' This revision petition arises out of the judgment dated 15-9-2003 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, whereby, the order dated 24-5-2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge, dismissing the objection petition filed by the present petitioner was upheld.
2. Facts, in brief, are that in the year 1956 after the amalgamation of the Province of West Pakistan into one Unit, the Government required accommodation for the amalgamated staff and hurridly ordered the completion of Wandat Colony within the shortest possible time. Construction of roads and foot-paths was entrusted to the respondent who was a Government contractor and was required to complete the work as early as possible. The work orders were issued in favour of the respondent which were converted into agreement after the decision of nonscheduled rates for working in rainy weather and provisions of two miles road earth work in the revised estimate was to be prepared later on. On 13-9-1956 to regularize the above work tenders were called fol. The work done by the respondent. Before the acceptance of tenders, the Chief Engineer West Pakistan ordered the respondent on 25-9-1956 to complete the work by 30-10-1956. When the work was nearly completed the Departmental Officers started dishonouring their own commitment and decided that amount for the work done by the respondent will be paid under separate agreement after the decision of non-scheduled rates. During the period of dispute about 16 Superintending Engineers were transferred and Mr. G.D. Habib, Superintending Engineer, Provincial Circle was appointed Arbitrator. Before he could complete the inquiry he was transferred and the matter of Arbitration was referred to Sayed Melmli Shah, Superintending Engineer. He acted as an Arbitrator and gave an award on 24-11-1960. Being dissatisfied with this award the respondent filed an application in the Civil Court on 21-6-1962 for setting aside of such award. During the pendency of the suit, the Government Pleader had made a statement that award of Mehdi Shah may be set aside and matter be referred to another Arbitrator appointed through Court. The Court then appointed Abdullah Qureshi, who after hearing the parties had given award on 16-3-1964. The respondent filed an application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act to make the award as rule of the Court.
3. Learned Civil Judge vide judgment dated 5-3-1965 accepted the petition filed by the respondent and made the award announced by Mr. Qureshi as rule of the Court.
4. The department filed an F.A.O. No.87 of 1965 which was accepted by this Court on 12-5-1967. The respondent filed L.P.A.' No.210 of 1967 which was accepted on' 26-11-1990. The department filed CPLA No.163 of 1991 in the Supreme Court of Pakistan which was accepted on 23-12-1992 and the matter was remanded to the High Court, Lahore. The review petition was also dismissed on 21-11-1993. After the remand of the case by the Supreme Court, this -Court had maintained the decision of Civil Court. The department filed CPLA No.1849-L of 1997 in the Supreme Court which was dismissed vide judgment dated 28-2-2001 being barred by 28 days.
5. The respondent filed execution petition of the decree passed by the Civil Court dated 5-3-1965, making the award as rule of Court which was contested by the petitioner-department by filing an objection petition, objecting that judgment of Civil Court dated 5-3-1965 is silent as to any definite amount. Learned Civil Judge vide its order dated 24-5-2003 dismissed the objection petition. This order had been assailed through an appeal which also met with the same fate by the ADJ through order dated 15-9-2003 which order has been impugned through this revision petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the amount of compensation was not determined by the Arbitrator in the award and without determining the same it could not be made as rule of Court; that the Executing Court had not adverted to this aspect of the case that Civil. Court had not prepared the separate order-sheet while making the award as rule of Court and no execution petition was maintainable without decree.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent has vehemently opposed the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner and supported the decisions rendered by the trial Court as well as Executing Court.
8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the record.
9. It is admitted position that the learned Civil Judge had made the award as rule of Court vide judgment dated 5-3-1965, wherein, the Court had observed, that no doubt the 'Arbitrator' had not determined the exact amount of compensation in its 'award' but the petitioner itself had determined the jurisdictional value of appeal while filing F.A.O. As Rs.4,75,000 and this amount was not challenged or changed by the petitioner uptil Supreme Court of Pakistan. However, the trial Court gave the power to the Department that the amount can be recalculated and directed the XEN to reevaluate the same, if so desired, otherwise it will be presumed that disputed amount was Rs.4,75,000. This direction of the Court had not been complied with by the petitioner and failed to recalculate the amount claimed by the respondent. So much so, the amount was not re-examined during hearing of the appeal therefore, no illegality had been committed by two Courts below, presuming the disputed amount as Rs.4,75,000 which was determined by the petitioner itself while filing the first appeal against order.
10. As to the other ground of learned counsel for the petitioner that no separate order-sheet was prepared by the trial Court while making the award as rule of Court, section 17 of the Arbitration Act envisaged that:-- "Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for consideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award."
Considering the above referred provision of law, it transpired that decree in terms of award could be passed only when Court finds no cause to remit the award. Before making award rule of the Court, it would be obligatory to examine basic and inherent infirmities of award apparent on record and after satisfying itself about its legality and propriety to pass final order.
11. Decree on the basis of award has no independent existence as it does not proceed upon determination of any controversial question except award itself. When award is upheld decree would be a necessary consequence. Decree being integral part of arbitration proceedings, and relatable to affirmed award, it would not be open to challenge merely because it happened to be an order of the Court.
12. When an award announced by the `Arbitrator' is vetted by the Court it shall be converted into a decree in which case the award would cease to exist as an independent cause of action. All the right of the parties would thereafter be enforceable under the decree and not under the award.
After the award merges in the decree, the award becomes for all purposes nonexistent as a source of title or rights between the parties and there will therefore no longer be any distinction between a decree passed in a suit and a decree passed on the basis of an award and a decree can be passed in terms of an award and that could be executed.
13. Where the disputes between the parties are referred by agreement to arbitration and the Arbitrator files the award in Court and no order is made for remitting the award to the consideration of the arbitrator nor is the award set aside, the award remains filed in Court and it is enforceable as if it was a decree of the Court. Reference in this respect, can be made to the case of Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri and another v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarty (AIR 1933 Privy Council 61).
14. While making the award as rule of Court the award merges into a decree automatically and terms of award incorporated in the decree did not envisage preparation of a final decree and the decree passed on award could be executed directly as laid down in case of Ratanlal v. Sm. Rukma Bai (AIR 1955 Ajmer 43).
15. For the foregoing reasons, the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner being misconceived are repelled.
16. In view of the above discussion and relying upon the case-law referred to above, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the decisions rendered by the two Courts below, hence, this revision petition having no force is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.