' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, with the leave of the Court, has been filed to call in-question an order recorded by the High Court on April 5, 1995, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant, herein, was dismissed.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that `Khalsa' land measuring 4 Kanals, 8 Marlas comprising Survey No.395 situate in village Bhangoin, Tehsil Rawalakot, was sanctioned in favour of appellant as `Nautor' by the Collector Poonch vide his order dated February 20, 1990, on payment of Rs.8,800 as premium which was duly deposited by the appellant. Accordingly Mutation No.2189 was also sanctioned in favour of appellant. Feeling aggrieved with the order of Collector District Poonch, dated February 20, 1990, an appeal was preferred by respondent No.3 before Additional Commissioner Revenue which was accepted and the order of the transfer of proprietary rights of the disputed `Khalsa' land was set aside. The appellant filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue but failed. Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court which was also dismissed vide the impugned order. Hence this appeal.
3. Syed Mushtaq Hussain Shah Gillani, the learned counsel, appearing on behalf of appellant, argued that the appeal filed before the Additional Commissioner Revenue by respondent No. 3 was time-barred and thus, the same entailed its dismissal. The learned counsel maintained that the Additional Commissioner Revenue, Member, Board of Revenue and even the High Court accepted the contention of the appellant that appeal before the Additional Commissioner was time-barred but all the same held that no limitation was prescribed in the cases where the impugned orders were either illegal or beyond jurisdiction. In the aforesaid premises it was impressed upon the learned counsel that the view expressed by the Revenue Authorities and the High Court runs counter to the view expressed by this Court in the cases decided, wherein it was held that even in case of a void order an aggrieved person must seek remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. The learned counsel argued that the proprietary rights were transferred to the appellant according to law, as the land had been in his continuous possession since 1961, and the sanction was granted in accordance with the reports submitted by the subordinate Revenue staff and on the basis of No Objection Certificates issued in his favour from the relevant quarter. The learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of submissions made sought the indulgence of this Court for quashing the impugned order recorded by the High Court and the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities.
4. Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Qureshi, the learned counsel for respondent No.3, on the other hand, submitted with vehemence that the objection with regard to the appeal being time-barred before Additional Commissioner Revenue was neither agitated nor argued by the appellant and as such the objection raised at a latter stage shall be deem:A to have been waived. The learned counsel maintained that the order passed by the Collector, District Rawalakot dated February 20, 1990, granting the regularization of `Nautor' land in favour of appellant was passed in violation of the provisions of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Khalsa Waste Land and Shamlat Deh (Amendment Act) 1989 hereinafter to be referred as the Act); as such it was patently illegal and without jurisdictional competence. The learned counsel maintained that the copy of Girdawari relied upon by the appellant in support of his possession appears to be a fabricated document and no reliance could be placed on that. The learned counsel explained that the possession of appellant was recorded in the Khasra Girdawri for the first time in the year 1961 but this change made in the Girdawari was not entered in the daily register maintained by the Patwari of the area concerned. Had the possession of the appellant been continuous, there was no need for again entering his possession in the Girdawari of the year 1989. Moreover, the reports of the subordinate Revenue staff were contradictory in nature. The learned Member Revenue, Board at the time of hearing the revision petition sent Tehsildar concerned for spot inspection and for submission of his report, who reported that Khasra No.395 is partly occupied by Girls Middle School's building of Bhangoin, whereas in Khasra No.394 which is adjacent to Khasra No.395 there exists a building of Girls Middle School. The learned counsel emphasized that since the portion of building is situate in Khasra No.395 so it is obvious that this land was required for the expansion of the school building.
According to the learned counsel for the respondents a land which is required or likely to be required for public purpose cannot be regularized in favour of any body. The learned counsel strenuously contended that the impugned order recorded by the High Court and orders passed by the Revenue Authorities call for no interference by this Court.
