' This judgment will dispose of Labour Appeals Nos.26 to 33 of 2003 as identical common question of law and facts are involved in them.
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are to the effect thatthe appellants were employed as drivers in Muslim Commercial Banks Limited at different Branches. Their services were retrenched by the Respondent-Bank on the ground that a Scheme was launched, whereby it had been decided to retrench all the drivers throughout Pakistan including Azad Kashmir and two hundred and ten drivers were retrenched by the Bank, without any exception and further not recruited any Driver nor Peon or Guard and in this regard the Board of Directors of the Bank had passed the requisite Resolution for their action and the work of cash carrying was contracted out and this scheme was highly beneficial to the respondent-Bank which was privatized in 1991.
3. The appellants submitted their grievance petitions stating thatthey were drivers with the respondent-Bank, which retrenched their services and also sent notices to the respondent-Bank but with no result. The appellants alleged that the reasons for their retrenched were baseless, dishonest, mala fide and illegal. It has also been pleaded that the Bank was going in profit and hence the retrenchment without show-cause notices to and personal hearing was not provided to them. Further pleaded that the appellants were employed in category-I of the comployees' category and the employees junior to them were still in service and their retrenchment was illegal in view of the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance.
4. The respondent-Bank while putting its appearance filed written reply of the grievance petitions stating therein that the appellants were employed in the Branches which establishment was having less than twenty workmen and hence Standing Orders Ordinance was not applicable to entertain the grievance petitions for the grant of relief prayed for. It was also objected that the valid grievance notices have notbeen served upon the respondent-Bank before filing the grievance petitions, which were not maintainable. It was specifically pleaded that the appellants had been paid substantial amount of money in excess of their legal dues and hence they were now estopped from filing the petitions. It was further pleaded by the Bank that on merits, there were in all two hundred ten drivers-with the respondent-Bank and all of them were not required, hence retrenched was without any discrimination and there was no question of mala fide because the entire cadre of drivers had been abolished and after that no driver was recruited.
5. The Labour Court observed that the grievance petitions were not maintainable under the Standing Orders Ordinance and the grievance notices were validly sent and there was no estoppel against the appellants but observed that the respondent-Bank had every right to reorganize the establishment wherein the impugned retrenchment was considered necessary specially when no category of drivers was retained or recruited afterwards and dismissed the grievance petitions filed by the appellants.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently objected to the judgment of the Labour Court and the retrenchment of the appellants contending that the show-cause notices had not been issued to them and they were condemned unheard but the learned counsel had no objection to the re-organization of the Bank.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The 'retrenchment' has been defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969, which would mean the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action and it has no application where the services of all workmen have been terminated by the employer on a real and bona fide closure of business or where the services of all workmen have been terminated by the employer on the business or undertaking being taken over by another employer in the circumstances, as laid down in the case of HariprasadShivshankerShukla and another v. A.D. Divelkar and others (AIR 1957 SC 121).
8. The Standing Orders Ordinance has defined the procedure for retrenchment where any workman is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen, the employer shall retrench the workman, who is the last person in that category. The retrenchment of the whole or part of a work force should have as its underlying reason, a driver for economy in an establishment or industry, occasioned on account of a number of factors, which may vary from time to time and situation to situation. The "retrenchment" comprises of an act or instanceof cutting off, cutting out or cutting down, in many a case, for considerations of economy, such as discharge of the surplus labour or staff in a continuing or running industry. As to the grievance of the dismissal, removal and discharge of the employee, it is quite distinguishable from the word "retrenchment". Dismissal" is the loose equivalent of removal from an office or employment. This class of termination, implicity involves severance Of relationship before time and on account of some defect in the performance or discharge of duties." Removal" signifies an act of displacement from a post or position. Such, usually, comes about for a fault on the part of an employee but also may be occasioned, in certain circumstances, quite blamelessly. "Discharge" involves either simple relieving of a charge of any kind or to dismiss, though usually the former, as perhaps in our labour laws, Such, therefore, may either be without apportionment of blame or on account of commission of an offence or misconduct. In either case , it results in extinguishments of an obligation or termination of an employment.
9. The aforesaid definitions have been discussed by the Karachi High Court in a case reported as Messrs Telephone Industries of Pakistan (Pvt.) through Manager, Planning and Installation, Karachi v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal through Chairman, Karachi and 2 others (1998 PLC 221), Zeal Pak Cement Factory Ltd., Hyderabad v. The Chairman, West Pakistan Industrial Court, Lahore (PLD 1965 Supreme Court 420) and Syed Momin v. Rashid Textile Mills Ltd., and 3 others (1987 P.L.0 852).
10. As to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that no show-cause notice was issued by the Employer Bank/respondent to the appellants and they have been condemned unheard and the violation of the principle of natural justice has been made. The question of issuance of notices to the Bank's employees whose services were retrenched was dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the cases reported as United Bank Limited v. Shahmim Ahmad Khan (PLD 1999 SC 990). The relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced below:-- "It has been very vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the respondents jointly that termination of services of respondents from the Bank was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice as the respondents were not afforded any opportunity of hearing or to place their cases before the authority before they were terminated from the service. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents has not impressed us at all. The termination of the services of respondents as a result of retrenchment carries no stigma. In fact, an employee terminated under the Retrenchment Scheme is eligible for future employment as and when such contingency arises.
As the termination of respondents from service did not carry any stigma, in our view in terms of rule 15 of the Rules, they were not entitled to any notice of hearing before termination of their employment. Apart from it, the reasons for termination of their services were set out in detail in the retrenchment scheme which was circulated to all the employees of the Bank in advance and, therefore, the respondents could not plead that they were not informed the reasons for termination of their services. We have already pointed out earlier that as there were no statutory rules applicable to be respondents, the terms and conditions contained U.B.L. (Staff) Services Rules, 1981 were applicable to them. These rules continued to govern the service of the respondents notwithstanding the fact that under section 20-A their services were declared to be one in the service of Pakistan and they were deemed to be civil servants for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act, 1973."
11. It is an admitted position that the Bank Management in the Retrenchment Scheme has given substantial benefits to the retrenched employees/appellants and it cannot be said that the exercise of powers by the Bank was opposed to the Islamic principle of Adal-o-Ihsan.
12. The learned Judge of the Labour Appellate Court recorded the evidence of the parties and after assessing the evidence and the case-law referred to above by both the sides did not disagree with the respondent-Bank that in such circumstances there were no requirement for show-cause notice to and personal hearing of the appellants. The only argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that they were condemned unheard is misconceived and repelled.
Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the cases reported in FarasatHussain and others v. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation through Chairman and others (2004 SCM R 1874) and Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) through Chairman and others v. Nasir Jamal Malik and others (2001 SCM R 934). The facts of these cases were not applicable to the facts of the present cases as that were not the cases of "retrenchment" of the employees rather it concerned with dismissal or removal of the services of the employees.
13. For the foregoing reasons, and following the principle laid down in the cases referred to above, all these appeals having no force are dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.