree and that in view of the deletion of rule 6 of Order X of the Rules of this Court, the time spent in obtaining certified copies of the Court's decree could not be excluded. I do not consider it necessary to examine the question whether Mr. Abbas was diligent in obtaining copies of the judgment and decree, and it is true, that no application is required now in view of the deletion of rule 6 for the preparation of a decree. But I agree with Mr. Abbas that the bill of costs could only be filed after the decree had been prepared. Therefore the question is whether it was for the Court to send a notice to the part' that the decree had-been prepared, or whether it was for the parties to make enquiries and find out whether the decree had been prepared. Mr. A.I Akbar submitted that it was for the parties to ascertain when the decree was ready, but as there is no system of making announcements about the decrees which are prepared by the Court, the submission, if accepted would mean that Advocate-on-Records would have to make enquiries continuously about something beyond their control: namely the preparation of the decree. On the other hand, Mr. Abbas submitted that it was for the Court to send information about the preparation of the decree, therefore, both the learned counsel requested that I should verify the position from the Superintendent of the Court. The Superintendent informs me that the office of the Court sends a notice to the parties when it has prepared the decree. As this notice was unfortunately not sent in the instant case, I would allow Mr. Abbas' application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and direct that the cost be paid to him by the appellant as the tax by the Court.