5. We have heard the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record made available with care. In our view the findings recorded by the High Court as well as by the Member Revenue, Board that in cases of illegal orders, the consideration of limitation is immaterial, is not warranted by law. This Court has held in various cases that even the void orders are subject to the law of limitation provided the same are challenged by an aggrieved person within a reasonable time. Out of many cases it is deemed expedient to quote here the case of "Mirza Lal Hussain v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and others" 1992 M LD 1280, wherein it was opined by this Court at page 1287 that "these judgments do lay down the proposition canvassed by Ch. Muhammad Sharif Tariq that there is no limitation so far as a void order is concerned. However, it is not a universal rule which may be necessarily applied in every case without regard to the consequences. While this rule would apply to cases where a person who is adversely affected by such an order does not come to know of its existence and has had no occasion to challenge that order. There is no warrant for the conclusion that a void order should be left unchallenged. If a person comes to know of a void order which adversely affects him but still he does not challenge it within a reasonable time the Courts may validly refuse to ignore it on the ground of laches, acquiescence or estoppel."
6. The order recorded by the Collector, District Poonch dated February 20, 1990, in our view is not a void order but is an illegal order for which the provisions of Limitation Act are fully attracted. In this view of the matter the findings recorded by the High Court as well as the Member, Board of Revenue that no limitation applies to illegal orders is not warranted by law. However we for our own satisfaction felt it advised to call for the record from the office of Additional Revenue Commissioner, Muzaffarabad Division . After perusal of the record we found that in para. No.1 of the Memo. Of appeal it was specifically mentioned by respondent No.3 that the order recorded by Collector Poonch dated February 20, 1990 was ex parte and it came in his knowledge on March, 9, 1991. The Memo. Of appeal is duly supported by an affidavit of the respondent. The appeal was filed before the Additional Revenue Commissioner on March 20, 1991. Respondent No.3 specifically pleaded that since the order of Collector was passed on his back; so the limitation may be condoned and the appeal be treated within time. This averment made in the Memo. Of appeal duly supported by an affidavit was not controverted by the appellant and neither Member, Board of Revenue nor the High Court adverted to this assertion of the respondent and his explanation for the delay in filing the appeal. In our view the explanation furnished by respondent No.3 in his memo. Of appeal before the Additional Revenue Commissioner is cogent and satisfactory, so we treat the appeal before the Additional Revenue Commissioner within time. Thus the objection taken by the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to limitation is hereby repelled.
7. Coming to the merits of the case we may observe that both the Additional Revenue Commissioner and Member, Board of Revenue came to the conclusion that the entries made in Khasra Girdawari in favour of appellant, showing his possession, are not entered in the daily register maintained by the Patwari of the area concerned, so it cannot be considered to be a valid document. It may be pointed ou that in the Khasra Girdawari produced by the appellant before 1961, in the column of possession, the entry shown as "Maqbooza Malkan" and the same was change,' and the entry in the name of appellant was recorded in the year 1961, but this change was not entered in the daily register maintained by the local Patwari.
' The cardinal rule is that any change effected in Khasra Girdawari is duly entered in the relevant column of Khasra Girdawari. Similarly had the possession of appellant been continuous on the disputed land, there seems to be no point in entering again and showing the possession of appellant in the year 1989. The above factor leads us to the conclusion that Khasra Girdawari relied upon by the appellant in support of his possession does not support the case of appellant. The learned District Collector, Rawalakot by passing his order dated February 20, 1990, granting sanction of `Khalsa' land in favour of appellant travelled beyond the jurisdiction vested in him under the provisions of the Act . The learned Member, Board of Revenue before passing his order on the revision petition sent the Tehsildar concerned on the spot for spot inspection and submission of his report who after the spot inspection reported that No. Khasra 395, in accordance with the latest settlement record, is partly occupied by the building of Girls Middle School and in Khasra No.394 which is adjacent to Khasra No.395 fulfledged building of Girls School exists. The learned Member, Board of Revenue also mentioned in his order that the objections on behalf of Girls School Authorities were submitted before Collector, Rawalakot, for requisition of the land in dispute for expansion of school building but without deciding the objections the Collector passed an order which is not in consonance with the law.
8. It may be clarified that proviso second of section 3(ii) of the Act reads as under:-- "3(i)xx xx xx xx xx xx xx (ii) xx xx xx xx xx xx xx Provided further that no such `Nautor' shall be regularized in respect of land likely to be required for any village common purpose.
' The above provision is indicative of the fact that the land which is likely to be required for any village common purpose cannot be regularized in favour of anybody but despite the fact that the land was required for the expansion of Girls School, it was sanctioned as `Nautor' in favour of appellant, which is a clear violation of the relevant law.
9. For the reasons stated above finding no force in this appeal, the same stands dismissed with costs.